Rental Housing Costs in Buffalo

This fact sheet summarizes the data currently available on the changing costs of rental housing in Buffalo, NY. It explores six data sources for rent figures and what each one can tell us about Buffalo’s rental market. The sources include U.S. Census data, online rental listing sites, and housing organizations in Buffalo

Body Cameras for the Buffalo Police: Best Practices for Policy Creation

This policy brief was drafted by Sarah Wooton, policy analyst at Partnership for the Public Good. It recommends that the Buffalo Police Department adopt policies governing the use of body cameras with a focus on six areas: activation, pre-report viewing, footage retention, footage protection, public disclosure of footage, and public input. Research suggests that simply adding body cameras may not improve policing without strong policies in each of these six areas

The City of Buffalo Police Department

This fact sheet was drafted by Sarah Wooton, a policy analyst at Partnership for the Public Good. It documents the history and demographics of the City of Buffalo Police Department, its recent activity, its organization and chain of command, the bodies that are tasked with oversight of the department, and how residents can file a complaint. The fact sheet shares the current schedule of district community meetings happening monthly across the City, and concludes by listing contact information for headquarters and each of Buffalo’s five districts

Competition for Firms in an Oligopolistic Industry: Do Firms or Countries Have to Pay?

We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes decline, switching from positive to negative levels, and then rise as trade costs fall even further. A range of trade costs is identified where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country

Competition for firms in an oligopolistic industry : the impact of economic integration

We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes initially decline, but then rise again as trade costs fall even further. A range of trade costs is identified where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country

Fiscal competition for FDI when bidding is costly

We introduce bidding costs into a standard model of tax/subsidy competition between two potential host countries to attract the plant of a monopoly firm. Such a bidding cost, even if it is infinitesimal, qualitatively alters the resulting equilibrium. At most one country offers fiscal inducements to the firm, and this attenuates the familiar "race to the bottom" in corporate taxes. In general, the successful host country benefits from the resulting absence of active tax/subsidy competition, at the expense of the owners of the firm in the rest of the world

Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper analyzes the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gains. First, for investments that would take place in the region in the absence of coordination, this measure can transfer location rents from the firm to the union. Second, by internalizing all of the union’s benefits from foreign direct investment, a coordinated policy attracts more investment than when member states act in isolation. Consequently, tax levels may rise or fall under regional coordination.tax competition, regional coordination, international investment

Competition for Firms in an Oligopolistic Industry: Do Firms or Countries Have to Pay?

We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes decline, switching from positive to negative levels, and then rise as trade costs fall even further. A range of trade costs is identified where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country.tax and subsidy competition; oligopolistic markets

Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment

This paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated corporate income tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain. First, for investments that would take place in the union in the absence of coordination, a coordinated tax increase can transfer location rents from the firm to the union. Second, by internalising all of the union’s benefits from foreign direct investment, a coordinated tax reduction can attract more welfare-enhancing investment than when member states act in isolation. Depending on which motive dominates, tax levels may thus rise or fall under regional coordination.tax competition; regional coordination; foreign direct investment