How Democracy could foster Economic Growth: The Last 200 Years

In this paper we explore current understandings of the influence of political rights, among historical legacies, on economic development. We construct variables for selected political regimes for 1811-2010. We find significant association between individual rights and economic growth. We argue that current understanding of political regimes supportive of growth (Acemoglu, etc), should parse the concept of property rights to include the protection of the individual in their focus on private property rights protection, alone, respected in various forms of government, are insufficient; what matters is the security of individuals from arbitrary arrest, regardless of “type of regime”. Discretionary rights of rulers or democratic governments to arrest citizens undermines the protection of private property rights and other attributes classically given to democratic foundations of economic growth, for example, free press, freedom of the exercise of religious belief. We suggest, as a research agenda, that the power of the politically competitive system therefore comes from weakening discretionary authority over law enforcemen

Russia: Political and Institutional Determinants of Economic Reforms

The purpose of this study is to analyze the course, determinants and political economy of economic reforms in Russia conducted in the period 1985-2003. The year 1985 can be considered an important turning point in Soviet/Russian history, marked as it was by the election of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) and (de facto) leader of the USSR. This nomination brought an end to two decades of political consolidation of the communist regime connected with the name of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and his short living successors (Yurii Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko), often referred to ex post as 'the stagnation period' (vremya zastoya). Gorbachev initiated a series of important political and (to a lesser extent) economic reforms, which led eventually to the collapse of the communist regime and the disintegration of the Soviet empire in 1991. Thus, 1991 must be seen as another dramatic turning point in Russia's contemporary history. From the end of 1991 onwards political and economic reforms have been carried out by the new Russian state that emerged after the disintegration of the USSR. This paper aims to explain the political and institutional determinants of economic reforms in the Russian Federation. It has been carried out under the Global Research Project on 'Understanding Reforms' organized and financed by the Global Development Network (GDN)1 as one of 30 country studies covering a broad set of developing and transition economies. It presents the project's intermediate results and will be the subject of further discussion as well as analytical and editorial work in the near future. The case of Russia is very important and interesting from the point of view of GRP 'Understanding Reforms' goals and agenda, for many reasons. First, all transitions from communist regimes and centrally-planned economies to democratic capitalism represent a much more complex, complicated and difficult reform experience than policy reforms observed in developing countries, especially when they relate to just one or a few specific policy areas. Thus, learning the transition experience, particularly in its early phase, can provide an extremely valuable empirical input to 'understanding reform' and provide answers to the project's key questions: 'why reform?', 'what reform?', and 'how well did the reform perform?'economic reforms, transition, Russia, reform sequencing, political reforms, institutional reforms, political economy.

Institutions, democracy and growth in the very long run

We tested the hypothesis of the political basis for economic rights and constructed our own variables of political regimes’ classification for the years 1820–2000. We found significant positive interdependencies between democracy indicators and economic growth. The protection of private property rights requires, first and foremost, due guarantees for personal immunity. Discretionary arrests and property seizures undermine any formal guarantees of private property, low taxation benefits, etc. Personal immunity should be defended even for “unpleasant” persons or for the possible political opponents of the country’s ruler

Political and Legal Factors of Economic Growth in Russian Regions

The authors propose some new approaches in order to evaluate formally regional specifics of political and legal culture and institutes' impact on the dynamics of economic development of the regions and on the regions' investment climate. They demonstrate using a model that the influence of institutional factors, including some indicators for the basic individual rights maintenance in the regions, on economic growth is significant.