Agri-environment Policy Design With Hidden Information and Hidden Action: Input Quotas vs Input Charges

Moxey, White and Ozanne (1999) have shown how transfer payments coupled with input quotas can be used to design optimal truth-telling mechanisms for voluntary agri-environmental schemes under hidden information about compliance costs. Ozanne, Hogan and Colman (2001) adapted the Moxey et al. model to analyze hidden action in such schemes, analyzing the relationships between input abatement, the cost of monitoring compliance and farmers’ risk preferences. White (2002) extended the Moxey et al. model to analyze the design of contracts under both hidden action and hidden information, but used an input charge/transfer payment approach rather than the original input quota/transfer payment one. In addition, he assumed that farmers caught cheating face a variable fine, related to the amount of input they apply in excess of the amount agreed in the contract, rather than a fixed fine as assumed by Ozanne et al. White argues that his results show that an input charge/transfer payment policy is more efficient than a quota when the regulator cannot observe compliance costs of individual farmers. This paper integrates the previous work, developing a model of both hidden action and hidden information in agri-environmental schemes based on the input quota/transfer payment approach of Moxey et al. (1999) and Ozanne et al. (2001), rather than the input charge/transfer payment approach of White (2002), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. This integrated model shows that, contrary to White (2002), the input quota and input charges approaches lead to identical outcomes in terms of abatement levels, compensation payments, monitoring costs, probabilities and social welfare.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Hidden action, risk aversion and variable fines in agri-environmental schemes

This note analyses the design of agri-environmental schemes for risk-averse producers whose input usage is only observable by costly monitoring. The scheme penalises producers in proportion to input use in excess of a quota. A striking result is that if the scheme is designed in such a way that producers always comply with the quota, risk aversion is not relevant in determining the level of input use.agri-environmental policy, monitoring, risk aversion, Environmental Economics and Policy, Risk and Uncertainty,

Nonlinear Filtering for Stochastic Volatility Models with Heavy Tails and Leverage

This paper develops a computationally efficient filtering based procedure for the estimation of the heavy tailed SV model with leverage. While there are many accepted techniques for the estimation of standard SV models, incorporating these effects into an SV framework is difficult. Simulation evidence provided in this paper indicates that the proposed procedure outperforms competing approaches in terms of the accuracy of parameter estimation. In an empirical setting, it is shown how the individual effects of heavy tails and leverage can be isolated using standard likelihood ratio tests.