Allied special forces and prisoner of war recovery operations in Europe, 1944-1945

This article investigates the efforts made to protect prisoners of war (POWs) in German hands at the end of the Second World War. Challenging contemporary and historical judgments, it argues that Allied plans were reasonable, realistic, and reflected a widespread belief in the importance of protecting the lives and well-being of Allied POWs. Although only two operations were ultimately mounted, the process of raising and equipping specialized recovery units provided a valuable learning experience for Allied planners, which later went on inform recovery operations in the Pacific, and set a precedent that arguably extends to influence attitudes towards POW recovery today

Resilient Humanitarianism? Using Assemblage to re-evaluate the history of the League of Red Cross Societies

The League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) – known as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) since 1991 – has received little historical attention despite representing the world’s largest volunteer network and being an integral part of the Red Cross Movement. Formed in the aftermath of the First World War by the national Red Cross Societies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, the LRCS aspired to lead in the promotion of global public health and welfare during peacetime. Through the lens of assemblage thinking and the five assemblage elements of exteriority, capacity to evolve, internal machinery, open systems, and desire, the paper seeks to understand the longevity and resilient humanitarianism of the LRCS. In doing so, the paper provides a new conceptualisation of the LRCS that helps to explain how it survived in the rapidly changing and increasingly contested international humanitarian environment of the twentieth century

Resilient Humanitarianism? Using Assemblage to re-evaluate the history of the League of Red Cross Societies

The League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) – known as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) since 1991 – has received little historical attention despite representing the world’s largest volunteer network and being an integral part of the Red Cross Movement. Formed in the aftermath of the First World War by the national Red Cross Societies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, the LRCS aspired to lead in the promotion of global public health and welfare during peacetime. Through the lens of assemblage thinking and the five assemblage elements of exteriority, capacity to evolve, internal machinery, open systems, and desire, the paper seeks to understand the longevity and resilient humanitarianism of the LRCS. In doing so, the paper provides a new conceptualisation of the LRCS that helps to explain how it survived in the rapidly changing and increasingly contested international humanitarian environment of the twentieth century

Une évaluation du parcours de la Suisse en tant que puissance protectrice à « double mandat » pour le Royaume-Uni et l'Allemagne durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale

La Seconde Guerre mondiale représente le point culminant dans l’histoire de la protection de tiers. Jamais autant d’États et de personnes n’ont profité de la protection d’un tiers neutre, ni avant, ni depuis. Dans cette histoire, la Confédération suisse détient une place de choix. Les Suisses avaient déjà acquis une réputation de solidité pendant la Grande Guerre, mais cela avait également été le cas de l’Espagne, du Danemark, des États-Unis et de la Suède. En 1945 cependant, l’éventail des activités de Berne en tant que puissance protectrice – tenant plus de deux cents mandats avec trente-cinq États, dont toutes les grandes puissances belligérantes, sauf la Russie – et l’absence d’un rival sérieux signifiaient que Berne était devenu le premier fournisseur de protection politique, diplomatique et humanitaire dans le monde, même si, de toute évidence, les diplomates suisses ne réussirent pas à atteindre tous leurs objectifs : un tel résultat n’est guère surprenant étant donné la nature du conflit. Mais dans les domaines où Berne a été en mesure d’opérer, l’importance de son travail est indéniable. La protection de Berne sur les prisonniers de guerre britanniques et les internés civils aux mains de l’Axe après décembre 1941, au lendemain de l’entrée en guerre des États-Unis, s’avéra cruciale en assurant les sympathies ritanniques à la Suisse au moment où celle-ci dut faire face à une agression sur deux fronts de la part des États-Unis et de l’Union soviétique au cours des derniers mois de la guerre. Plus important encore, la diplomatie discrète de Berne entre les lignes de bataille fut essentielle pour encourager les Allemands à se conformer à la convention de Genève et pour maintenir le niveau de confiance nécessaire pour protéger les intérêts humanitaires britanniques – et allemands – au cours de la guerre

'An amateur learns his job'? Special operations executive in Portugal, 1940-42

During the first years of its existence, Special Operations Executive looked to neutral Europe as an area in which it could deploy its limited resources against German interests with a reasonable chance of success. By early 1942, however, it was clear that neutral Europe had failed to live up to SOE's expectations. Most of SOE's plans had either been aborted or cancelled. This article examines SOE's work in Portugal between early 1941 and summer 1942. During this period, SOE not only failed to achieve any of its objectives but also suffered the indignity of having its station in Lisbon exposed by the Portuguese and was ultimately forced to withdraw its officer from the country. The article argues that SOE's lack of success was due not so much to the practical difficulties it encountered in the field, or even the opposition of other departments in Whitehall, which did so much to blight its operations elsewhere in Europe, but to its failure to create a sustainable role within British political and military policies towards Portugal

Ungentlemanly Warriors or Unreliable Diplomats? Special Operations Executive and 'Irregular Political Activities' in Europe

This paper examines the development of SOE's 'irregular political activities'. It argues that SOE's approach to political warfare evolved considerably over the course of the war, partly as a response to changes in SOE's leadership, but primarily on account of its failure to carve a niche for itself within British diplomacy in Europe that did not 'threaten' the interests of the established government agencies in this area. Despite a recrudescence of its covert political work in the final year of the war, SOE was unable to persuade the political and military leadership of the benefits of conducting 'irregular political activities' in support of British diplomacy and as a consequence the legacy it was able to leave for Britain's post-war operations in this area was a meagre one

Marcel Pilet-Golaz, David Kelly and Anglo-Swiss Relations in 1940

First paragraph: Switzerland's Foreign Minister and Federal President for 1940, Marcel Pilet-Golaz, has held centre-stage in the historical record of Switzerland's wartime experience. Moving to the Swiss Federal Political Department (foreign ministry) in March 1940, Pilet stamped his character on Swiss foreign relations and successfully steered his country through the testing war years before retiring from political life five years later in December 1944. His personality and policies left him open to criticism from many different quarters, especially during the 12 months following the fall of France, when Switzerland's existence was most under threat. In many respects he personified the tensions gnawing away at Switzerland at the time. His defeatist radio broadcast to the nation on 25 June 1940, and his meeting with the Swiss fascist party on 10 September are taken as key moments in Switzerland's flirtation with Nazi Europe. At the same time, however, German documents reveal how faith in Pilet's collaborationist tendencies persuaded Berlin against forcing the pace and bringing about an enforced Gleichschaltung of Switzerland. Curiously, amongst the detailed scholarship on these events there has been no thorough analysis of how Britain viewed Switzerland's controversial Foreign Minister. This is a surprising omission. Despite the collapse of Britain's military presence on the continent, London still had an interest in the maintenance of an independent and democratic Switzerland, and indications that Pilet wished to deliver Switzerland into the hands of Britain's enemies were not allowed to pass by without comment. This article sketches the contours of a 'British view' of Pilet-Golaz in 1940, and offers an explanation as to why Pilet was able to remain persona grata in London, despite his apparently inimical activities

Allied special forces and prisoner of war recovery operations in Europe, 1944-1945

This article investigates the efforts made to protect prisoners of war (POWs) in German hands at the end of the Second World War. Challenging contemporary and historical judgments, it argues that Allied plans were reasonable, realistic, and reflected a widespread belief in the importance of protecting the lives and well-being of Allied POWs. Although only two operations were ultimately mounted, the process of raising and equipping specialized recovery units provided a valuable learning experience for Allied planners, which later went on inform recovery operations in the Pacific, and set a precedent that arguably extends to influence attitudes towards POW recovery today

'The importance of being honest': Switzerland, neutrality and the problems of intelligence collection and liaison

This paper seeks to contribute to a number of debates that have attracted scholarly attention over the last few years. Firstly, by examining the experiences of the Swiss foreign intelligence service, the paper takes issue with what one scholar has dubbed 'intelligence history snobbery'; a process that has privileged the study of the major powers and overlooked the contribution made to the secret world by the intelligence agencies of small states. Secondly, the paper explores the extent to which a state's engagement in the secret world is affected by its preconceived ideas over its place and standing in the international community. It asks whether the behaviour of a neutral foreign intelligence service is likely to differ from that of any other 'small' state, and whether neutrals can be both honest brokers in international affairs, and earnest players in the field of secret intelligence. The final section of the paper looks at the impact of the end of the Cold War and the emerging 'global war on terror' on the shape of the Swiss intelligence community

British smuggling operations from Switzerland, 1940-1944

This article departs from traditional writing on British economic warfare against the Axis during the Second World War by highlighting the efforts made by the British government to evade German 'counter-blockade' measures and secure access to European sources of supply. It does so by examining British efforts to obtain Swiss industrial equipment and manufactures after June 1940, when German military success effectively severed normal communications between the two countries. In practical terms, Britain's smuggling operations were enormously successful. Some £1.8m worth of Swiss contraband reached British hands by October 1944. They also, however, exercised considerable influence over the development of Anglo-Swiss relations and Switzerland's relations with its neighbours. In illuminating the scale of Britain's commercial interest in Switzerland after June 1940, the article lends weight to new writing on the Second World War, which emphasizes the neutrals' importance to the war economies and political ambitions of the two belligerent camps