Understanding Democracy and Development Traps Using a Data-Driven Approach

Methods from machine learning and data science are becoming increasingly important in the social sciences, providing powerful new ways of identifying statistical relationships in large data sets. However, these relationships do not necessarily offer an understanding of the processes underlying the data. To address this problem, we have developed a method for fitting nonlinear dynamical systems models to data related to social change. Here, we use this method to investigate how countries become trapped at low levels of socioeconomic development. We identify two types of traps. The first is a democracy trap, where countries with low levels of economic growth and/or citizen education fail to develop democracy. The second trap is in terms of cultural values, where countries with low levels of democracy and/or life expectancy fail to develop emancipative values. We show that many key developing countries, including India and Egypt, lie near the border of these development traps, and we investigate the time taken for these nations to transition toward higher democracy and socioeconomic well-being

The Role of For-Profit Actors in Implementing Targeted Sanctions:The Case of the European Union

The evolution of sanctions from comprehensive to targeted has favored the inclusion of for-profit actors in the policy process. Sanctions are used to deal with security challenges and while the role of for-profit actors in the provision of public goods has been investigated, less has been said about their role in the provision of security. This chapter investigates the role of for-profit actors in the implementation of sanctions. More specifically, this chapter suggests a typology of regulatory environments that facilitates explaining and understanding the behavior of for-profit actors in implementing targeted sanctions. By looking at the quality of instructions provided by state authorities and their capacity to monitor the implementation of such decisions, the chapter argues that overcompliance, uneven and lack of compliance are more likely in certain regulatory environments rather than in others. The theoretical framework is tested on the case study of the restrictive measures of the EU. The data for this research was collected through semi-opened interviews and focus groups held in Brussels from 2013 to 2015

Executive control of bureaucracy and presidential cabinet appointments in East Asian democracies

This article examines the role of cabinet appointments in controlling the bureaucracy in presidential democracies. I demonstrate how administrative challenges stemming from the structure of the bureaucracy shape presidential choice of ministers. Analyzing a sample of four East Asian cases from 1986 through 2013, I find that presidents are more likely to select ministers from the civil service as bureaucracies are more professionalized, controlling for several political factors. Further evidence from qualitative interviews and case studies suggests that, in professionalized systems equipped with a sizable pool of talent but lacking responsiveness, presidents tend to promote ideologically aligned senior civil servants. However, in politicized systems, where presidents easily obtain responsiveness but face a low level of competence, policy experts tend to be selected from outside the bureaucracy. My findings have important implications for the regulatory governance and state capacity of East Asia, demonstrating the value of balancing between responsiveness and competence

Budget institutions and taxation

While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending

Rekonvaleszenz der Demokratie? Die Erholung bürgerlicher Freiheitsrechte im internationalen Vergleich

Nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 wurden in einigen westlichen Demokratien bürgerliche Freiheitsrechte durch eine verschärfte Sicherheitsgesetzgebung empfindlich beschnitten. Allerdings zeigen sich im folgenden Jahrzehnt deutliche Erholungseffekte, die wiederum zwischen den Ländern variieren. Auf Grundlage von Daten u. a. des Demokratiebarometers gehen wir der Frage nach, welche Faktoren die unterschiedliche Erholung bürgerlicher Freiheitsrechte in 22 OECD-Staaten zwischen 2002 und 2012 erklären können. Dabei zeigt sich, dass ein starkes und unabhängiges Rechtssystem und eine liberale politische Kultur den Wiederaufbau von Freiheitsrechten fördern, während die Betroffenheit von terroristischen Anschlägen keinen signifikanten Effekt auf die Erholung der Freiheitsrechte hat. Die Ergebnisse sprechen dafür, dass Demokratien dann zu einer Selbstkorrektur im Bereich der Sicherheitsgesetzgebung fähig sind, wenn sie durch rechtsstaatliche Institutionen eingehegt werden, die durch eine liberale politische Kultur unterfüttert sind