Deflecting a Suspect From Requesting an Attorney

Max Alexander Soffar, who had been arrested for motorcycle theft in Harris County, Texas, hinted to the arresting officer that he had been involved in the killing of bowling alley employees in Houston, Texas. At the police station, officers summoned Officer Clawson to assist in the interrogation. Soffar had previously worked as an informant for Clawson and viewed him as a friend. Clawson gave Soffar a new set of Miranda warnings and Soffar waived his rights. A little later, Detective Schultz questioned Soffar and Soffar recounted details relating to the killings that Schultz believed “only the perpetrator would know.

Improving Constitutional Criminal Procedure

A Review of The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution by Craig M. Bradle

Interrogation Without Questions: \u3cem\u3eRhode Island v. Innis\u3c/em\u3e and \u3cem\u3eUnited States v. Henry\u3c/em\u3e

In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court defined interrogation within the meaning of Miranda; and in United States v. Henry, it defined deliberate elicitation within the meaning of Massiah. This article explores the implications of Innis and Henry, suggests readings of the new tests consistent with their purposes, and applies the tests to several situations where the scope of the fifth and sixth amendment protections remains unclear

Yale Kamisar: The Enemy of Injustice

In the summer of 1978, Duke Law School hosted a conference in which a variety of speakers offered perspectives on Constitutional Criminal Procedure. One of the speakers argued that the Warren Court\u27s criminal-procedure revolution created a backlash that ultimately made things worse for criminal defendants. In order to dramatize his point, he suggested, Yale Kamisar is the enemy. When that speaker had finished, the Conference Moderator began his response by stating, First of all, Yale Kamisar is not the enemy of anything, except injustice

Capital Punishment\u27s Future

A Review of Capital Punishment in America by Raymond Paternoste

Accomplices\u27 Confessions and the Confrontation Clause

The admissibility of an accomplice\u27s confession against a criminal defendant has long been a subject of concern in Anglo-American law. The Supreme Court has held that accomplices\u27 confessions to the police are presumptively unreliable under the Confrontation Clause, without clearly expressing what facts would lend to the reliability of such statements. However, Professor White argues that in Williamson v. United States, the Court adopted an empirical framework that will make such confessions more likely to be admissible against an accused. In this Article, Professor White first explores the traditional skepticism towards accomplices\u27 confessions and explains the nature of the current Confrontation Clause test. He then focuses on Williamson and its analysis of an accomplice\u27s confession\u27s admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). Professor White argues that in Williamson, a majority of the Court adopted the position that a confession may be admissible if it is inculpatory, and not given as the result of a police inducement, such as a promise of leniency. He then attacks the empirical premises underlying this position, basing his arguments on the practical realities of police questioning and human nature. Professor White concludes that an accomplice\u27s confession to the police is per se unreliable, and should never be introduced as evidence of the guilt of an accused