109 research outputs found
Does Prospect Theory Explain IPO Market Behavior?
We derive a behavioral measure of the IPO decision-maker’s satisfaction with the underwriter’s performance based on Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) application of prospect theory to IPO underpricing. We assess the plausibility of this measure by studying its power to explain the decision-maker’s subsequent choices. Controlling for other known factors, IPO firms are less likely to switch underwriters for their first seasoned equity offering when our behavioral measure indicates they were satisfied with the IPO underwriter’s performance. Underwriters also appear to benefit from behavioral biases in the sense that they extract higher fees for subsequent transactions involving satisfied decision-makers. Although our tests suggest there is explanatory power in the behavioral model, they do not speak directly to whether deviations from expected utility maximization determine patterns in IPO initial returns
IPO pricing in the dot-com bubble
IPO initial returns reached astronomical levels during 1999-2000. We show that the regime shift in initial returns and other elements of pricing behavior can be at least partially accounted for by a variety of marked changes in pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior over the
period which reduced key decision-makers’ incentives to control underpricing. After controlling for these changes, there appears to be little special about the 1999-2000 period, aside from the preponderance of internet and high-tech firms going public. Our results suggest that it was firm
characteristics that were unique during the “dot-com bubble” and that pricing behavior followed from incentives created by these characteristics
Does Prospect Theory Explain IPO Market Behavior?
We derive a behavioral measure of the IPO decision-maker’s satisfaction with the underwriter’s performance based on Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) application of prospect theory to IPO underpricing. We assess the plausibility of this measure by studying its power to explain the decision-maker’s subsequent choices. Controlling for other known factors, IPO firms are less likely to switch underwriters for their first seasoned equity offering when our behavioral measure
indicates they were satisfied with the IPO underwriter’s performance. Underwriters also appear to benefit from behavioral biases in the sense that they extract higher fees for subsequent transactions involving satisfied decision-makers. Although our tests suggest there is explanatory power in the behavioral model, they do not speak directly to whether deviations from expected utility maximization determine patterns in IPO initial returns
Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investments Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments
We investigate the empirical puzzle why banks pressured their analysts to provide aggressive assessments of issuing firms during the 1990s when doing so apparently had little positive effect on their chances of receiving lead-management appointments and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and costly structural reform. We show that aggressively optimistic research can attract
co-management appointments and that co-management appointments eventually lead to more lucrative lead-management opportunities. Our results suggest a potential unintended anticompetitive effect of the Global Settlement if forcing greater separation of research and investment banking diminishes co-management opportunities for (and thereby potential competition from) marginal competitors in securities underwriting, especially in the debt markets
Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments
We investigate why banks pressured research analysts to provide aggressive assessments of
issuing firms during the 1990s. This competitive strategy did little to directly increase a bank’s chances of winning lead-management mandates and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and costly structural reform. We show that aggressively optimistic research and even the mere provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management
appointments. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish
relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase their chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the presence of historically exclusive banking relationships. If recent regulatory reforms compromise
this entry mechanism, they may have the unintended consequence of diminishing competition among securities underwriters
Global Integration in Primary Equity Markets: The Role of U.S. Banks and U.S. Investors
We examine the costs and benefits of the global integration of primary equity markets associated with the parallel diffusion of U.S. underwriting methods. We analyze both direct and indirect costs (associated with underpricing) using a unique dataset of 2,132 IPOs by non-U.S. issuers from 65 countries in 1992-1999. Bookbuilding typically costs twice as much as a fixed-price offer, but on its own, does not lead to lower underpricing. However, when conducted by U.S. banks and/or targeted at U.S. investors, bookbuilding can reduce underpricing significantly, relative to fixed-price offerings or bookbuilding efforts conducted by ‘local’ banks. These results are obtained after allowing for the endogeneity and interdependence of issuers’ choices. For the great majority of issuers, the gains associated with lower underpricing outweighed the additional costs associated with hiring U.S. banks or marketing in the U.S. This suggests a quality/price trade-off contrasting with the findings of Chen and Ritter [Journal of Finance 55, 2000], particularly since non-U.S. issuers raising US$20m-80m also typically pay a 7% spread when U.S. banks and investors are involved
Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-Management Appointments
We investigate the empirical puzzle why banks pressured their analysts to provide aggressive
assessments of issuing firms during the 1990s when doing so apparently had little positive effect on their chances of receiving lead-management appointments and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and costly structural reform. We show that aggressively optimistic research can attract co-management appointments and that co-management appointments eventually lead to more lucrative lead-management opportunities. Our results suggest a potential unintended anticompetitive effect of the Global Settlement if forcing greater separation of research and investment banking diminishes co-management opportunities for (and thereby potential competition from) marginal competitors in securities underwriting, especially in the debt markets
Does Prospect Theory Explain IPO Market Behavior?
We derive a behavioral measure of the IPO decision-maker’s satisfaction with the underwriter’s performance based on Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) application of prospect theory to IPO underpricing. We assess the plausibility of this measure by studying its power to explain the decision-maker’s subsequent choices. Controlling for other known factors, IPO firms are less likely to switch underwriters for their first seasoned equity offering when our behavioral measure indicates they were satisfied with the IPO underwriter’s performance. Underwriters also appear to benefit from behavioral biases in the sense that they extract higher fees for subsequent transactions involving satisfied decision-makers. Although our tests suggest there is explanatory power in the behavioral model, they do not speak directly to whether deviations from expected utility maximization determine patterns in IPO initial returns
IPO Pricing in the Dot-Com Bubble: Complacency or Incentives
IPO initial returns reached astronomical levels during 1999-2000. We show that the regime shift in initial returns and other elements of pricing behavior can be at least partially accounted for by a variety of marked changes in pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior over the period which reduced key decision-makers™ incentives to control underpricing. After controlling for these changes, there appears to be little special about the 1999-2000 period, aside from the preponderance of Internet and high-tech firms going public. Our results suggest that it was firm characteristics that were unique during the “dot-com bubble” and that pricing behavior followed from incentives created by these characteristics
Does Prospect Theory Explain IPO Market Behavior?
We derive a behavioral measure of the IPO decision-maker’s satisfaction with the underwriter’s performance based on Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) application of prospect theory to IPO underpricing. We assess the plausibility of this measure by studying its power to explain the decision-maker’s subsequent choices. Controlling for other known factors, IPO firms are less likely to switch underwriters for their first seasoned equity offering when our behavioral measure
indicates they were satisfied with the IPO underwriter’s performance. Underwriters also appear to benefit from behavioral biases in the sense that they extract higher fees for subsequent transactions involving satisfied decision-makers. Although our tests suggest there is explanatory power in the behavioral model, they do not speak directly to whether deviations from expected utility maximization determine patterns in IPO initial returns
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