An Inconsistency in Craig’s Defence of the Moral Argument

I argue that William Craig’s defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why such connections hold. Another component of Craig’s defence of the moral argument is an endorsement of a particular version of the divine command theory. Craig’s version of DCT posits certain logically necessary connections but Craig fails to provide an adequate account of why these connections hold. Thus, Craig’s critique of non-theistic moral realism is at odds with his DCT. Since the critique and DCT are both essential elements of his defence of the moral argument, that defence is internally inconsistent

Difference-Making and Easy Knowledge: Reply to Comesaña and Sartorio

Juan Comesaña and Carolina Sartorio have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in apparently illegitimate cases of ‘bootstrapping’ one’s way toexcessively easy knowledge. They argue that in such cases the bootstrapper bases at least one of her beliefs on evidence that does not evidentially support the proposition believed. I explicate the principle that underlies Comesaña and Sartorio’s diagnosis of such cases and show that their account of what goes wrong in such cases is mistaken

Craig's Contradictory Kalam: Trouble at the Moment of Creation

William Lane Craig’s much-discussed kalam cosmological argument for God’s existence is intended to provide support for a particular theistic explanation of the origin of the universe.  I argue here that Craig’s theistic account of the origin of the universe entails two contradictions and hence should be rejected.  The main contribution of the paper is the identification of some relatively straightforward but previously unrecognized problems in Craig’s hypothesis that the beginning of the universe was a temporal effect of a timeless personal cause

A Temporal First Cause?

In a recent paper in this journal, I argued that William Craig’s theistic account of the origin of the universe implies that at the first moment of time, t1, God is both timeless and temporal, a contradiction (Wielenberg 2021). Craig responded to that argument; I here reply to Craig’s response

Dawkins’s Gambit, Hume’s Aroma, and God’s Simplicity

I examine the central atheistic argument of Richard Dawkins’s book The God Delusion (“Dawkins’s Gambit”) and illustrate its failure. I further show that Dawkins’s Gambit is a fragment of a more comprehensive critique of theism found in David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Among the failings of Dawkins’s Gambit is that it is directed against a version of the God Hypothesis that few traditional monotheists hold. Hume’s critique is more challenging in that it targets versions of the God Hypothesis that are central to traditional monotheism. Theists and atheists should put away The God Delusion and pick up Hume’s Dialogues

Divine command theory and psychopathy

I advance a novel challenge for Divine Command Theory based on the existence of psychopaths. The challenge, in a nutshell, is that Divine Command Theory has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible. After explaining this argument, I respond to three objections to it and then critically examine the prospect that Divine Command Theorists might bite the bullet and accept that psychopaths can do no wrong. I conclude that the Psychopathy Objection constitutes a serious and novel challenge for Divine Command Theory

Egoism and Eudaimonia - Maximization in the Nicomachean Ethics

I argue that Aristotle holds the following principle: (AE) An ethically virtuous person always chooses a course of action that he believes promotes his own eudaimonia at least as much as any other course of action he could have chosen. The claim that Aristotle holds such a principle conflicts with Richard Kraut’s interpretation of Aristotle’s view presented in Kraut’s important book Aristotle on the Human Good. I am inclined to count (AE) as a brand of egoism, primarily on the grounds that it implies that sacrificing one’s own eudaimonia for the sake of the eudaimonia of others is incompatible with complete ethical virtue. On such a view, a person who knowingly enhances the quality , of the lives of others at the expense of the quality of his own life thereby reveals an ethical defect in his character. Nevertheless, (AE) is significantly different from the kind of egoism that is typically attributed to Aristotle. I am not particularly concerned with the issue of whether it is appropriate to apply the term ‘egoistic’ to Aristotle’s ethical view. My main concern here is to make the case that Aristotle holds (AE) and that Kraut’s non-egoistic interpretation of Aristotle is incorrect

A Temporal First Cause? Reply to Craig\u27s Reply

In a recent paper in this journal, I argued that William Craig’s theistic account of the origin of the universe implies that at the first moment of time, t1, God is both timeless and temporal, a contradiction (Wielenberg 2021). Craig responded to that argument; I here reply to Craig’s response