Non-Obviousness and Complementary Innovations

This paper explores which patent policy should be applied to complementary innovations that are aggregated into broader technologies. I compare a setting in which complementary innovations must be bundled prior to patenting, with a second setting in which they can be patented separately. The first setting can improve static efficiency by avoiding the costs resulting from the scattering of complementary patents. But it also limits the disclosure of small innovations, which may lead to inefficient R&D cost duplications. A model capturing these effects shows that patenting complementary innovations separately is not efficient when innovations can be developed rapidly. This result justifies the enforcement of a severe “inventive step” or “non-obviousness” requirement in sectors where complementary innovations are frequent.Innovation; Brevet; R&D; Complementarité

Decentralized licensing of complementary patents: Comparing the royalty, fixed-fee and two-part tariff regimes

This paper explores the decentralized licensing of complementary patents reading on a technology standard. We develop a model in which manufacturers must buy licenses from different patent owners in order to enter the market for differentiated standard-compliant products. We consider three different types of licensing, namely, the fixed-fee, per-unit royalty and two-part tariff regimes, and compare their performances in terms of licensing revenue, price, product variety and welfare. We show that each regime entails different types of coordination failures. We establish that each of them may maximize the licensing revenue depending on the number of licensors, number of potential entrants and product differentiation.Standard; Licence; Patent; Royalty; License; Complementary innovations

Copyright versus Patents: the Open Source Software Legal Battle

Open Source Software is often viewed as an anti-intellectual property regime. By contrast, we argue how IP law is at the heart of open source model since licenses that organize the innovation and business relationships between developers, distributors and end-users are based on copyright law. The proliferation of software patents can, however be seen as a threat for the development and deployment of open source software. We present the nature of the threat and review a series of initiatives undertaken by the open source community to address them effectively. These initiatives, such as the redesign of licenses and the creation of patent commons, are a testiment to a genuinely creative use of IP law by the open source community, not its undermining.Open Source Software; Patent; Hold-Up; Copyright; Copyleft; Intellectual Property

Technology standards, patents and antitrust

From the perspective of antitrust authorities, the multiplication of patents embodied in technology standards is a source of concerns. Certainly it is necessary and efficient that patents owners derive a revenue from the use of the standard. Yet by their function - ensuring compatibility between different products by promoting a common technology platform in a particular industry - standards generate potential for market power far beyond the legal protection conferred by patents. Patent holders may thus be tempted to leverage their position to make illegal profits. Such concerns arise in two different cases that have fueled antitrust debates and economic research during the last decade. On the one hand, patent owners may be tempted to collude by coordinating their licensing policies. The difficulty here is that some coordination between them within a patent pool may actually be pro-competitive. After a brief introduction, we explain in the first part why, and on what conditions, patent pools should be accepted by antitrust authorities. On the other hand, patent owners may be tempted to manipulate the standard setting process by waiting for the wide adoption of the standard before charging excessive royalties to its users. We present this hold-up problem in the second part, and show how appropriate rules for standard setting processes can help mitigate it.Antitrust, Hold-up, Innovation, Licensing, Patent, Patent Pool, Royalty, Standard

Non-Obviousness and Complementary Innovations

I am grateful to the publisher, Elsevier, for letting the manuscript being archived in this Open Access repository.International audienceThis paper explores which patent policy should be applied to complementary innovations that are aggregated into broader technologies. I compare a setting in which complementary innovations must be bundled prior to patenting, with a second setting in which they can be patented separately. The first setting can improve static efficiency by avoiding the costs resulting from the scattering of complementary patents. But it also limits the disclosure of small innovations, which may lead to inefficient R&D cost duplications. A model capturing these effects shows that patenting complementary innovations separately is not efficient when innovations can be developed rapidly. This result justifies the enforcement of a severe “inventive step” or “non-obviousness” requirement in sectors where complementary innovations are frequent

Technology transfer by CDM projects: A comparison of Brazil, China, India and Mexico

In a companion paper [Dechezleprêtre, A., Glachant, M., Ménière, Y., 2008. The Clean Development Mechanism and the international diffusion of technologies: An empirical study, Energy Policy 36, 1273–1283], we gave a general description of technology transfers by Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects and we analyzed their drivers. In this paper, we use the same data and similar econometric models to explain inter-country differences. We focus on 4 countries gathering about 75% of the CDM projects: Brazil, China, India and Mexico. Sixty eight percent of Mexican projects include an international transfer of technology. The rates are, respectively, 12%, 40% and 59% for India, Brazil and China. Our results show that transfers to Mexico and Brazil are mainly related to the strong involvement of foreign partners and good technological capabilities. Besides a relative advantage with respect to these factors, the higher rate of international transfers in Mexico seems to be due to a sector-composition effect. The involvement of foreign partners is less frequent in India and China, where investment opportunities generated by fast growing economies seem to play a more important role in facilitating international technology transfers through the CDM. International transfers are also related to strong technology capabilities in China. In contrast, the lower rate of international transfer (12%) in India may be due to a better capability to diffuse domestic technologies.

The Clean Development Mechanism and the International Diffusion of Technologies: An Empirical Study

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is expected to stimulate the North-South transfer of climate-friendly technologies. This paper provides an assessment of the technology transfers that take place through the CDM using a unique data set of 644 registered projects. It provides a detailed description of the transfers (frequency, type, by sector, by host country, etc.). It also includes an econometric analysis of their drivers. We show that transfer likeliness increases with the size of the projects. The transfer probability is 50% higher in projects implemented in a subsidiary of Annex 1 companies while the presence of an official credit buyer has a lower – albeit positive – impact. The analysis also yields interesting results on how technological capabilities of the host country influence technology diffusion in the CDM.Kyoto Protocol, Clean Development Mechanism, International Technology Transfer

Copyright versus Patents: the Open Source Software Legal Battle

International audienceOpen Source Software is often viewed as an anti-intellectual property regime. By contrast, we argue how IP law is at the heart of open source model since licenses that organize the innovation and business relationships between developers, distributors and end-users are based on copyright law. The proliferation of software patents can, however be seen as a threat for the development and deployment of open source software. We present the nature of the threat and review a series of initiatives undertaken by the open source community to address them effectively. These initiatives, such as the redesign of licenses and the creation of patent commons, are a testiment to a genuinely creative use of IP law by the open source community, not its undermining

The Clean Development Mechanism and the International Diffusion of Technologies: An Empirical Study

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is expected to stimulate the North-South transfer of climate-friendly technologies. This paper provides an assessment of the technology transfers that take place through the CDM using a unique data set of 644 registered projects. It provides a detailed description of the transfers (frequency, type, by sector, by host country, etc.). It also includes an econometric analysis of their drivers. We show that transfer likeliness increases with the size of the projects. The transfer probability is 50% higher in projects implemented in a subsidiary of Annex 1 companies while the presence of an official credit buyer has a lower-albeit positive-impact. The analysis also yields interesting results on how technological capabilities of the host country influence technology diffusion in the CDM.Protocole de Kyoto; Mécanisme de Développement Propre; Transfert International de Technologie