Regulation and Evolution of Harvesting Rules and Compliance in Common Pool Resources

The present paper models jointly the evolution of compliance to regulation and the evolution of the CPR stock in the context of an evolutionary process emerging from combining replicator dynamics, which describe the adoption of harvesting rules, with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach characterizes the emergence of steady-state equilibrium harvesting rules or compliance levels under regulation, and the corresponding behavior of the steady-state equilibrium resource stock. This evolutionary approach suggests that coexistence of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. It is shown that stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities, could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome for the level of compliance and the biomass stock. It is also shown that it is possible to modify regulation, by modifying penalties for regulatory violations, in order to attain full compliance equilibria and take the system out of low stock traps. It shown it might be easier for the regulator to obtain the full compliance if there is precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.Common pool resources, harvesting, regulation, replicator dynamics, compliance

Modeling Complex Systems

Abstract Empirical observations suggest that linear dynamics are not an adequate representa- tion of ecological systems and that a realistic representation would require adoption of complex nonlinear dynamical systems with characteristics encountered in complex adaptive systems (CAS). Adequate modelling should include and combine, among others, strategic interactions among economic agents, nonconvexities induced by non-linear feedbacks, separate spatial and temporal scales and modeling of spatiotempo-ral dynamics, and allowance of alternative time scales. Ignoring these characteristics might obscure very important features that we observe in reality such as bifurcations and irreversibilities or hysteresis. As a consequence, the design of policies that do not take CAS characteristics into account might lead to erroneous results and undesirable states of managed economic-ecological systems.Complex adaptive systems, differential games, spatiotemporal dynamics, fast-slow variables.

The Cost of Ambiguity and Robustness in International Pollution Control

This paper examines robustness in international pollution control emerg- ing from the regulator��s concerns regarding possible misspeci��cation of the natural system that is used to model pollution dynamics. Cooperative and noncooperative robust policy rules are determined along with the cost in terms of value loss of being robust relative to conventional policy rules.Ambiguity, Robustness, Precaution, Di¤erential games, Open Loop and Feedback Nash equilibrium

Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources

The paper jointly models the evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock, by combining replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules, with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that coexistence, in long run equilibrium, of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome for compliance and the biomass stock. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.Common pool resources (CPR), harvesting, regulation, replicator dynamics, compliance

Non-Cooperative Exercise Boundaries and Regulation under Uncertainty: The Case of Cost-Reducing R&D

This paper extends the concept of the exercise boundary as an analytical tool in determining when an optimizing agent might undertake an irreversible action under uncertainty. to situations where the objective function of optimizing agents depends on decisions taken by other agents. By using the case of cost redusing R&D in a fixed numbers oligopoly under demand and technological uncertainty, the exercise bounadaries and the corresponding optimal R&D accumulation paths are determined fot the non-cooperative, cooperative, and socially optimal cases. Comparison of the exercise boundaries makes possible the formulation of R&D policy in the form of subsidies.Uncertainty, Irreversibility, Exercise Boundary, Oligopoly, R&D

Environmental consciousness and moral hazard international agreements to protect the environment

A group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation to protect the environment are identified as environmentally-conscious countries. Conditions are examined under which they can provide self-financing side payments, to a second group of less environmentally-conscious countries, so that the two groups form a global or partial stable coalition that agrees to emit at the first-best global welfare optimum. A mechanism is also developed which must be incorporated into the agreement between the two groups, in order to induce all countries to emit at the desired level, even when global pollution has nonpoint source pollution characteristics

Uncertainty Aversion, Robust Control and Asset Holdings

Optimal portfolio rules are derived under uncertainty aversion by formulating the portfolio choice problem as a robust control problem. The robust portfolio rule indicates that the total holdings of risky assets as a proportion of the investor’s wealth could increase as compared to the holdings under the Merton rule, which is the standard risk aversion case. In particular, with two risky assets and one risk-free asset, we show that uncertainty aversion could lead to an increase in the holdings of the one risky asset, accompanied by a reduction in the holdings of the other risky asset. Furthermore, in the optimal robust portfolio the investor may increase the holdings of the asset for which there is or less ambiguity, and reduce the holdings of the asset for which there is more ambiguity, a result that might provide an explanation of the home bias puzzle.Uncertainty Aversion, Model Misspecification, Robust Control, Portfolio Choice Models

Total Factor Productivity Growth when Factors of Production Generate Environmental Externalities

Total factor productivity growth (TFPG) has been traditionally associated with technological change. We show that when a factor of production, such as energy, generates an environmental externality in the form of CO₂ emissions which is not internalized because of lack of environmental policy, then TFPG estimates could be biased. This is because the contribution of environment as a factor of production is not accounted for in the growth accounting framework. Empirical estimates confirm this hypothesis and suggest that part of what is regarded as technology's contribution to growth could be attributed to the use of environment in output production.Total Factor Productivity, Sources of Growth, Environmental Externalities, Energy, Environmental Policy