The Inherent Predictability of Legislative Votes: The Perils of Successful Prediction

Most social science fields find prediction, even in the post-diction sense, to be very difficult. Predictive accuracy is generally low. Thus one would expect great enthusiasm once a field is able to move up to 80-90 percent correct prediction. This level has now been achieved in the legislative roll call analysis area. That would seem to suggest an important theoretical breakthrough has occurred in the area--until it becomes apparent that this same level of predictive success has been achieved by several different and competing theories. How does one go about choosing between theories in such situations? Are statistical criteria irrelevant at this juncture? How is this uniformly high success to be explained

Partisan Defection and Change in the 2008 US Presidential Election

Party identification remained an important determinant of vote choice in the 2008 election. Indeed, the extent to which people voted according to their partisanship remained as exceptionally high as it had been in the 2004 election. The Democrats led in partisanship, with a greater lead than in 2004. The ANES four‐wave panel survey shows that some change occurred in the Democratic direction during 2008. The Democrats gained among most population groups, with the exception of older citizens. Obama\u27s victory margin was due to his carrying pure independents and the growth in strong Democrats as opposed to strong Republicans. Both candidates lost the votes of some partisans who disagreed with them ideologically. The rate of defection among major‐party identifiers to the other major party hit post‐1950 lows in 2004 and 2008, reflecting increased polarization in the electorate. The partisanship shifts of young people and Hispanics could portend realignment, although that depends on their satisfaction with the Obama administration

Racial Attitude Effects in the 2008 Presidential Election: Examining the Unconventional Factors Shaping Vote Choice in a Most Unconventional Election

Every election has unique elements, but the 2008 U.S. presidential race had it all: an African-American presidential candidate who won his party’s nomination by defeating a former first lady, an historically unpopular outgoing president, two ongoing wars, a failing economy, and a war hero running for president with a female vice-presidential running mate. With so many unique elements to account for, disentangling their independent effects to identify the dominant factors shaping the 2008 election is a tremendous challenge. This paper explores a wide variety of factors potentially influencing the 2008 vote, but it devotes particular attention to two exceptionally relevant factors: racial attitudes and succession effects. We begin this paper with a discussion of racial attitudes and succession effects’ relevance to vote choice. Then we test the effects of racial attitudes and succession effects, as well as other important factors, on vote choice in 2008, by analyzing the 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES) traditional September–October pre-election survey and November–December post-election survey.1 Finally, we test whether the racial attitude effects found in our 2008 results are unique to the Obama candidacy, or if similar results would be obtained by comparable analysis of the two most recent elections not contested by an incumbent president, the elections of 1988 and 2000, or in the preceding election of 2004. Stated concisely, our analysis shows that, of all the unusual factors shaping vote choice in 2008, two particularly important ones were racial attitudes and dissatisfaction with the Bush Administration. The comparison with 1988 and 2000 shows that attitudes toward the previous administration generally affect voting even when the incumbent is not running, and regardless of whether the incumbent party’s presidential candidate was a member of the outgoing presidential administration. The comparison with previous elections, including 2004, also provides an important demonstration that the racial attitudes effect was specific to 2008. Clearly, the historic nomination of an African-American for the presidency made racial attitudes more important in voting than they had been in analogous elections

The Inherent Predictability of Legislative Votes: The Perils of Successful Prediction

Most social science fields find prediction, even in the post-diction sense, to be very difficult. Predictive accuracy is generally low. Thus one would expect great enthusiasm once a field is able to move up to 80-90 percent correct prediction. This level has now been achieved in the legislative roll call analysis area. That would seem to suggest an important theoretical breakthrough has occurred in the area--until it becomes apparent that this same level of predictive success has been achieved by several different and competing theories. How does one go about choosing between theories in such situations? Are statistical criteria irrelevant at this juncture? How is this uniformly high success to be explained

Toward a Theory of Legislative Decision

Recent developments in formal political analysis have spawned two seemingly related theories of democratic political processes. The more familiar of the two is the theory of electoral competition based on Downs' (1957) heuristics and greatly elaborated by Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970), Kramer (1975), McKelvey (1976), and others. Somewhat less familiar (perhaps because the intellectual movement is less well integrated) is the theory of legislative decision which has grown from roots in game theory and the theory of social choice. Black (1958), Riker (1962), Plott (1967), Wilson (1969), Schwartz (1970), Kadane (1972), and several others have nurtured the rudimentary models which compose this theory

Toward a Theory of Legislative Decision

Recent developments in formal political analysis have spawned two seemingly related theories of democratic political processes. The more familiar of the two is the theory of electoral competition based on Downs' (1957) heuristics and greatly elaborated by Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970), Kramer (1975), McKelvey (1976), and others. Somewhat less familiar (perhaps because the intellectual movement is less well integrated) is the theory of legislative decision which has grown from roots in game theory and the theory of social choice. Black (1958), Riker (1962), Plott (1967), Wilson (1969), Schwartz (1970), Kadane (1972), and several others have nurtured the rudimentary models which compose this theory