Mistaken Eyewitness Identification Rates Increase When Either Witnessing or Testing Conditions get Worse

We examined how giving eyewitnesses a weak recognition experience impacts their identification decisions. In two experiments we forced a weak recognition experience for lineups by impairing either encoding or retrieval conditions. In Experiment 1 (N = 245), undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to watch either a clear or a degraded culprit video and then viewed either a culprit-present or culprit-removed lineup identification procedure. In Experiment 2 (N = 227), all participants watched the same clear culprit video but were then randomly assigned to either view a clear or noise- degraded lineup procedure. Half of the participants viewed a culprit-present lineup procedure and the remaining participants viewed a culprit-removed lineup procedure. Not surprisingly degrading either encoding or retrieval conditions led to a sharp drop in culprit identifications. Critically, and as predicted, degrading either encoding or retrieval conditions also led to a sharp increase in the identification of innocent persons. These results suggest that when a lineup procedure gives a witness a weak match-to-memory experience, the witness will lower her criterion for making an affirmative identification decision. This pattern of results is troubling because it suggests that witnesses who encounter lineups that do not include the culprit might have a tendency to use a lower criterion for identification than do witnesses who encounter lineups that actually include the culprit

Let's make a deal: Exploring plea acceptance rates in the guilty and the innocent

Research on juror decision-making has been vast. Research on plea-bargaining, in contrast, has been scarce. This fact runs in opposition to the reality that less than 10% of cases in most jurisdictions ever make it to trial. Typically, plea-negotiations rather than jurors determine the outcome of cases. The present research examines the willingness of people to accept plea-bargains when guilty or innocent. All participants were paired with a confederate-participant. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the guilty condition and the other half were in the innocent condition. Those in the guilty condition were induced by the confederate-participant to cheat on a problem that was supposed to be solved individually. All participants (whether guilty or innocent) were then accused of having cheated on one of the problems. Participants were then told that they could choose to sign a statement agreeing to work in the research lab for 20 hours (the plea deal) or risk a charge of academic dishonesty. Although guilty participants were expected to accept the plea more often than innocent participants, individual differences were expected to moderate the magnitude of this effect. The plea acceptance results confirmed the hypotheses--guilty people accepted the plea deal at a rate of 79%, which was significantly more often than innocent individuals. More importantly, innocent participants were still willing to accept the plea agreement at a significant rate of 52%. Among the innocent, belief in a just world had no moderating effects on the rate of plea acceptance. Among the guilty however, those with stronger endorsement of belief in a just world were significantly more likely to accept the plea than those weaker in belief in a just world. Individuals with higher perceived intelligence and ACT scores were generally more likely to reject the plea than those who scored lower on these measures, but only among the innocent.</p

Bluffed by the dealer: Distinguishing false pleas from false confessions

The United States convicts over one million people of felonies each year without affording the resources of a trial. Instead, these convictions are attained in plea bargains. The current research investigated potential differences between pleas and confessions to determine whether new experimental research on plea-bargaining is warranted, or whether the research on false confessions can be extended to pleas as well. Given the exploratory nature of this work, multiple theoretically-relevant variables were measured so that multiple potential differences between pleas and confessions could be explored. The study employed a 2 (innocent or guilty) x 2 (plea or confession) x 2 (evidence-bluff or no-bluff) between-participants design. Participants were recruited for a study described as examining problem solving. Once at the lab, all participants were paired with a confederate posing as another participant. The participant and confederate were asked to complete problems both independently (individual) and together (team). Guilty participants were asked to provide help on one of the individual problems by the confederate. Innocent participants were never asked for help. All participants were later accused of cheating on an individual problem. Participants in confession conditions were then asked to sign a statement admitting guilt. Participants in plea conditions were asked to sign a statement agreeing to work 20 hours in the research lab in exchange for dropping the accusation. Participants in evidence-bluff conditions were told that a video camera recorded the problem-solving phase of the study and could reveal whether cheating actually occurred. The theoretically-relevant individual difference variables did not consistently differentiate pleas from confessions. A hypothesized interaction between the evidence-bluff and plea-confession conditions on acceptance outcomes did not materialize either. Nevertheless, some evidence emerged indicating that pleas and confessions might involve different processes. Specifically, innocent participants gave different reasons for refusing to sign a plea statement than they did for refusing to sign a confession statement. Similarly, the plea and confession conditions prompted guilty participants to provide significantly different reasons for agreeing to sign the statement. In conclusion, the current research provides support for a new line of research on plea-bargaining.</p

Retrieval Can Increase or Decrease Suggestibility Depending on How Memory is Tested: The Importance of Source Complexity

Taking an intervening test between learning episodes can enhance later source recollection. Paradoxically, testing can also increase people’s susceptibility to the misinformation effect – a finding termed retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES, Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009). We conducted three experiments to examine this apparent contradiction. Experiment 1 extended the RES effect to a new set of materials. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that testing can produce opposite effects on memory suggestibility depending on the complexity of the source test. Specifically, retrieval facilitated source discriminations when the test contained only items with unique source origins. But when the source test included some items that had appeared in multiple sources, the intervening test actually increased source confusions. These results have implications for a wide variety of learning situations. We focused our discussion on eyewitness memory, source complexity, and reconsolidation.NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Memory and Language. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Memory and Language, [67, 1, (2012)] DOI:10.1016/j.jml.2012.02.006</p

The Dark Side of Interpolated Testing: Frequent Switching Between Retrieval and Encoding Impairs New Learning

Practicing retrieval can improve the updating or modification of existing knowledge. When students need to update their existing knowledge, performing retrieval practice on the first set of materials often strengthens learning of the next set. However, Davis and Chan (2015)reported that interpolated testing can sometimes impair new learning. Here, we examined whether frequently switching between retrieval of previously learned material and encoding of new material can disrupt learning of the new material. In the current experiment, participants either switched between restudying originally learned items and new learning or between retrieving originally learned items and new learning, and we varied the frequency with which task switching occurred. We found that interpolating retrieval, but not restudy, with new learning impaired new learning. These results are consistent with the idea that retrieval practice and encoding rely on different cognitive processes, and intermixing them can exert a cost.This is an accepted manuscript of an article published as Davis, Sara D., Jason CK Chan, and Miko M. Wilford. "The Dark Side of Interpolated Testing: Frequent Switching Between Retrieval and Encoding Impairs New Learning." Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 6, no. 4 (2017): 434-441. doi: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.07.002. Posted with permission.</p

Retrieval Enhances Eyewitness Suggestibility to Misinformation in Free and Cued Recall

Immediately recalling a witnessed event can increase people’s susceptibility to later postevent misinformation. But this retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES) effect has been shown only when the initial recall test included specific questions that reappeared on the final test. Moreover, it is unclear whether this phenomenon is affected by the centrality of event details. These limitations make it difficult to generalize RES to criminal investigations, which often begin with free recall prior to more specific queries from legal officials and attorneys. In 3 experiments, we examined the influence of test formats (free recall vs. cued recall) and centrality of event details (central vs. peripheral) on RES. In Experiment 1, both the initial and final tests were cued recall. In Experiment 2, the initial test was free recall and the final test was cued recall. In Experiment 3, both the initial and final tests were free recall. Initial testing increased misinformation reporting on the final test for peripheral details in all experiments, but the effect was significant for central details only after aggregating the data from all 3 experiments. These results show that initial free recall can produce RES, and more broadly, that free recall can potentiate subsequent learning of complex prose materials. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)This is a manuscript of an article from Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 20 (2014): 81, doi:10.1037/xap0000001. Posted with permission. This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.</p

reject the Offer : the Asymmetric Impact of Defense Attorneys\u27 Plea Recommendations

In two studies, we examined the impact of defense attorney recommendation on defendant plea decision-making. Community members and college students participated in a 2 (guilt status: innocent or guilty) × 2 (defense attorney recommendation: accept or reject offer) between-subjects factorial design study. The plea scenario was conveyed via an interactive computer simulation. In both studies (Study 1, n = 106; Study 2, n = 282), guilty participants were more likely to plead guilty than innocent participants. In Study 2, participants advised to accept the plea were more likely to plead guilty than those advised to reject the plea. Furthermore, being advised to reject the plea resulted in larger changes in willingness to accept a plea (WTAP) than being advised to accept the plea. This asymmetric effect was driven by those participants who were initially inclined to plead guilty but then received advice inconsistent with that inclination