Wireless Network Virtualization: Opportunities for Spectrum Sharing in the 3.5GHz Band

In this paper, we evaluate the opportunities that Wireless Network Virtualization (WNV) can bring for spectrum sharing by focusing on the regulatory framework that has been deployed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for the 3.5GHz band. Pairing this regulatory approach with WNV permits us to present a sharing proposal where emphasis is made on increasing resource availability and providing flexible methods for negotiating for resource access. We include an economics framework that aims at presenting an additional perspective on the attainable outcomes of our sharing proposal. We find that by pairing regulatory flexibility with an enabling technology, within an appropriate economics context, we can increase resource access opportunities and enhance current sharing arrangements

Analysis of the Experimental Licenses of the Federal Communication Commission

Experimental licenses have been awarded by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for more than thirty years as a means to promote research and innovation. Indeed, in the past 30 years (since 1987) more than 20,000 licenses have been granted under the Experimental Radio Service (ERS) of the FCC. In this work, we present a comprehensive analysis of the details pertaining to the assignment of these licenses during the past ten years (2007-20016). For this purpose, utilizing publicly available information in the website of the Office of Engineering and Technology of the FCC, we have built a single repository (database) for all the technical and non-technical details of these licenses. This has permitted us to differentiate among the existing types of Experimental Licenses and, subsequently, analyze the multiple details of these licenses. We pay particular attention to the evolution, over time, of various parameters such as number and duration of licenses, frequency of assignment, processing times, operational parameters (mainly authorized frequencies and transmission power levels), purpose of operation, among others. The proposed poster summarizes the methods and findings of our work. We include a brief introduction to the research framework that was implemented. We expose the main characteristics of the conventional experimental licenses and the Special Temporary Authorizations (STAs) in addition to the main results regarding the general processing time for any type of license

Kosovo after the ICJ opinion

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Exploration of the Federal Communications Commission’s Experimental Radio Service (ERS): Understanding ten years of experimental spectrum licenses

The Experimental Radio Service (ERS) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has awarded experimental licenses for more than thirty years as a means to promote research and innovation in wireless technologies. In this work, we present an exploratory analysis of the details pertaining to the assignment of these licenses during the past ten years (2007-2016). For this purpose, we have built a single repository of technical and non-technical details about license applications by scraping publicly available information in the FCC’s website. This has permitted us systematically categorize among the existing types of experimental licenses and, subsequently, analyze their characteristics. We pay particular attention to the evolution of various parameters such as duration of license, frequency of assignment, processing times, operational parameters, among others. In addition, we explore potential trends hidden in ten years of experimental licenses. This allow us to better understand the time burden of obtaining an authorization or the factors that may influence the license granting process.We conclude this work by delving into the details behind the relationship between ERS authorizations and well known wireless technologies, in particular TV White Spaces and 5G

Sensing as a Service: An Exploration into the Practical Implementations of DSA

The cognitive radio literature generally assumes that the functions required for non-cooperative secondary DSA are integrated into a single radio system. It need not be so. In this paper, we model cognitive radio functions as a value chain and explore the implications of different forms of organization of this value chain. We initially explore the consequences of separating the sensing function from other cognitive radio functions

Matching Markets for Spectrum Sharing

Next generation networks are designed to improve connectivity and capacity, adding to the current range of available services and expanding their reachability. For these systems to work, they need to be compatible with legacy technologies in addition to making use of (limited) available spectrum resources. This is one of the reasons why spectrum sharing has been at the forefront of the list of enablers for such systems. From federal commercial sharing to finding opportunities in millimeter-wave spectrum, we have witnessed the formulation of multiple approaches to making spectrum sharing happen. Existing work on spectrum sharing is wide ranging and includes technical as well as market-based approaches. The study of spectrum markets is of particular interest, as it merges a market approach with the technical limitations inherent to electromagnetic spectrum. In this manner, spectrum markets settings have called for different definitions of spectrum-related resources as a means to increase market thickness and thus improve the opportunities for market success. In a similar vein, we find proposals of network models which aim at adapting technical definitions of spectrum resources, such as those that are the product of virtualization. In this work, we adopt a market perspective for spectrum sharing within the context of more comprehensive network definitions such as those envisioned for next generation networks. To this end, we explore matching market concepts and middleman theory in order to shed light on factors that may impact the performance and, ultimately, the success of spectrum markets

Improving Liquidity in Secondary Spectrum Markets: Virtualizing Spectrum for Fungibility

Pricing mechanisms in the form of auctions have been the main method for spectrum assignment in the U.S. for over 20 years. The spectrum auctions carried out by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) constitute a primary market for spectrum and have been affected by lack of flexibility which has resulted in inefficiencies in spectrum assignment, especially in environments where spectrum is considered scarce. In recent years, we have observed significant efforts to increase efficiency in spectrum assignment and use. Among those efforts is the design and adoption of secondary markets. Secondary markets have the potential to address inefficiencies arising in primary markets over time or those that occur through features of auction mechanisms by enabling spectrum to be assigned to users who value it the most. Furthermore, liquid secondary markets have enabled the explicit management of risk in other markets, such as agriculture and commodities, through futures and options trading. In this paper, we advance the study of liquidity in secondary markets that was begun in our previous work. We explore (i) the reasons that may have hindered the emergence of liquid secondary markets for radio spectrum and (ii) what we might change to promote secondary markets. With these objectives in mind, we study various configurations for the design of secondary markets, which account for the physical constraints inherent to electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, we study technical alternatives that would permit us to develop an appropriate, tradeable, spectrum-related commodity. The results of our analysis show that lack of fungibility has an adverse impact on secondary market liquidity. To address this outcome, we propose virtualization of spectrum resources into fungible chunks and show that this improves market liquidity by yielding viable market outcomes in all the scenarios we tested

Spectrum Valuation: implications for sharing and secondary markets

How much is electromagnetic spectrum worth? Appropriate metrics and methodologies for valuing spectrum help policymakers, network operators, service providers, and end-users in planning wireless-related investment and in ensuring that spectrum resources are used efficiently. Secondary markets have often served to provide publicly observable, market-based valuation metrics, but in the case of spectrum, these are under-developed and segmented, limiting the availability and comparability of market transactions as indicators of spectrum value. Furthermore, the continued growth in wireless services and networks of all types and further advances in wireless technologies enabling more dynamic and granular spectrum sharing are transforming the supply and demand conditions for RF spectrum. Today, the most common metric for valuing spectrum resources is /MHz-POP, derived from dividing the value of a spectrum transaction by the total population in the coverage area of the license times the bandwidth (in MHz). Traditionally, spectrum value has been observed in spectrum auctions, M&A transactions involving the transfer of spectrum usage rights, or from infrequent secondary market activity. This was a viable approach when the fungibility of spectrum resources was limited by technical, market, and regulatory factors that constrained the commodification of highly differentiated spectrum resources and limited the potential for dynamically reallocating, substituting and transferring spectrum rights via markets. With increased opportunities for spectrum sharing, the transition to 5G, smaller cell architectures, and the emergence of IoT, new spectrum usage patterns are arising and enabling more granular, multi-dimensional, virtualized spectrum management (in terms of frequency, location, time, etc.). In a world of increasing spectrum sharing, dynamic spectrum access, and commercial applications of higher frequencies for wireless service, /MHz-POP may be an increasingly noisy indicator of spectrum value. In this paper, we consider how changing technology, markets and policy are enabling the commoditization of spectrum resources and explore what that implies for traditional spectrum value metrics that are used to project auction proceeds and value spectrum transactions

Agent-Based Modelling Approach for Developing Enforcement Mechanisms in Spectrum Sharing Scenarios: An application for the 1695-1710MHz band

As radio spectrum sharing matures, one of the main challenges becomes finding adequate governance systems and the appropriate enforcement mechanisms. Historically, these processes were assigned to a central entity (in most cases a governmental agency). Nevertheless, the literature of Common Pool Resources (CPRs) shows that other governance mechanisms are possible, which include collaboration with a private, thirdparty regulator or the complete absence of central institutions, as in self-enforcement solutions. These alternatives have been developed around well-known CPRs such as fisheries, forests, etc. As argued by Weiss et al [50], and other researchers, spectrum can indeed be considered to be a CPR. In this work we study the two extremes of governance systems that could be applied to spectrum sharing scenarios. Initially, we study the classical centralized scheme of command and control, where governmental institutions are in charge of rule-definition and enforcement. Subsequently, we explore a government-less environment, i.e., a distributed enforcement approach. In this anarchy situation (i.e., lack of a formal government intervention as defined by Leeson [29]), rules and enforcement mechanisms are solely the product of repeated interactions among the intervening agents. For our analysis, we have selected the spectrum sharing framework of the 1695-1710MHz band. We also use the definitions presented by Bhattarai et al. [9], [10] as well as Altamimi [3] for managing the size of the coordination and exclusion zones. In addition, we utilize Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) to analyze the applicability of these governance mechanisms. ABM simulation allows us to explore how macro phenomena can emerge from micro-level interactions of independent agents

Simulation Analysis of QoS Enabled Internet Pricing Strategies: Flat Rate vs. Two-Part Tariff

In this paper, we study the influence of QoS pricing strategy in the future QoS Internet market. We create a Bertrand duopoly game model with different pricing schemes: One ISP with flat rate pricing for its QoS service and the other ISP with two part tariff, a combined pricing scheme with flat rate and usage-sensitive pricing. Based on industry survey data, we conduct a simulation of a random number generation method for consumer demand and Internet access hours. Then, we find an equilibrium point of pricing strategy where an ISP with flat rate pricing has higher profit than an ISP with a two-part tariff. Finally, we present an analytical framework for the future QoS Internet pricing strategy