Foreign Portfolio Investors before and during a Crisis

Using a unique data set, we study the trading behavior of foreign portfolio investors in Korea before and during the currency crisis. Different categories of investors have significant differences as well as similarities. First, non-resident institutional investors are always positive feedback traders, whereas resident investors before the crisis were negative feedback (contrarian) traders but switch to be positive feedback traders during the crisis. Second, individual investors herd significantly more than institutional investors. Non-resident (institutional as well individual) investors herd significantly more than their resident counterparts. Third, differences in the Western and Korean news coverage are correlated with differences in net selling by non-resident investors relative to resident investors.foreign portfolio investment, crisis, feedback trading, herding

Offshore Investment Funds: Monsters in Emerging Markets?

The 1997-99 financial crises in the emerging markets have brought to the foreground the concern about offshore investment funds and their possible role in exacerbating volatility in the markets they invest in. Offshore investment funds are alleged to engage in trading behaviors that are different from their onshore counterparts. Because their behavior is less moderated by tax consequences, and because they may be subject to less supervision and regulation, the offshore funds may trade more intensely. They could also pursue more aggressively certain trading strategies such as positive feedback trading or herding that could contribute to greater volatility in the market. Using a unique data set, we compare the trading behavior in Korea by offshore funds with that of their onshore counterparts registered in the United States and the United Kingdom. There are a number of interesting findings. First there is indeed evidence suggesting that the offshore funds trade more intensely than their onshore counterparts. Second, however, there is no evidence that the offshore funds engage in positive feedback trading. In contrast, there is strong evidence that the funds from the US and UK do so. Third, while offshore funds herd, they do so significantly less than the offshore funds from the US or UK. In sum, the offshore funds are not especially worrisome monsters.

Korea investment corporation: its origin and evolution

In this paper, I give a detailed account of the creation and the evolution of Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) – a sovereign wealth fund established in 2005 by the Korean government. In doing so, I highlight three of its unique features. First, the case of KIC effectively shows the problem of having an unclear mission statement, which allows the mission to evolve over time and multiple missions to coexist that may contradict each other. Second, it effectively reveals the typical conflicts that may arise between the central bank and the ministry involved when setting up a reserve-based sovereign wealth fund. Third, it effectively shows how a sovereign wealth fund can be operated in a way that favors the bureaucrats and the politicians

Death Spiral Issues in Emerging Market: A Control Related Perspective

This paper studies the motive of issuing floating-priced convertibles or warrants, known as death spirals, in a country where the private benefit of control is high. Using a total of 199 death spiral issuances by public firms listed in the Korea Stock Exchange during 1998-2006, we find a number of pieces of empirical evidence that are less consistent with the conventional last resort financing hypothesis, but rather consistent with the control enhancing or control transferring hypothesis. First, abnormal returns subsequent to death spiral issuance is negative, but more so in poorly governed firms. Second, operating performance of chaebol issuers are not necessarily low at the time of the issue nor does it deteriorate over time, but they still prefer to issue death spirals over traditional fixed-priced hybrid securities. Third, we do not observe subsequent changes in the controlling shareholder in more than 60% of the issuers and these firms exhibit superior operating performance at the time of the issue compared to other death spiral or non-death spiral issuers. Fourth, this same set of firms do not experience a decrease in proportional ownership by the controlling party, while family members other than the controlling shareholder experience the most pronounced increases in the number of shares held. Finally, in approximately half of these firms, at least one member of the controlling party holds hybrid securities that can later be converted into voting shares

When Heirs Become Major Shareholders: Evidence on Tunneling and Succession through Related-Party Transactions

In family firms, the succession of controlling equity stake to next generation is an issue of paramount importance. This, however, can be a major challenge in the presence of heavy inheritance or gift tax burden (high tax rate and absence of tax-saving vehicles, such as trusts or foundations) and in the absence of dual-class equity. Such regulatory environment may lead families to seek alternative ways of succession. As for families controlling business groups, one way of doing so is making use of related-party transactions among member firms. By favoring firms where the heir holds significant equity stake, the family can tunnel corporate resources to the heir. Eventually, the firm can grow large enough to acquire controlling equity stakes in other firms within the group. In this paper, we investigate this possibility using Korean chaebol firms during a sample period of 2000-2009. We identify firms where heirs become a major shareholder (treatment group) and compare them against their year-industry-size-matched firms (control group) before and after the ownership change. Difference-in-differences test with firm fixed effects reveal that treatment group firms experience greater related-party transactions, benefit from them in terms of earnings, pay out more dividends, and become more important in controlling other firms in the group

Revisiting Executive Pay in Family-Controlled Firms: Family Premium in Large Business Groups

According to the prior literature, family executives of family-controlled firms receive lower compensation than non-family executives. One of the key driving forces behind this is the existence of family members who are not involved in management, but own significant fraction of shares and closely monitor and/or discipline those involved in management. In this paper, we show that this assumption falls apart if family-controlled firm is part of a large business group, where most of the family members take managerial positions but own little equity stakes in member firms. Using 2014 compensation data of 564 executives in 368 family-controlled firms in Korea, we find three key results consistent with our prediction First, family executives are paid more than non-family executives (by 27% more, on average) and this family premium is pronounced in larger business group firms even after controlling for potential selection bias problems. Second, pay to family-executives falls with the influence of outside family members (their aggregate ownership in the firm minus the ownership held by the family executive in the same firm). Third, family premium in large business group firms rises with group size, but falls with family’s cash flow rights. It also rises for group chairs, but falls with the number of board seats the family-executive holds within the group

Managerial entrenchment of anti-takeover devices: quasi-experimental evidence from Korea

With the removal of statute-based anti-takeover provisions during the aftermath of Asian crisis, a significant number of Korean firms started to introduce charter-based measures. In this paper, we make use of this unique situation where firm-level anti-takeover provisions (ATP) vary over time (making firm fixed effects regression feasible) and its amendment requires a shareholder approval (making event study feasible), when investigating the link between ATP and firm performance. Using a sample during 1999-2009, we find that firms with charter-based anti-takeover provisions are smaller in size, have lower inside and foreign ownerships, and upon adoption, experience lower share prices, the extent of which drops with inside ownership. Consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis in Jensen (1986), we also find that these firms increase capital expenditure. Our finding also shows that ATP adoptions are followed by lower profitability and lower dividend payouts. Firms with ATPs also experience greater de-listings after the global financial crisi

How Does Corporate Governance Risk at Home Affect Investment Choices Abroad?

Disparity between control and ownership rights gives rise to the risk of tunneling by the controlling shareholder, and is prevalent in many emerging market economies and present in some developed countries. At the same time, international investors come from different countries whose home markets are characterized by varying degrees of control-ownership disparity. This paper studies whether this difference in investors’ home countries affects their portfolio choice in an emerging market. It combines two unique data sets on ownership and control in business groups, and investor-stock level foreign investment in Korea. A key finding is that, investors from low-disparity countries disfavor high-disparity stocks in Korea, but investors from high-disparity countries are indifferent. Moreover, investors from low-disparity countries became averse to disparity only after the Asian financial crisis. These results suggest that the nature of corporate governance in international investors’ home countries affects their portfolio choice abroad, and therefore that these investors should not be lumped together in the analyses of their portfolio choice.