Power, Governance, and Ideas in Chile’s Free Trade Agreement Policy

Why is Chile following such a proactive FTA policy and at the same time promoting the benefits of these type of agreements to other Latin American countries? There is a pre-dominance of economic explanations to analyze why countries pursue an active FTA policy. Yet within an FTA policy, understood as an essential component of a country’s foreign policy, strategic and ideational goals are also important. Without downgrading economic explanations, I argue in this article that Chile’s proactive FTA policy can also be understood using variables from “traditional” international relations such as power, governance, and ideas. A framework based on such political-economic strategic issues and value-based ideas provides a better understanding of the country’s motivations in implementing such a proactive FTA policy.FTAs, status, soft balancing, economic dependence, governance, ideas, Chile

From Rivalry to Mutual Trust: The Othering Process between Bolivia and Chile

Bolivia and Chile live in a culture of rivalry as a consequence of the Nitrate War (1879-1883). In each country’s case, the construction of the other as a threat, a rival and/or inferior has shaped the discursive articulation of the bilateral relationship. Whereas the culture of rivalry is more evident in Bolivia because of its aspiration to alter the border, Chile’s statusquo position, which stresses that there are no pending issues with Bolivia, as well as its construction of itself as superior, also represents rivalrous behavior. The perception of Chile as a threat and rival became especially evident in Bolivia during these two countries’ bilateral negotiations to export gas to and through Chile (gas crisis from 2001-05). However, since Evo Morales and Michelle Bachelet took office in Bolivia (2006-present) and in Chile (2006-10), respectively, they have sought to change this culture of rivalry to one of friendship by constructing discursive articulations of self and other based on the principle of building mutual trust. Such a change in the form of othering is only possible to understand within the context of a crisis of meanings. The new approach of othering the counterpart as a friend has filled the void of meaning left by the crisis of discursive articulations of othering the counterpart as a rival, a threat and/or inferior.discourse, othering, identity, crisis, change, Bolivia, Chile

From Rivalry to Mutual Trust : The Othering Process between Bolivia and Chile

Bolivia and Chile live in a culture of rivalry as a consequence of the Nitrate War (1879‐1883). In each country’s case, the construction of the other as a threat, a rival and/or inferior has shaped the discursive articulation of the bilateral relationship. Whereas the culture of rivalry is more evident in Bolivia because of its aspiration to alter the border, Chile’s statusquo position, which stresses that there are no pending issues with Bolivia, as well as its construction of itself as superior, also represents rivalrous behavior. The perception of Chile as a threat and rival became especially evident in Bolivia during these two countries’ bilateral negotiations to export gas to and through Chile (gas crisis from 2001‐05). However, since Evo Morales and Michelle Bachelet took office in Bolivia (2006‐present) and in Chile (2006‐10), respectively, they have sought to change this culture of rivalry to one of friendship by constructing discursive articulations of self and other based on the principle of building mutual trust. Such a change in the form of othering is only possible to understand within the context of a crisis of meanings. The new approach of othering the counterpart as a friend has filled the void of meaning left by the crisis of discursive articulations of othering the counterpart as a rival, a threat and/or inferior.Bolivien und Chile leben – als Konsequenz des Salpeter‐Krieges (1879‐1883) – in einer „Kultur der Rivalität“. Seit diesem Krieg wechseln sich in den bilateralen Beziehungen dieser beiden Länder Episoden der Anspannung mit Momenten relativer Beruhigung ab. Die Darstellung des jeweils Anderen als eine Bedrohung, als Rivale und die Einstufung als minderwertig hat die diskursive Umsetzung der bilateralen Beziehungen geformt. Während in Bolivien die „Kultur der Rivalität“ wegen der angestrebten Grenzänderung stärker in den Vordergrund rückt, nimmt Chile gegenwärtig eine Position ein, wonach es keine offenen Themen mit Bolivien gäbe. Jedoch zeugt die Betonung der chilenischen Seite als überlegene Kraft gegenüber Bolivien von offener Rivalität. Die Wahrnehmung Chiles als Bedrohung und als Rivale wurde in Bolivien während der Gas‐Krise zwischen 2001 und 2005 offensichtlich. Seit dem Regierungsantritt von Evo Morales in Bolivien (2006‐) und Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2006‐2010) betonen beide, dass sie diese „Kultur der Rivalität“ beenden wollen und stattdessen eine diskursive Verständigung – basierend auf den Prinzipien der Freundschaft und des gegenseitigen Vertrauens – zwischen beiden Ländern anstreben

Power, Governance, and Ideas in Chile's Free Trade Agreement Policy

Why is Chile following such a proactive FTA policy and at the same time promoting the benefits of these type of agreements to other Latin American countries? There is a pre-dominance of economic explanations to analyze why countries pursue an active FTA policy. Yet within an FTA policy, understood as an essential component of a country's foreign policy, strategic and ideational goals are also important. Without downgrading economic explanations, I argue in this article that Chile's proactive FTA policy can also be understood using variables from 'traditional' international relations such as power, governance, and ideas. A framework based on such political-economic strategic issues and value-based ideas provides a better understanding of the country's motivations in implementing such a proactive FTA policy.Was sind die Gründe für Chiles derartig aktive Freihandelspolitik und dafür, dass Chile die Vorteile dieser Art von Abkommen gleichzeitig auch anderen lateinamerikanischen Staaten anpreist? Zur Erklärung, warum Länder eine aktive Freihandelspolitik verfolgen, werden überwiegend ökonomische Gründe aufgeführt. Doch bei einer aktiven Freihandelspolitik, die als wichtiger Bestandteil der Außenpolitik angesehen wird, müssen auch strategische und ideelle Ziele Berücksichtigung finden. Ohne die ökonomischen Erklärungen abzuwerten, wird in diesem Beitrag die Auffassung vertreten, dass Chiles aktive Freihandelspolitik auch als Rückgriff auf 'traditionelle' Variablen der internationalen Beziehungen wie Macht, Governance und Ideen verstanden werden kann. Eine Darstellung der politisch-ökonomischen Strategiefragen und der ideellen Aspekte lässt die Beweggründe dieses Landes für eine solch aktive Freihandelspolitik einfacher nachvollziehen

Más allá de lo económico: Los objetivos estratégicos de los TLCs de Chile y México

En este trabajo se analizan los “otros” objetivos que llevan a Chile y México a concretar TLCs intra o extra-regionales. Estos países tienen una motivación económica que predomina al momento de buscar estos acuerdos; sin embargo, existen otros elementos que son menos aparentes, pero igualmente esenciales en la configuración de sus políticas de TLCs; por lo tanto, estos acuerdos también pueden ser vistos como medios de poder y mecanismos de gobernanza económica global más cercanos que los disponibles en foros multilaterales y, por ende, ad-hoc a las realidades económicas y políticas de estos dos países. Es decir, los TLCs al ser parte importante de la política exterior de Chile y México, poseen una lógica político-económica estratégica que se sintetiza en poder e instituciones de gobernanza. Estas dos fuerzas no son en sí contradictorias a la lógica económica, que se centra en la maximización del bienestar económico de los consumidores y en la utilidad de los productores, si no que deben ser vistas como factores complementarios.TLCs, asimetría, poder suave, balance de poder, gobernanza

Drivers of Strategic Contestation in South America

The politics of contestation on the part of secondary regional powers such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela towards Brazil as the regional leader oscillate between competition and cooperation, inasmuch as the South American region has one regional power and is a zone of negative peace without aggressive rivalries. The secondary powers use different tactics, which constitute their respective foreign policy strategies, to soft balance Brazil. These tactics include alliance building, entangling diplomacy, binding, and omnienmeshment. This paper identifies, first, the specific drivers of contestation towards Brazil and, second, why the secondary powers' foreign policy strategies vary in how they directly or indirectly contest the rise of Brazil at the regional and international levels. The paper demonstrates that in a regional order such as that of South America, which is characterized by relative stability, domestic drivers of contestation are key to explaining secondary powers' varied strategic responses to the regional power

The “I” in BRICS:Leadership Traits of Indian Prime Ministers and India's Role Adaptation to Rising Status in World Politics

This paper inquires theoretically into how leaders act and react to the state role of rising power through the case study of India. It brings together role theory and leadership trait analysis, and contends that there is a puzzling interplay between rising status and leaders’ characteristics. We project that leaders’ traits and styles condition how they enact roles. India and its leaders offer a suitable case for investigating this issue. Since the economically unstable early 1990s, India has gone through a relatively successful era of global emergence. Thus, we examine the relationship between India’s roles and the leadership profiles of Prime Ministers Atal Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Narenda Modi, specifically their belief in the ability to control events and the need for power. We find especially in Vajpayee and Singh that their traits can help explain India’s foreign policy roles and in Modi (first term only) a leader vulnerable to contextual winds. We argue that the interplay of leaders’ traits and roles, as expressions of both material and social dimensions, helps assess how they make sense of their country’s rising within both the regional and international systems

The “I” in BRICS:leadership traits of Indian prime ministers and India's role adaptation to rising status in world politics

This paper inquires theoretically into how leaders act and react to the state role of rising power through the case study of India. It brings together role theory and leadership trait analysis, and contends that there is a puzzling interplay between rising status and leaders’ characteristics. We project that leaders’ traits and styles condition how they enact roles. India and its leaders offer a suitable case for investigating this issue. Since the economically unstable early 1990s, India has gone through a relatively successful era of global emergence. Thus, we examine the relationship between India’s roles and the leadership profiles of Prime Ministers Atal Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Narenda Modi, specifically their belief in the ability to control events and the need for power. We find especially in Vajpayee and Singh that their traits can help explain India’s foreign policy roles and in Modi (first term only) a leader vulnerable to contextual winds. We argue that the interplay of leaders’ traits and roles, as expressions of both material and social dimensions, helps assess how they make sense of their country’s rising within both the regional and international systems

Leader Influence in Role Selection Choices: Fulfilling Role Theory’s Potential for Foreign Policy Analysis

While it has been well-documented when and how leaders matter in foreign policy, there is still no clear roadmap on how to connect and investigate the different possibilities that leadership studies offer for the benefit of role theory development. Thus, this article lays the foundation for a dialogue between role theory and leader-based approaches to foreign policy. We approach this as a ‘glass half full’ as leaders are present in role theory, but not properly integrated in terms of theorisation and methods to study their influence on the overall selection of roles. We present a range of possible ways to study the beliefs and personal characteristics of leaders and other motivational approaches that inform and shape their role selection process. A better integration of the individual level can give foreign policy scholars and practitioners a more complete picture of why governments decide to prioritise certain roles over others. Introducing a way forward in establishing a more robust connection between leaders and the roles of the state also provides scholars with a more complete toolkit to analyse and unpack agent-structure relations in foreign policy

The Pacific Alliance casts its cloud over Latin America

In a joint declaration on 8 October 2013, the presidents of the Pacific Alliance (PA) – an organisation legally constituted in 2012 that is comprised of Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico – announced the conclusion of trade negotiations to remove all tariff barriers between its member states, thus making it the eighth largest economy in the world. This new free trade agreement (FTA) has attracted the interest of states and business sectors around the world, including the German Business Association for Latin America, which will dedicate its Latin American Day conference in November 2013 to this new group. The PA will remove 92 percent of all trade tariffs by the end of 2013 and progressively lift the remaining 8 percent. Whereas financial markets and some of its protagonists depict the PA as the new star in Latin America, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA) and most of the countries of the Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur – Mercosur) see the PA as a new attempt by the United States to undermine alternative patterns of regional integration in the Americas. The PA is an economic alliance that revives the open regionalist model of the early 1990s in Latin America in that it seeks to increase intratrade and extraregional trade relationships with Asia, the United States and Europe; the PA states already have FTAs with the United States and the European Union. The positive view of the PA in Latin America and abroad is based on its economic potential. In fact, Australia, Canada, China, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Paraguay, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the United States and Uruguay have already applied for and been granted observer status. Moreover, Costa Rica and Panama are on their way to becoming full members. At the political level, however, the PA has created friction in the region as it brings Mexico into South America – an area seen by Brazil as its sphere of influence. Moreover, the PA countries have good relations with the United States and are in line with its FTA agenda