Wanted: A Strict Contractual Approach to the Private University/Student Relationship

Institutions of higher education command and receive considerable respect in our society. An apparent corollary of this revered status is the deference accorded colleges and universities by the courts. This deferential attitude is brought into sharp focus when a contractual dispute arises between a private university and one of its students. It is well settled that the private university/student relationship is contractual in nature. Educational contracts, however, are regarded as possessing unique features that require special consideration; a construction which preserves schools\u27 broad discretionary powers is often viewed as essential. Thus, courts have refused to invoke a strict contractual approach in their consideration of these contracts. The result is that the contract theory, as it is currently employed, excessively supports the university\u27s interests while those of the student receive little protection. The recent decision by the Kentucky court of Appeals in Lexington Theological Seminary v. Vance is illustrative. In Vance, the court rejected a student\u27s argument that catalog provisions used to deny the student his degree were too vague to be enforceable. While this ruling is consistent with the overwhelming majority of decisions upholding university regulations challenged on the basis of vagueness, a strict application of contract law presumably would have resulted in a decision favoring the student. This Comment proposes that the Vance decision demonstrates the need for a strict contractual approach to the private university/student relationship. Without such an application, student interests will continue to be shortchanged. Because contract law provides a suitable framework for resolving these disputes, it should be stringently applied. The result would be a more equitable protection for student and university interests alike

Remembrance

My thanks to the Georgia Law Review for dedicating thisVolume to my former colleague and close friend, Professor AnneDupre.In her Dedication and Remembrance in the prior issue, HillaryMiller, the Review\u27s Senior Managing Editor, described ProfessorDupre as a person who lived a passionate life. Passionate indeedis the word that comes to mind when remembering Anne Dupre

Introduction

It is my pleasure, and honor, to congratulate the Georgia Law Review on its fiftieth anniversary. Throughout my 27 years on our law school\u27s faculty, including over a decade of service as dean, I watched with pride as the Georgia Law Review grew in prestige and stature, helping to enhance the academic reputation of our law school. Each of our graduates, whether a member of the Georgia Law Review or not, benefits from having a review of its caliber. Law is an unusual academic discipline; our most sought after publication venues are student edited reviews. As academics, we put our fate in the hands of second and third year law students, who decide not only which handful of the literally thousands of submissions they receive to select for publication but who also edit our work. To say that our colleagues in other disciplines find this a strange publication system is an understatement. But it works, and works well, because of the talent, extraordinary hard work, and dedication that law students bring to this critically important part of the academic enterprise. And it has the substantial benefit of enhancing, in significant ways, the education our law students receive. As a law student, I served as editor-in-chief of my alma mater\u27s law journal. My law journal experience was invaluable to me, particularly as a new lawyer, and I am grateful that our students at the University of Georgia\u27s School of Law have the opportunity to engage in this meaningful work as part of their own law school careers. It is work that enhances their analytical and writing skills, hones their attention to detail, and, often, through dealing with authors, helps them develop diplomatic talents they will put to good use in the practice of law

Aging On Air: Sex, Age, and Television News

The best piece of advice I received when I began teaching law was to adopt Charlie Sullivan\u27s and Mike Zimmer\u27s casebook for my Employment Discrimination class. Before I became a law professor, I had no clue how important choosing the right textbook is, not only for the students but for the teacher. I also was unaware of how much I had to learn about a subject I thought I knew well. I had been litigating employment discrimination cases for several years, but when I began teaching, I quickly learned how much I did not know. Charlie\u27s and Mike\u27s casebook, through its organizational structure, its case selection and, importantly, its thoughtful and probing notes, gave me a deeper understanding of my field. As did their scholarship.2 I first met Charlie at the AALS annual meeting my first year in law teaching. I got up the nerve to introduce myself (I was, and still am, a bit star-struck by Charlie), and was gratefully surprised by how kind and approachable he was. He talked with me about my work in progress and made me feel like I belonged in this profession. Later at the conference, he introduced me to Mike, and the three of us ended up sharing a taxi to the airport. Best cab ride ever

Dean\u27s Report 2009

This year marks the 150th anniversary of our law school, one of the nation’s oldest and most successful public law schools. Although legal education has changed in significant ways over the past 150 years, the markers of a great law school have not. Putting academically rigorous teachers into classrooms with intellectually serious and highly motivated students results in a first class learning experience that produces professionals of the highest caliber. We are committed to continuing that proud tradition at Georgia Law and to enhancing what is already an outstanding work product. It is my pleasure to provide you this report on our progress over the past year. As you will discover in reading through it, Georgia Law, 150 years after its founding, is and should be a source of pride for all those connected with our school

Modern Discrimination Theory and the National Labor Relations Act

This Article explores the concept of discrimination under the NLRA [National Labor Relations Act]. Specifically, it examines discrimination under the statute through the lens of Title VII, an approach that brings a fresh perspective to doctrine long considered settled. The purpose of this comparison is to explore the extent to which Title VII\u27s discrimination concepts make sense under the NLRA. This analysis focuses on three specific areas. First, it examines discrimination cases under section 8(a)(1), concluding that the lower courts are wrong to apply Title VII concepts and to insist that without disparate treatment of union activities, no unlawful discrimination has occurred. Title VII contains no exact counterpart to section 8(a)(1). Judicial insistence that discrimination under that section fit withing Title VII\u27s disparate treatment of disparate impact paradigms reflects an inadequate understanding of the role section 8(a)(1) plays in the NLRA\u27s statutory scheme. Second, the article contrasts the animus requirement of section 8(a)(3) with unlawful motive under Title VII. The two are not synonymous. Frequently, employment decisions overtly based on union activities are not considered unlawfully motivated under the NLRA, even though employment decisions premised on race or gender rarely will be lawful under Title VII. The NLRA\u27s language and structure, however, require its distinctive approach to animus, an approach inconsistent with the wording and the purposes of Title VII. Third the article considers systematic claims of discrimination under section 8(a)(3)--those involving an employer\u27s structural decisions and its use of economic weapons. In this area, borrowing from Title VII would be useful, although it has not as yet occurred. When no animus is present, these cases should be considered under disparate impact doctrine. Indeed, the Court\u27s section 8(a)(3) jurisprudence, a confusing and immature amalgam of treatment and impact theory, could be discarded and profitably replaced by Title VII\u27s analytical structure. The objective of this Article is to provide a theoretical framework for thinking about discrimination concepts under the NLRA in a way that recognizes the inevitable influence of Title VII doctrine. In lieu of the hit-or-miss borrowing from Title VII that occurs today, this Article offers a blueprint for developing a more unified and analytically coherent approach to unlawful discrimination under the NLRA