The economic effects of franchise termination laws

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre- DSC:5300.405(LSE-FMG-DP--67) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Bargaining on Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering

Going public often creates an agency conflict between the owner-manager and minority shareholders. One possible way to resolve this conflict is through independent board monitoring. But board monitoring does not arise automatically in IPO companies. Owner-managers tend to entrench and capture the board. Analyzing a sample of French IPO firms, we find that the fraction of independent directors declines if the owner-manager is more powerful. However, we find that large pre-IPO non-management shareholders, such as venture capitalists, are successful in bargaining on board composition. These shareholders are successful in opposing the owner-manager and prevent a further reduction in the proportion of independent directors in the board. We also find that these shareholders contract on board composition in shareholder agreements. Copyright Springer 2005boards, initial public offerings (IPOs), going public, G32, G34,

Board monitoring, firm risk, and external regulation

Regulation, Board monitoring, Firm risk, Board independence, G34,