Eliana Yi, Piano

Prelude and Fugue in C# minor BWV 849 / J. S. Bach; Fantasiestücke Op. 12 / Robert Schumann; Pour le Piano L. 95 / Claude Debussy; Etude in C# minor Op. 33 no. 8 / Segei Rachmininof

Traditional Chinese acupuncture does not improve outcomes from post-stroke motor rehabilitation

Sze FK, Wong E, Yi X and Woo J (2002): Does acupuncture have additional value to standard poststroke motor rehabilitation

Junior Recital: Andrew J. Yi, Percussion

This recital is presented in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree Bachelor of Music in Music Performance. Mr. Yi studies percussion with John Lawless.https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/musicprograms/2286/thumbnail.jp

Correcting Things as Correcting Feelings: A Phenomenological Study of Wang Yang-ming’s Doctrine of Ge-Wu

This article is designed to offer a phenomenological reading of Wang Yang-ming’s (王陽明) doctrine of ge-wu (格物), which, as a part of Wang radical reading of The Great Learning (Da-Xue 大學), distinguishes his doctrine from that of Zhu Xi (朱熹). Wang argues that ge-wu, as rectifying things, is the same process with the act of cheng-yi (誠意), in which yi (意) and wu (物) form a relation of intentionality in Edmund Husserl’s sense. Since for Wang, what can be made sincere are emotional yi such as liking and disliking, Husserl\u27s phenomenology on emotional intentionality will be used in this article. The emotional intentionality is the unity of emotional noeses and valued noemata. For Wang, ge-wu is to change a wu improperly valued into a proper one, which is the same process of rectifying an immoral yi into a moral one

Emotional Attachment and Its Limits: Mengzi, Gaozi and the Guodian Discussions

Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi 義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi's interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi's view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a motivational role. I set out yi's complexity in these discussions, highlighting its implications for (i) the nei-wai debate; (ii) the notion of yi as "rightness," or doing the right thing; and (iii) how we can understand the connection between virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views on Warring States Confucian intellectual history. In the well-known debate between Mengzi and Gaozi in Mencius 6A, Mengzi maintained that both ren and yi are naturally-given 1 in human nature. The figure 1 To say that ren and yi are naturally-given is not to say that they are fully-developed from the start. I use the phrase "naturally-given" throughout the paper to indicate where a particular capacity or resource (ren or yi) may be found, rather than its final polished state