An Outlier-Robust Extreme Bounds Analysis of the Determinants of Health-Care Expenditure Growth

Hartwig (2008) has presented empirical evidence that the difference between real wage growth and productivity growth at the macroeconomic level is a robust explanatory variable for deflated health-care expenditure growth in OECD countries. In this paper, we test whether this finding is robust to the inclusion of additional covariates, applying different versions of Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) to data for 33 OECD countries over the period 1970-2010. As far as it is statistically feasible, all macroeconomic and institutional determinants of health-care expenditure growth that have been suggested in the literature are included in the EBA. Furthermore, we analyse to what extent outliers in the data influence the results using an outlier-robust MM estimator. Our results confirm Hartwig's earlier finding. A number of additional both covariate- and outlier-robust determinants are also identified

On Compulsory Voting and Income Inequality in a Cross-Section of Countries

This paper explores the link between compulsory voting and income distribution using a cross-section of countries around the world. Our empirical cross-country analysis for 91 countries during the period 1960-2000 shows that compulsory voting, when enforced strictly, improves income distribution, as measured by the Gini coefficient and the bottom income quintiles of the population. Our findings are robust to changes and additions to our benchmark specification. Since poorer countries suffer from relatively greater income inequality, it might make sense to promote such voting schemes in developing regions such as Latin America. This proposal assumes that bureaucratic costs related with design and implementation are not excessive

Structure and Development of Financial Institutions and Links with Trust: Cross-Country Evidence

We explore the links between trust and a broad range of financial structure and development measures. Our base sample is a cross section of 48 countries and the analysis covers the period 1980-1994. We use a new World Bank data set that provides the most comprehensive coverage of financial development and structure to this date. We find that trust is correlated with financial depth and efficiency as well as with stock market development. Results hold when using an instrumental variable approach, and they are robust to changes in specification when using a formal Sala-i-Martín sensitivity analysis

Inequality, Democracy, and Persistence: Is There a Political Kuznets Curve?

The aim of this paper is to provide comprehensive empirical evidence on recent theories that link democracy and income inequality for the period 1960-1995. In simple cross-country regressions I find a non-monotonic link between these two variables when using ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, and Eusufzai tests. Since these results cannot be taken as true time series findings, even though recent theories that explain such a link are, I also employ recent methods applied to dynamic models on panel data. These techniques allow accounting for potential simultaneity and heterogeneity problems. Using the preferred econometric methodology, I also find support for the existence of a political Kuznets curve. Moreover, it appears that income inequality is unconditionally persistent. Results hold for two different democracy proxies and when sensitivity analysis is applied

Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration

This paper explores the institutional determinants of economic growth in Latin America by taking advantage of recent empirical research that employs subjective and objective measures to test for a possible Northian explanation that links institutional quality and economic growth. I provide a framework that helps better understand the policymakers` choices and persistence regarding inward-looking policies that were pursued between the 1930s and the 1980s by arguing that in the Latin American case Olson`s (1982) idea of encompassing interest should be expanded to cover not only the economic stakes of power holders, but also, their political stakes, somewhat along the lines of work by Robinson (1997)