123 research outputs found
International Environmental Agreements: Incentive Contracts with Multilateral Externalities
We consider how one party can induce another party to join an inter- national emission compact given private information. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to in- centivize the agent. This leads to a number of non-standard features: Optimal contracts can include a boundary part, which is not a copy of the no contract outcome. Compared to this, a contract can increase emis- sions of the principal for ine¢ cient types, and reduce his payo¤ for e¢ cient types. Subsidies can be constant or even decreasing and turn negative, i.e., the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal.private information, multilateral externalities, mecha- nism design, restricted contracts, environmental agreements
China’s foreign oil policy: genesis, deployment and selected effects
China is a rising global power with a growing role and impact on the world’s energy markets as well as on the Earth’s climate system. China pursues its development in an essentially non-confrontational manner, a vision encapsulated by the notion of peaceful rise which is viewed positively in the world’s major capitals. Nevertheless, China’s rapid growth represents a genuine global challenge and raises many questions. How is China dealing with its growing need for imported crude oil? What is the impact of China’s rise on the global oil market, notably in terms of oil price developments? Are Chinese actions on oil markets different from those of other major importers? What opportunities and risks arise as a result of china’s growing role on the global oil market from the viewpoint of other global players? In this report we seek to offer some answers to those questions with a review of China’s developing energy policy, of the actions and revealed preferences of its national oil companies, and of broader economic and geopolitical analyses of the impact of China’s growing oil consumption on other global players.Crude oil, energy security, oil security, China, foreign oil policy
Identifying the Rebound: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence from a German Household Panel
Stability and limit cycles in competitive equilibria subject to adjustment costs and dynamic spillovers
Consequences of irreversibilities on optimal intertemporal CO2 emission policies under uncertainty
OPEC as a political and economical entity
This paper assumes that the decision makers of OPEC (or at least of its core members) are interested in both profits and political payoffs (support, popularity, being a hero of the Arab or Islamic street, etc.). The oil weapon, i.e. a reduction of output is the most powerful instrument to obtain political payoffs from harming the West, which can be also profitable in the short run due to the high prices implied by sluggish demand for OPEC oil. The analysis shows that this political objective reduces longrun supply and includes the possibility that it is optimal to 'kill the goose that lays the golden eggs' if initial demand is below a threshold (and multiple steady states exist).OPEC Political objectives Dynamic demand Thresholds
- …