The Theory of Trade Policy and Trade Agreements: A Critique

During the past half century, multilateral trade liberalization has reduced tariffs to historically low levels. The Received Theory of multilateral trade agreements, based solely on terms-of-trade externalities between national governments, offers an explanation that has become the conventional wisdom among international trade theorists. But it displays two puzzles that cast doubt on its practical relevance: the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle and the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle. This paper examines the consistency of the implications of the Received Theory with actual trade policy. The basic conclusion is that the theory is inconsistent with reality. Furthermore, it is the role of terms-of-trade externalities — the central component of the Received Theory — that is the sole cause of this inconsistency.Political externalities, trade agreements, the Received Theory, the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle, the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle

Punishment and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements.

This paper interprets dispute settlement procedures and punishments as responses to the fact that trade agreements are incomplete contracts. If no weight is given to the adjudication phase and if the degree of trade relatedness is known with certainty, the negotiated trade agreement will feature commensurate punishments, will induce violation of the dispute settlement ruling, and will deliver optimal liberalization and optimal unilateral trade-related action. With the adjudication phase of concern, the trade agreement will feature less liberalization, but still with a presumption of at least approximate commensurate punishment. The optimal trade agreement will likely induce abiding by the ruling when negotiators attach more importance to the adjudication phase, and violating it when they attach less.

The Greater the Differences, the Greater the Gains?, Second Version

This paper addresses the fundamental question of whether, in a comparative-advantage context, the gains from trade will be greater when the differences between trading countries are greater. Such a presumption is established. The paper then discusses circumstances that could cause the presumption to fail.trade gains, international differences

The Greater the Differences, the Greater the Gains?

This paper addresses the fundamental question of whether, in a comparative-advantage context, the gains from trade will be greater when the differences between trading countries are greater. Such a presumption is established. The paper then discusses circumstances that could cause the presumption to fail.trade gains, international differences

Trade Policies Based on Political Externalities: An Exploration, Third Version

During the past half century, multilateral trade liberalization has reduced tariffs to historically low levels. The Received Theory of multilateral trade agreements, based solely on terms-of-trade externalities between national governments, offers an explanation that has become the conventional wisdom among international trade theorists. But this explanation displays two puzzles that render it inconsistent with actual trade policy and actual trade agreements: the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle and the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle. This paper addresses inter-governmental political externalities in a model with terms-of-trade externalities. The model resolves the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle if and only if political externalities dominate terms-of-trade externalities. But it resolves the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle, and delivers results consistent with what we actually observe, only if terms-of-trade externalities play no role whatsoever.Political externalities, trade agreements, the Received Theory, the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle, the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle

The Political Economy of Protection

This paper offers a selective, interpretative survey of the literature on the political economy of international trade policy. Unilateral trade policy and multilateral trade agreements are covered, but preferential trading arrangements are not. Much of the literature is characterized either by a discrepancy between what policymakers say they are doing and how the theory models their actions (the Cognitive Dissonance issue) or by a lack of a detailed microeconomic foundation (the Black Box issue).Political support function, Protection For Sale, trade agreements, exchange of market access

Trade Agreements Based on Political Externalities, Second Version

During the past half century, multilateral trade liberalization has reduced tariffs to historically low levels. The Received Theory of multilateral trade agreements, based solely on terms-of-trade externalities between national governments, offers an explanation that has become the conventional wisdom among international trade theorists. But this explanation displays two puzzles that render it inconsistent with actual trade policy and actual trade agreements. This paper introduces inter-governmental political externalities into a model with terms-of-trade externalities. It delivers results consistent with what we actually observe, and thus resolves the puzzles, if and only if political externalities dominate terms-of-trade externalities.Political externalities, trade agreements, reciprocity, the Received Theory, the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle, the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle

Protectionism and Increasing Returns with Comparative-Cost Disadvantage

We reconsider the economics of protection with an industry subject to increasing returns. Under strong comparative disadvantage in one country, any tariff-distorted equilibrium in which both countries produce the commodity must be unstable.In general, under strong comparative disadvantage, the case for free trade is greater than without increasing returns. Also, exceptionally high tariffs are required to protect a high cost increasing-returns industry. Beneficial tariffs or subsidies for the country with comparative disadvantage become prominent when the country with a comparative advantage faces a relevant capacity constraint.increasing returns, protection, comparative-cost disadvantage, flexible capacity

The Theorems of International Trade with Factor Mobility

This paper addresses the relation between goods trade and international factor mobility in general terms. Conditions for factor price equalization are derived for situations with tradein both goods and factors,as well as Rybczynski and Stolper-Sarnuel Sofl theorems. A weak price versionof the Heckscher-Ohlifl theorem is presented, as well as stronger quantity versions.The basic theorems of international trade, suitably interpreted,are shown to hold in their strong versions ifthe number of international markets is at least as large as the number of factors.The crucial dimensionality issue is hence not the relative number of goods and factors per se, but the number of international markets relative to the number of factors. Only the price version of the Heckscher-Ohlifl theorem fails to be essentially preserved by this condition.