Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy

This paper reconsiders the Phelps-Lucas hypothesis, according to which temporary real effects of purely nominal disturbances result from imperfect information, but departs from the assumptions of Lucas (1973) in two crucial respects. Due to monopolistically competitive pricing, higher-order expectations are crucial for aggregate inflation dynamics, as argued by Phelps (1983). And decisionmakers' subjective perceptions of current conditions are assumed to be of imperfect precision, owing to finite information processing capacity, as argued by Sims (2001). The model can explain highly persistent real effects of a monetary disturbance, and a delayed effect on inflation, as found in VAR studies.

How Important is Money in the Conduct of Monetary Policy?

This paper was presented as the 2006 W.A. Mackintosh Lecture at Queen's University. I consider some of the leading arguments for assigning an important role to tracking the growth of monetary aggregates when making decisions about monetary policy. First, I consider whether ignoring money means returning to the conceptual framework that allowed the high inflation of the 1970s. Second, I consider whether models of inflation determination with no role for money are incomplete, or inconsistent with elementary economic principles. Third, I consider the implications for monetary policy strategy of the empirical evidence for a long­run relationship between money growth and inflation. (Here I give particular attention to the implications of "two-­pillar Phillips curves" of the kind proposed by Gerlach (2003).) And fourth, I consider reasons why a monetary policy strategy based solely on short-­run inflation forecasts derived from a Phillips curve may not be a reliable way of controlling inflation. I argue that none of these considerations provide a compelling reason to assign a prominent role to monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy.inflation, Phillips curve, monetary policy

Financial market efficiency and the effectiveness of monetary policy

Paper for a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York entitled Financial Innovation and Monetary TransmissionMonetary policy ; Financial markets

Loan Commitments and Optimal Monetary Policy

With loan commitments negotiated in advance, the use of tight money to restrain nominal spending has asymmetric effects upon different categories of borrowers. This can reduce efficiency, even though aggregate demand is stabilized. This is illustrated in the context of an equilibrium model of financial intermediation with loan commitments, where monetary policy is characterized by a supply curve for reserves on the part of the central bank in an inter-bank market. If demand uncertainty relates primarily to the intensity of demand by each borrower with no difference in the degree of cyclicality of individual borrowers' demands, an inelastic supply of reserves by the central bank is optimal, because it stabilizes aggregate demand and as a result increases average capacity utilization. But if demand uncertainty relates primarily to the number of borrowers rather than to each one's demand for credit, an interest-rate smoothing policy is optimal, because it eliminates inefficient rationing of credit in high-demand states.

Monetary Policy in the Information Economy

This paper considers two challenges that improvements in private-sector information-processing capabilities may pose for the effectiveness of monetary policy. It first considers the consequences of improved information about central-bank actions, and argues that the management of expectations will become even more important to effective monetary policy. The paper next considers the consequences of the potential erosion of private-sector demand for central-bank money. This should not fundamentally impair the ability of central banks to achieve their stabilization objectives, though it may require a new approach to the implementation of monetary policy. The advantages of a 'channel' system, in which central-bank standing facilities are the main tool used to control overnight interest rates, are discussed.

Forecast Targeting as a Monetary Policy Strategy: Policy Rules in Practice

Forecast targeting is an innovation in central banking that represents an important step toward more rule-based policymaking, even if it is not an attempt to follow a policy rule of any of the types that have received primary attention in the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy. This paper discusses the extent to which forecast targeting can be considered an example of a policy rule, and the conditions under which it would represent a desirable rule, with a view to suggesting improvements in the approaches currently used by forecast-targeting central banks. Particular attention is given to the intertemporal consistency of forecast-targeting procedures, the assumptions about future policy that should be used in constructing the forecasts used in such procedures, the horizon with which the target criterion should be concerned, the relevance of forecasts other than the inflation forecast, and the degree of robustness of a desirable target criterion for monetary policy to changing circumstances.

How Important is Money in the Conduct of Monetary Policy?

I consider some of the leading arguments for assigning an important role to tracking the growth of monetary aggregates when making decisions about monetary policy. First, I consider whether ignoring money means returning to the conceptual framework that allowed the high inflation of the 1970s. Second, I consider whether models of inflation determination with no role for money are incomplete, or inconsistent with elementary economic principles. Third, I consider the implications for monetary policy strategy of the empirical evidence for a long-run relationship between money growth and inflation. And fourth, I consider reasons why a monetary policy strategy based solely on short-run inflation forecasts derived from a Phillips curve may not be a reliable way of controlling inflation. I argue that none of these considerations provides a compelling reason to assign a prominent role to monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy.