Transboundary Pollution and Welfare Effects of Technology Transfer

The purpose of this paper is to examine the welfare effects of pollution abatement technology transfer in a two-good two-country model with transboundary pollution. In each country, one industry emits pollution as a joint product of output and the sum of domestic and cross-border pollution decreases productivity of the other industry. Then, we show that technology transfer can bene?t the recipient country regardless of the level of cross-border pollution. Moreover, the donor country gains from technology transfer if all pollution is transboundary but it may harm the donor country with out cross-border pollution. We demonstrate that the effects of technology transfer depend on the trade pattern as well as cross-border pollution. Keywords: Environment; Pollution; Technology transfer; Pareto-improving transfer JEL classi?cation: D62; F18; O39

On Efficiency of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) through Reduction of Vessels

This paper theoretically examines whether an individual transferable quotas (ITQs) regime can achieve the long-run efficiency through the reduction of vessel numbers. Assuming the existence of two types of vessels in terms of their scales, we consider not only quota transactions but also the exit of fishers. Changes in vessel sizes of incumbent fishers are also taken into consideration. We find that when large-scale vessels are more efficient than small-scale vessels, the long-run efficiency is achieved only with an ITQ regime. However, when small-scale vessels are more efficient than large-scale vessels, the long-run efficiency is not achieved; the number of vessels becomes too few compared to when the total harvesting cost is minimized.Efficient fishery, fishery management, individual transferable quotas, quota transaction, vessel scale.

Shared Renewable Resource and International Trade: Technical measures for fisheries management

We examine trade and strategic interaction between countries that enforce technical measures for fisheries management (e.g., restrictions on fishing gears, vessels, areas and time) when countries share access to a common resource stock. Although technical measures are important as basic management tools, compliance with such measures makes it more costly for the fishermen to catch a certain quantity of fish. We show that under bilateral management, the resource exporting country gains from trade, whereas trade causes the steady state utility to fall in the resource importing country because the resource exporting country implements non-cooperative resource management when demand for a harvest is not so high. Under sufficiently high demand for a harvest, maximum sustainable yield can be attained after trade by what we call cooperative management; a situation in which both countries are better off. Under low demand for a harvest, trade benefits the resource importing country but may harm the resource exporting country regardless of whether it implements strict resource management or not.

Shared Renewable Resource and International Trade: Technical Measures for Resource Management

We examine trade and strategic interaction between countries that enforce technical measures for resource management which restricts capacity of exploitation to protect an internationally shared renewable resource. The technical measures are common management tools in fisheries (e.g., restrictions on gears, vessels, areas and time). We show that under bilateral resource management, the resource exporting country gains from trade, whereas trade causes steady state utility to fall in the resource importing country because the resource exporting country implements non-cooperative management when the demand for the harvest is not so high. Under sufficiently high demand for the harvest, maximum sustainable yield (MSY) can be attained after trade by what we call cooperative management and both countries are better off. Under low demand for the harvest, trade benefits the resource importing country but may harm the resource exporting country although it implements strict resource management which leads to MSY.

Efficiency of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) Systems and Input and Stock Controls

This paper examines whether or not the number of fishers is optimal under an Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) program. We consider two cases on the structure of the quota market: (1) cases in which all fishers are price takers, and (2) cases in which large-scale fishers have market power. When all fishers are price takers in the quota market, the social optimum is likely to be achieved given the total allowable catch (TAC) level. On the other hand, when low-cost fishers have market power in the quota market, the inefficiency may be serious: excess entry of low-cost fishers and insufficient exit of high-cost fishers may take place. Moreover, we demonstrate that vessel controls and stock targeting may work for an ITQ program.

Technological change and international interaction in environmental policies

This paper considers the impact of differences in endogenous technological change between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic interaction in environmental policies. First, we demonstrate that an environmentally lagging country's technology may continue to advance through a learning-by-doing effect until it exceeds the environmental friendliness of a leading country that initially had the cleanest technology (i.e., environmental leapfrogging could occur). Whether a country eventually becomes an environmentally leading country depends on the country size and its awareness of environmental quality. Second, we find that global emissions fluctuate despite the fact that environmental technology advances in both countries. Global emissions eventually become constant because both countries cease to tighten environmental regulations when their technologies are sufficiently clean. The final emissions might be larger than emissions in early stages of adjustment under dirty technologies. If environmental leapfrogging frequently occurs, both countries possess similarly clean technologies, thereby reducing long-term global pollution

Technological change and international interaction in environmental policies

This paper considers the impact of differences in endogenous technological change between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic interaction in environmental policies. First, we demonstrate that an environmentally lagging country's technology may continue to advance through a learning-by-doing effect until it exceeds the environmental friendliness of a leading country that initially had the cleanest technology (i.e., environmental leapfrogging could occur). Whether a country eventually becomes an environmentally leading country depends on the country size and its awareness of environmental quality. Second, we find that global emissions may increase despite the fact that environmental technology advances in both countries. Global emissions eventually become constant because both countries cease to tighten environmental regulations when their technologies are sufficiently clean. The final emissions might be larger than emissions in early stages of adjustment under dirty technologies. If environmental leapfrogging frequently occurs, both countries possess similarly clean technologies, thereby reducing long-term global pollution

Learning by Doing and International Interaction in Environmental Policies

This paper considers the impact of differences in endogenous technological change between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic interaction in environmental policies. A country that initially has a dirty technology (an environmentally lagging country) reduces more pollution emissions by imposing a higher rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emission, although it may generate larger total emissions. The more a country reduces pollutants, the more it learns how to produce in an environmentally friendly manner at low cost. The main finding is that an environmentally lagging country's technology may continue to advance through a learning-by-doing effect until it exceeds the environmental friendliness of a leading country that initially had the cleanest technology. Whether a country eventually becomes an environmentally leading country depends on the country size and its awareness of environmental quality

Learning by Doing and Strategic Interaction in Environmental Policies in a Two-country Model

This paper considers the impact of differences in endogenous technological change between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic interaction in environmental policies. A country that initially has a dirty technology (an environmentally lagging country) reduces more pollution emissions by imposing a higher rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emission, although it may generate larger total emissions. The more a country reduces pollutants, the more it learns how to produce in an environmentally friendly manner at low cost. The main finding is that an environmentally lagging country's technology may continue to advance through a learning-by-doing effect until it exceeds the environmental friendliness of a leading country that initially had the cleanest technology. Whether a country eventually becomes an environmentally leading country depends on the country size and its awareness of environmental quality