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Thesis (Ed.M.)--Boston Universit

THE BONES OF HADDOCK v. HADDOCK

It would not be fitting to say in the language of the stage that Williams v. North Carolina has drawn the curtain on Haddock v. Haddock. Rather we will shift the metaphor to say that the recent case from North Carolina has largely stripped the flesh from the earlier decision. Yet the bones of Haddock v. Haddock remain unbleached and unpulverized. Just as persons with mechanical turn of mind may frame from blocks of wood puzzles of readjustment and resetting, so courts in states that do not favor free and easy termination of marriage may still find in the osseous remains of the Haddock case material to fashion some puzzles for the Supreme Court of the United States to solve-puzzles upon which law students and their teachers in the meantime may speculate

ANY MORE LIGHT ON HADDOCK v. HADDOCK? THE PROBLEM OF DOMICIL IN DIVORCE

AT first glance it seems a work of foolhardiness or of supererogation to embark upon a rediscussion of any problems arising from Haddock v. Haddock. True, the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court in that case has not won wholehearted support from the bench or legal profession. True it is, also, that collusive divorces still flourish. These considerations alone might, perhaps, lead the reader to concede that it would not be unfruitful to speculate upon an eventual modification of some of the principles which the Court in that case approved. If, however, further justification is demanded of the writer for the course he is about to take, he begs the reader to keep in mind that the progress of legal thought during the last three decades and a half may have brought about a modification of the reasoning upon which the Supreme Court based its decision. Courts have a tendency to utilize changes in the content of concepts in one type of case as a justification for making similar alterations in the content of the same or similar concepts in another field of litigation. This tendency may be especially strong when there has been marked popular or professional disapproval of judicial development in the latter field