Reconstructing domestic violence as "terrorism against women" : disrupting dominant discourse

This thesis examines the different ways in which violence is constructed within legal discourse. Two specific types of violence are compared - domestic violence and terrorism. While on the face of it, these appear to be very different types of violence, in the second section of my thesis, I argue that there are significant parallels between the two. In particular, in Chapter 2.2 I argue that serious domestic violence is often committed with a particular ideological motive, that of masculinist ideology. Ideological motive is the first element of the legal definition of terrorism. In making this argument, I draw upon definitions of domestic violence that point to the elements of power and control inherent in some domestic violence, which is committed predominantly by men against women. I also argue that this type of violence is a manifestation of masculinist ideology in a broader sense, which permeates Australian society. In Chapter 2.3, I also argue for the reconceptualisation of domestic violence as a crime committed against women as a 'section of the public'. This accords with the second aspect of the legal definition of terrorism, as a crime committed with the intention of coercing a government, or intimidating the public, or a section of the public. This reconceptualisation contrasts with the usual conceptualisation of domestic violence as a crime committed in the private sphere, a feature of domestic violence which has been the subject of significant feminist critique. Having reconstructed domestic violence as fitting within the two key parameters of the legal definition of terrorism, in Section 3 I go on to consider some of the various ways in which the law differentially treats terrorism and domestic violence. In Chapters 3.1 and 3.2, I consider the treatment of preparatory forms of violence, and prevention of violence. In Chapter 3.1, I examine the regulation of incitement to violence, through the national system for classification of publications and films, and also through the regulation of hate speech in Australian and various overseas jurisdictions. Chapter 3.2 contains an examination of the civil regimes for the control and prevention of violence, specifically terrorism control orders and domestic violence protection orders. Chapters 3.3 and 3.4 consist of an examination of the treatment of more serious forms of violence. In Chapter 3.3 I compare sentencing decisions in Australian terrorism cases with sentences for male-perpetrated homicides against intimate partners, exploring the ways in which the concepts of 'ideology' and 'public' interact with the various considerations to be taken account of upon sentence. In Chapter 3.4, I examine cases in which female victims of domestic violence respond with lethal violence against their abusers, and how they are constructed in legal discourse, in comparison with law enforcement agents who respond to terrorism and other types of violence that threaten the safety of police or the community. I argue that the construction of domestic violence as a 'private' crime devoid of ideological aspects affects the ways in which female perpetrators of defensive homicide are treated in the legal system. Throughout each of these chapters, I consider how the differential constructions of domestic violence and terrorism serve to reflect and reinforce existing power relationships within society. In particular, the continued trivialisation of domestic violence serves masculinist interests in ways that I explore in each chapter. Finally, in Chapter 4, I draw upon some of the themes from these various chapters and discuss possibilities for legal reform and further ways in which reconceptualising domestic violence as an ideological/public crime may influence the way it is dealt with in the legal system

Consent to Treatment for Transgender and Intersex Children

More than a decade has passed since the landmark High Court decision in Marion’s Case,1 where the Court authorised the sterilisation of a young woman who suffered from a disability. Recently, the principles established in that case were applied by the Family Court in a different context – for the provision of hormonal treatment for a 13 year old child,2 some aspects of which are irreversible. Previously, the Family Court had authorised gender reassignment surgery for a child suffering from a physical, congenital condition,3 but notably in Re Alex, the subject child suffered no identified physical condition indicating treatment, but from an identified psychological condition, gender identity dysphoria. This article considers the issues raised by recent applications of the principles relating to the capacity of children to consent to medical treatment, including the decision in Re Alex and the application of those principles to transgender and intersex children. While not all children or adults who identify as transgender or intersex choose the long and difficult path of gender reassignment, some will choose surgical gender reassignment or hormonal treatment at some stage of their lives. In cases where it is proposed that a minor undergo such treatment, the application of the principles of child consent poses particular difficulties

Consent to Treatment for Transgender and Intersex Children

More than a decade has passed since the landmark High Court decision in Marion’s Case,1 where the Court authorised the sterilisation of a young woman who suffered from a disability. Recently, the principles established in that case were applied by the Family Court in a different context – for the provision of hormonal treatment for a 13 year old child,2 some aspects of which are irreversible. Previously, the Family Court had authorised gender reassignment surgery for a child suffering from a physical, congenital condition,3 but notably in Re Alex, the subject child suffered no identified physical condition indicating treatment, but from an identified psychological condition, gender identity dysphoria. This article considers the issues raised by recent applications of the principles relating to the capacity of children to consent to medical treatment, including the decision in Re Alex and the application of those principles to transgender and intersex children. While not all children or adults who identify as transgender or intersex choose the long and difficult path of gender reassignment, some will choose surgical gender reassignment or hormonal treatment at some stage of their lives. In cases where it is proposed that a minor undergo such treatment, the application of the principles of child consent poses particular difficulties