Disturbance of greedy publishing to academia

Questionable publications have been accused of "greedy" practices; however, their influence on academia has not been gauged. Here, we probe the impact of questionable publications through a systematic and comprehensive analysis with various participants from academia and compare the results with those of their unaccused counterparts using billions of citation records, including liaisons, e.g., journals and publishers, and prosumers, e.g., authors. The analysis reveals that questionable publications embellished their citation scores by attributing publisher-level self-citations to their journals while also controlling the journal-level self-citations to circumvent the evaluation of journal-indexing services. This approach makes it difficult to detect malpractice by conventional journal-level metrics. We propose journal-publisher-hybrid metric that help detect malpractice. We also demonstrate that the questionable publications had a weaker disruptiveness and influence than their counterparts. This indicates the negative effect of suspicious publishers in the academia. The findings provide a basis for actionable policy making against questionable publications.Comment: 16 pages of main text including 4 figures + 32 pages of supplementary information including 30 supplementary figure

A characteristic analysis of ergonomic console layout studies using optimization techniques

22kc

Chaos and unpredictability in evolution of cooperation in continuous time

Cooperators benefit others with paying costs. Evolution of cooperation crucially depends on the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, denoted as c. In thiswork, we investigate the infinitely repeated prisoner&apos;s dilemma for various values of c with four of the representative memory-one strategies, i.e., unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, tit-for-tat, and win-stay-lose-shift. We consider replicator dynamics which deterministically describes how the fraction of each strategy evolves over time in an infinite-sized well-mixed population in the presence of implementation error and mutation among the four strategies. Our finding is that this three-dimensional continuous-time dynamics exhibits chaos through a bifurcation sequence similar to that of a logistic map as c varies. If mutation occurs with rate mu << 1, the position of the bifurcation sequence on the c axis is numerically found to scale as mu << 0.1, and such sensitivity to mu suggests that mutation may have nonperturbative effects on evolutionary paths. It demonstrates how the microscopic randomness of the mutation process can be amplified to macroscopic unpredictability by evolutionary dynamics.111Nsciescopu

Chaos and unpredictability in evolution of cooperation in continuous time

Cooperators benefit others with paying costs. Evolution of cooperation crucially depends on the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, denoted as c. In thiswork, we investigate the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma for various values of c with four of the representative memory-one strategies, i.e., unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, tit-for-tat, and win-stay-lose-shift. We consider replicator dynamics which deterministically describes how the fraction of each strategy evolves over time in an infinite-sized well-mixed population in the presence of implementation error and mutation among the four strategies. Our finding is that this three-dimensional continuous-time dynamics exhibits chaos through a bifurcation sequence similar to that of a logistic map as c varies. If mutation occurs with rate muPeer reviewe