A Short-term Intervention for Long-term Fairness in the Labor Market

The persistence of racial inequality in the U.S. labor market against a general backdrop of formal equality of opportunity is a troubling phenomenon that has significant ramifications on the design of hiring policies. In this paper, we show that current group disparate outcomes may be immovable even when hiring decisions are bound by an input-output notion of "individual fairness." Instead, we construct a dynamic reputational model of the labor market that illustrates the reinforcing nature of asymmetric outcomes resulting from groups' divergent accesses to resources and as a result, investment choices. To address these disparities, we adopt a dual labor market composed of a Temporary Labor Market (TLM), in which firms' hiring strategies are constrained to ensure statistical parity of workers granted entry into the pipeline, and a Permanent Labor Market (PLM), in which firms hire top performers as desired. Individual worker reputations produce externalities for their group; the corresponding feedback loop raises the collective reputation of the initially disadvantaged group via a TLM fairness intervention that need not be permanent. We show that such a restriction on hiring practices induces an equilibrium that, under particular market conditions, Pareto-dominates those arising from strategies that statistically discriminate or employ a "group-blind" criterion. The enduring nature of equilibria that are both inequitable and Pareto suboptimal suggests that fairness interventions beyond procedural checks of hiring decisions will be of critical importance in a world where machines play a greater role in the employment process.Comment: 10 page

Traffic-Aware Transmission Mode Selection in D2D-enabled Cellular Networks with Token System

We consider a D2D-enabled cellular network where user equipments (UEs) owned by rational users are incentivized to form D2D pairs using tokens. They exchange tokens electronically to "buy" and "sell" D2D services. Meanwhile the devices have the ability to choose the transmission mode, i.e. receiving data via cellular links or D2D links. Thus taking the different benefits brought by diverse traffic types as a prior, the UEs can utilize their tokens more efficiently via transmission mode selection. In this paper, the optimal transmission mode selection strategy as well as token collection policy are investigated to maximize the long-term utility in the dynamic network environment. The optimal policy is proved to be a threshold strategy, and the thresholds have a monotonicity property. Numerical simulations verify our observations and the gain from transmission mode selection is observed.Comment: 7 pages, 6 figures. A shorter version is submitted to EUSIPC