Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version

We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private.Repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem,imperfect monitoring

TRUNCATED-AT-ZERO COUNT DATA MODELS WITH PARTIAL OBSERVABILITY: AN APPLICATION TO THE FRESHWATER FISHING DEMAND IN THE SOUTHEASTERN U.S.

We extend the double-hurdle count data model to account for a joint decision in the first stage in which the individual jointly makes a decision about a participation in fishing and a site (region) selection decision. Contrary to the conventional the double-hurdle count data model, our model discriminates between the effects of non-participant and potential participants (e.g., potential participants are those who participated in fishing but may or may not take a trip to a specific site, the Southeastern U.S.) on the probability of taking a fishing trip.Consumer/Household Economics,

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version

A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure towards private monitoring (the case of almost-public monitoring), while strict equilibria in unbounded-recall strategies are typically not robust. We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private.Repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring

Growth Expectations and Decision to Renovate a Golf Course: An Application of a Censored Model with the Simultaneity Test

Golf course renovation and expected business growth were examined. Endogeneity test on the renovation decision and a censored expected growth model rejected the hypothesis of simultaneity and decisions were modeled separately. Key determinants for both decisions were golf facility features, but not respondents' characteristics.Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,

An Analysis of Price Determination in the Sweet Cherry Markets of British Columbia, Washington, Oregon and California

Crop Production/Industries, Demand and Price Analysis,

PRICE-INVENTORY RELATIONSHIP IN THE PECAN INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF LONG- AND SHORT-RUN EFFECTS WITH SEASONAL CONSIDERATION

Demand and Price Analysis,