The Feeling of Volition as a Retrospective Observational Inference

We generally assume that intentions and decisions cause our voluntary acts:We form a conscious intention to do something, and then this mental act leads to a bodily act. Neuroscientific research into the timeline of volition faces the challenge of measuring and reconciling events along many unstably related timelines - external, neural and mental. We use motor TMS stimulation to create a reference event, allowing for single-trial temporal order judgements to be meaningful across all the timelines

The Feeling of Volition as a Retrospective Observational Inference

We generally assume that intentions and decisions cause our voluntary acts:We form a conscious intention to do something, and then this mental act leads to a bodily act. Neuroscientific research into the timeline of volition faces the challenge of measuring and reconciling events along many unstably related timelines - external, neural and mental. We use motor TMS stimulation to create a reference event, allowing for single-trial temporal order judgements to be meaningful across all the timelines

Where Are You Looking? Pseudogaze in Afterimages

How do we know where we are looking? A frequent assumption is that the subjective experience of our direction of gaze is assigned to the location in the world that falls on our fovea. However, we find that observers can shift their subjective direction of gaze among different nonfoveal points in an afterimage. Observers were asked to look directly at different corners of a diamond-shaped afterimage. When the requested corner was 3.5° in the periphery, the observer often reported that the image moved away in the direction of the attempted gaze shift. However, when the corner was at 1.75° eccentricity, most reported successfully fixating at the point. Eye-tracking data revealed systematic drift during the subjective fixations on peripheral locations. For example, when observers reported looking directly at a point above the fovea, their eyes were often drifting steadily upwards. We then asked observers to make a saccade from a subjectively fixated, nonfoveal point to another point in the afterimage, 7° directly below their fovea. The observers consistently reported making appropriately diagonal saccades, but the eye movement traces only occasionally followed the perceived oblique direction. These results suggest that the perceived direction of gaze can be assigned flexibly to an attended point near the fovea. This may be how the visual world acquires its stability during fixation of an object, despite the drifts and microsaccades that are normal characteristics of visual fixation

Where Are You Looking? Pseudogaze in Afterimages

How do we know where we are looking? A frequent assumption is that the subjective experience of our direction of gaze is assigned to the location in the world that falls on our fovea. However, we find that observers can shift their subjective direction of gaze among different nonfoveal points in an afterimage. Observers were asked to look directly at different corners of a diamond-shaped afterimage. When the requested corner was 3.5° in the periphery, the observer often reported that the image moved away in the direction of the attempted gaze shift. However, when the corner was at 1.75° eccentricity, most reported successfully fixating at the point. Eye-tracking data revealed systematic drift during the subjective fixations on peripheral locations. For example, when observers reported looking directly at a point above the fovea, their eyes were often drifting steadily upwards. We then asked observers to make a saccade from a subjectively fixated, nonfoveal point to another point in the afterimage, 7° directly below their fovea. The observers consistently reported making appropriately diagonal saccades, but the eye movement traces only occasionally followed the perceived oblique direction. These results suggest that the perceived direction of gaze can be assigned flexibly to an attended point near the fovea. This may be how the visual world acquires its stability during fixation of an object, despite the drifts and microsaccades that are normal characteristics of visual fixation

Electronically Switchable Sham Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) System

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is increasingly being used to demonstrate the causal links between brain and behavior in humans. Further, extensive clinical trials are being conducted to investigate the therapeutic role of TMS in disorders such as depression. Because TMS causes strong peripheral effects such as auditory clicks and muscle twitches, experimental artifacts such as subject bias and placebo effect are clear concerns. Several sham TMS methods have been developed, but none of the techniques allows one to intermix real and sham TMS on a trial-by-trial basis in a double-blind manner. We have developed an attachment that allows fast, automated switching between Standard TMS and two types of control TMS (Sham and Reverse) without movement of the coil or reconfiguration of the setup. We validate the setup by performing mathematical modeling, search-coil and physiological measurements. To see if the stimulus conditions can be blinded, we conduct perceptual discrimination and sensory perception studies. We verify that the physical properties of the stimulus are appropriate, and that successive stimuli do not contaminate each other. We find that the threshold for motor activation is significantly higher for Reversed than for Standard stimulation, and that Sham stimulation entirely fails to activate muscle potentials. Subjects and experimenters perform poorly at discriminating between Sham and Standard TMS with a figure-of-eight coil, and between Reverse and Standard TMS with a circular coil. Our results raise the possibility of utilizing this technique for a wide range of applications

Task-induced attention load guides and gates unconscious semantic interference

The tight relationship between attention and conscious perception has been extensively researched in the past decades. However, whether attentional modulation extended to unconscious processes remained largely unknown, particularly when it came to abstract and high-level processing. Here we use a double Stroop paradigm to demonstrate that attention load gates unconscious semantic processing. We find that word and color incongruencies between a subliminal prime and a supraliminal target cause slower responses to non-Stroop target words—but only if the task is to name the target word (low-load task), and not if the task is to name the target’s color (high-load task). The task load hypothesis is confirmed by showing that the word-induced incongruence effect can be detected in the color-naming task, but only in the late, practiced trials. We further replicate this task-induced attentional modulation phenomenon in separate experiments with colorless words (word-only) and words with semantic relationship but no orthographic similarities (semantics-only)

Auditory Cue Suppresses Visual Detection in Extreme-Periphery

Several studies found cross-modal cueing can enhance perceptual tasks; visual stimulus, for example, can be better detected with auditory cue than without it. Most studies, however, focused on a target within foveal or peripheral visual field (e.g., 20°–50° eccentricity). Neurological and behavioral studies showed auditory can complement visual perception in the periphery, but such cross-modal cueing in the extreme-periphery has been unexplored. In the present study, participants detected a dot appeared randomly in either left/right extreme-periphery (from 60°to 90°, with 5° distance). In a half of the trials, the dot was presented with a simultaneous beep as an auditory cue. The results counterintuitively indicated that auditory cue significantly decreased the visual detection in the extreme-periphery. Further pilot study implied auditory cue may be more reckoned on with widespread visual attention and produced false alarms, resulting decreased sensitivity in the extreme-periphery

Where are you looking? Pseudogaze in afterimages

How do we know where we are looking? A frequent assumption is that the subjective experience of our direction of gaze is assigned to the location in the world that falls on our fovea. However, we find that observers can shift their subjective direction of gaze among different nonfoveal points in an afterimage. Observers were asked to look directly at different corners of a diamond-shaped afterimage. When the requested corner was 3.5° in the periphery, the observer often reported that the image moved away in the direction of the attempted gaze shift. However, when the corner was at 1.75° eccentricity, most reported successfully fixating at the point. Eye-tracking data revealed systematic drift during the subjective fixations on peripheral locations. For example, when observers reported looking directly at a point above the fovea, their eyes were often drifting steadily upwards. We then asked observers to make a saccade from a subjectively fixated, nonfoveal point to another point in the afterimage, 7° directly below their fovea. The observers consistently reported making appropriately diagonal saccades, but the eye movement traces only occasionally followed the perceived oblique direction. These results suggest that the perceived direction of gaze can be assigned flexibly to an attended point near the fovea. This may be how the visual world acquires its stability during fixation of an object, despite the drifts and microsaccades that are normal characteristics of visual fixation

Cortical stimulation consolidates and reactivates visual experience: neural plasticity from magnetic entrainment of visual activity

Delivering transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) shortly after the end of a visual stimulus can cause a TMS-induced ‘replay’ or ‘visual echo’ of the visual percept. In the current study, we find an entrainment effect that after repeated elicitations of TMS-induced replay with the same visual stimulus, the replay can be induced by TMS alone, without the need for the physical visual stimulus. In Experiment 1, we used a subjective rating task to examine the phenomenal aspects of TMS-entrained replays. In Experiment 2, we used an objective masking paradigm to quantitatively validate the phenomenon and to examine the involvement of low-level mechanisms. Results showed that the TMS-entrained replay was not only phenomenally experienced (Exp.1), but also able to hamper letter identification (Exp.2). The findings have implications in several directions: (1) the visual cortical representation and iconic memory, (2) experience-based plasticity in the visual cortex, and (3) their relationship to visual awareness