What Do Unions Do About Appearance Codes?

In contrast, Renee Gaud and Trisha Hart worked as cocktail servers at the Borgata Hotel Casino and Spa in Atlantic City, New Jersey.8 Unlike Darlene Jespersen, they were union employees represented by the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union, Local 54, and thus were not at-will workers.9 Gaud, Hart, and other employees objected to a new Borgata policy prohibiting cocktail servers and bartenders from gaining more than seven percent of their body weight as determined by a baseline set when the policy was instituted.10 Gaud and Hart challenged the policy in New Jersey state court on the grounds that it constituted unlawful discrimination against women under New Jersey law.11 However, because Borgata cocktail servers and bartenders are represented by a union, they had another avenue available to challenge Borgata\u27s policy. Second, assuming a union and an employer have successfully executed a collective bargaining agreement, the employer may not modify any provision of that agreement involving a mandatory subject for the life of the contract without the union\u27s consent or a waiver of the union\u27s right to bargain over the issue.17 For example, in Public Service Co.,18 the employer, a utility company, had a collective bargaining relationship for over fifty years with a union representing its electrical and water transmission, distribution, and production employees.19 The most recent agreement provided specifically that union employees were not required to wear uniforms.20 However, without bargaining with the union, the employer announced a new uniform policy that stated in part [w]earing of approved uniform clothing items shall be mandatory as a condition of employment

Salvaging the Opportunity: A Response to Professor Clark

In this Article, Professor Yelnosky responds to Professor Clark\u27s critique of his previous article, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs. Professor Yelnosky first clarifies that Professor Clark has adopted several of the points Professor Yelnosky originally made in his earlier article. He then responds to the portions of Professor Clark\u27s article that challenge his prior conclusions. He builds on and defends his previous arguments that: (1) testing is best suited to uncover hiring discrimination for lower-skilled jobs; (2) disincentives to bringing tester lawsuits make it unwise to rely on private parties and organizations to use testers sufficiently; (3) the EEOC currently lacks the statutory authority to engage in or fund testing for employment discrimination; and (4) Congress should amend Title VII to expressly authorize EEOC participation in testing. Professor Yelnosky discusses the Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIPJ as a potential model statutory framework. FHIP authorized the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to fund testing by private groups and individuals and has proven to be an effective and popular program for combatting housing discrimination