15 research outputs found
Study on Evolution of China’s Construction Industry Based on Input-Output Analysis and Complex Network
Exploring the evolution of China’s construction industry is conducive to the formulation of industrial policies. The construction industry is associated with many industries. Hence, the policies formed according to internal evolution of the construction industry are easy to direct the industry toward an unfavourable direction. This study aims to analyze the evolution of construction industry based on the relationships between the construction industry and other industries. The pull coefficients and push coefficients of China’s construction industry during 2001-2015 were calculated based on the input-output table. Complex network topologies of industries were constructed, and network topologies were used to analyze the network centrality and the cohesive subgroups. The evolutionary trend of China’s construction industry in interactions with other industries was explored. Results show that the pull and push effects of China’s construction industry experience a sharp reduction. The construction industry has the inclination to be transformed from a pillar industry to an industry driven by other industries. The control of the construction industry in the network is weakened. In conclusion, using input-out analysis and complex network to study the evolution of China’s construction industry can consider interaction of different industries, and provide certain theoretical references to formulate reasonable policies
Boomerang Connectivity Table Revisited. Application to SKINNY and AES
The boomerang attack is a variant of differential cryptanalysis which regards a block cipher E as the composition of two sub-ciphers, i.e., E = E1 o E0, and which constructs distinguishers for E with probability p2q2 by combining differential trails for E0 and E1 with probability p and q respectively. However, the validity of this attack relies on the dependency between the two differential trails. Murphy has shown cases where probabilities calculated by p2q2 turn out to be zero, while techniques such as boomerang switches proposed by Biryukov and Khovratovich give rise to probabilities greater than p2q2. To formalize such dependency to obtain a more accurate estimation of the probability of the distinguisher, Dunkelman et al. proposed the sandwich framework that regards E as Ẽ1 o Em o Ẽ0, where the dependency between the two differential trails is handled by a careful analysis of the probability of the middle part Em. Recently, Cid et al. proposed the Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT) which unifies the previous switch techniques and incompatibility together and evaluates the probability of Em theoretically when Em is composed of a single S-box layer. In this paper, we revisit the BCT and propose a generalized framework which is able to identify the actual boundaries of Em which contains dependency of the two differential trails and systematically evaluate the probability of Em with any number of rounds. To demonstrate the power of this new framework, we apply it to two block ciphers SKINNY and AES. In the application to SKINNY, the probabilities of four boomerang distinguishers are re-evaluated. It turns out that Em involves5 or 6 rounds and the probabilities of the full distinguishers are much higher than previously evaluated. In the application to AES, the new framework is used to exclude incompatibility and find high probability distinguishers of AES-128 under the related-subkey setting. As a result, a 6-round distinguisher with probability 2−109.42 is constructed. Lastly, we discuss the relation between the dependency of two differential trails in boomerang distinguishers and the properties of components of the cipher
Boomerang Connectivity Table Revisited
The boomerang attack is a variant of differential cryptanalysis which regards a block cipher as the composition of two sub-ciphers, i.e., , and which constructs distinguishers for with probability by combining differential trails for and with probability and respectively. However, the validity of this attack relies on the dependency between the two differential trails. Murphy has shown cases where probabilities calculated by turn out to be zero, while techniques such as boomerang switches proposed by Biryukov and Khovratovich give rise to probabilities greater than . To formalize such dependency to obtain a more accurate estimation of the probability of the distinguisher, Dunkelman et al. proposed the sandwich framework that regards as , where the dependency between the two differential trails is handled by a careful analysis of the probability of the middle part . Recently, Cid et al. proposed the Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT) which unifies the previous switch techniques and incompatibility together and evaluates the probability of theoretically when is composed of a single S-box layer. In this paper, we revisit the BCT and propose a generalized framework which is able to identify the actual boundaries of which contains dependency of the two differential trails and systematically evaluate the probability of with any number of rounds. To demonstrate the power of this new framework, we apply it to two block ciphers SKNNY and AES. In the application to SKNNY, the probabilities of four boomerang distinguishers are re-evaluated. It turns out that involves 5 or 6 rounds and the probabilities of the full distinguishers are much higher than previously evaluated. In the application to AES, the new framework is used to exclude incompatibility and find high probability distinguishers of AES-128 under the related-subkey setting. As a result, a 6-round distinguisher with probability is constructed. Lastly, we discuss the relation between the dependency of two differential trails in boomerang distinguishers and the properties of components of the cipher
One-more Unforgeability of Blind ECDSA
In this paper, we give the first formal security analysis on the one-more unforgeability of blind ECDSA.
We start with giving a general attack on blind ECDSA, which is similar to the ROS attack on the blind Schnorr signature. We formulate the ECDSA-ROS problem to capture this attack.
Next, we give a generic construction of blind ECDSA based on an additive homomorphic encryption and a corresponding zero-knowledge proof. Our concrete instantiation is about 40 times more bandwidth efficient than the blind ECDSA in AsiaCCS 2019.
After that, we give the first formal proof of one-more unforgeability for blind ECDSA, under a new model called algebraic bijective random oracle. The security of our generic blind ECDSA relies on the hardness of a discrete logarithm-based interactive assumption and an assumption of the underlying elliptic curve.
Finally, we analyze the hardness of the ECDSA-ROS problem in the algebraic bijective random oracle model
MoNet: A Fast Payment Channel Network for Scriptless Cryptocurrency Monero
We propose MoNet, the first bi-directional payment channel network with unlimited lifetime for Monero. It is fully compatible with Monero without requiring any modification of the current Monero blockchain.
MoNet preserves transaction fungibility, i.e., transactions over MoNet and Monero are indistinguishable, and guarantees anonymity of Monero and MoNet users by avoiding any potential privacy leakage introduced by the new payment channel network.
We also propose a new crypto primitive, named Verifiable Consecutive One-way Function (VCOF). It allows one to generate a sequence of statement-witness pairs in a consecutive and verifiable way, and these statement-witness pairs are one-way, namely it is easy to compute a statement-witness pair by knowing any of the pre-generated pairs, but hard in an opposite flow. By using VCOF, a signer can produce a series of consecutive adaptor signatures CAS. We
further propose the generic construction of consecutive adaptor signature as an important building block of MoNet. We develop a proof-of-concept implementation for MoNet, and our evaluation shows that MoNet can reach the same transaction throughput as Lightning Network, the payment channel network for Bitcoin. Moreover, we provide a security analysis of MoNet under the Universal Composable (UC) security framework
Robust Publicly Verifiable Covert Security: Limited Information Leakage and Guaranteed Correctness with Low Overhead
Protocols with \emph{publicly verifiable covert (PVC) security} offer high efficiency and an appealing feature: a covert party may deviate from the protocol, but with a probability (\eg , referred to as the \emph{deterrence factor}), the honest party can identify this deviation and expose it using a publicly verifiable certificate. These protocols are particularly suitable for practical applications involving reputation-conscious parties.
However, in the cases where misbehavior goes undetected (\eg with a probability of ), \emph{no security guarantee is provided for the honest party}, potentially resulting in a complete loss of input privacy and output correctness.
In this paper, we tackle this critical problem by presenting a highly effective solution. We introduce and formally define an enhanced notion called \emph{robust PVC security}, such that even if the misbehavior remains undetected, the malicious party can only gain an additional -bit of information about the honest party\u27s input while maintaining the correctness of the output. We propose a novel approach leveraging \emph{dual execution} and \emph{time-lock puzzles} to design a robust PVC-secure two-party protocol with \emph{low overhead} (depending on the deterrence factor). For instance, with a deterrence factor of , our robust PVC-secure protocol incurs \emph{only additional overhead} compared to the state-of-the-art PVC-secure protocol.
Given the stronger security guarantees with low overhead, our protocol is highly suitable for practical applications of secure two-party computation
BlindHub: Bitcoin-Compatible Privacy-Preserving Payment Channel Hubs Supporting Variable Amounts
Payment Channel Hub (PCH) is a promising solution to the scalability issue of first-generation blockchains or cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. It supports off-chain payments between a sender and a receiver through an intermediary (called the tumbler). Relationship anonymity and value privacy are desirable features of privacy-preserving PCHs, which prevent the tumbler from identifying the sender and receiver pairs as well as the payment amounts. To our knowledge, all existing Bitcoin-compatible PCH constructions that guarantee relationship anonymity allow only a (predefined) fixed payment amount. Thus, to achieve payments with different amounts, they would require either multiple PCH systems or running one PCH system multiple times. Neither of these solutions would be deemed practical.
In this paper, we propose the first Bitcoin-compatible PCH that achieves relationship anonymity and supports variable amounts for payment. To achieve this, we have several layers of technical constructions, each of which could be of independent interest to the community. First, we propose , a novel bi-directional payment channel protocol for privacy-preserving payments, where {one of the channel parties} is unable to see the channel balances. Then, we further propose , a three-party (sender, tumbler, receiver) protocol for private conditional payments, where the tumbler pays to the receiver only if the sender pays to the tumbler. The appealing additional feature of BlindHub is that the tumbler cannot link the sender and the receiver while supporting a variable payment amount. To construct BlindHub, we also introduce two new cryptographic primitives as building blocks, namely (BAS), and . BAS is an adaptor signature protocol built on top of a blind signature scheme. Flexible Blind Conditional Signature is a new cryptographic notion enabling us to provide an atomic and privacy-preserving PCH. Lastly, we instantiate both BlindChannel and BlindHub protocols and present implementation results to show their practicality
Boomerang Connectivity Table Revisited. Application to SKINNY and AES
The boomerang attack is a variant of differential cryptanalysis which regards a block cipher E as the composition of two sub-ciphers, i.e., E = E1 o E0, and which constructs distinguishers for E with probability p2q2 by combining differential trails for E0 and E1 with probability p and q respectively. However, the validity of this attack relies on the dependency between the two differential trails. Murphy has shown cases where probabilities calculated by p2q2 turn out to be zero, while techniques such as boomerang switches proposed by Biryukov and Khovratovich give rise to probabilities greater than p2q2. To formalize such dependency to obtain a more accurate estimation of the probability of the distinguisher, Dunkelman et al. proposed the sandwich framework that regards E as Ẽ1 o Em o Ẽ0, where the dependency between the two differential trails is handled by a careful analysis of the probability of the middle part Em. Recently, Cid et al. proposed the Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT) which unifies the previous switch techniques and incompatibility together and evaluates the probability of Em theoretically when Em is composed of a single S-box layer. In this paper, we revisit the BCT and propose a generalized framework which is able to identify the actual boundaries of Em which contains dependency of the two differential trails and systematically evaluate the probability of Em with any number of rounds. To demonstrate the power of this new framework, we apply it to two block ciphers SKINNY and AES. In the application to SKINNY, the probabilities of four boomerang distinguishers are re-evaluated. It turns out that Em involves5 or 6 rounds and the probabilities of the full distinguishers are much higher than previously evaluated. In the application to AES, the new framework is used to exclude incompatibility and find high probability distinguishers of AES-128 under the related-subkey setting. As a result, a 6-round distinguisher with probability 2−109.42 is constructed. Lastly, we discuss the relation between the dependency of two differential trails in boomerang distinguishers and the properties of components of the cipher
Eigen decomposition expedites longitudinal genome-wide association studies for milk production traits in Chinese Holstein
Abstract Background Pseudo-phenotypes, such as 305-day yields, estimated breeding values or deregressed proofs, are usually used as response variables for genome-wide association studies (GWAS) of milk production traits in dairy cattle. Computational inefficiency challenges the direct use of test-day records for longitudinal GWAS with large datasets. Results We propose a rapid longitudinal GWAS method that is based on a random regression model. Our method uses Eigen decomposition of the phenotypic covariance matrix to rotate the data, thereby transforming the complex mixed linear model into weighted least squares analysis. We performed a simulation study that showed that our method can control type I errors well and has higher power than a longitudinal GWAS method that does not include time-varied additive genetic effects. We also applied our method to the analysis of milk production traits in the first three parities of 6711 Chinese Holstein cows. The analysis for each trait was completed within 1 day with known variances. In total, we located 84 significant single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) of which 65 were within previously reported quantitative trait loci (QTL) regions. Conclusions Our rapid method can control type I errors in the analysis of longitudinal data and can be applied to other longitudinal traits. We detected QTL that were for the most part similar to those reported in a previous study in Chinese Holstein. Moreover, six additional SNPs for fat percentage and 13 SNPs for protein percentage were identified by our method. These additional 19 SNPs could be new candidate quantitative trait nucleotides for milk production traits in Chinese Holstein