Worker remittances and the global preconditions of ‘smart development’

With the growing environmental crisis affecting our globe, ideas to weigh economic or social progress by the ‘energy input’ necessary to achieve it are increasingly gaining acceptance. This question is intriguing and is being dealt with by a growing number of studies, focusing on the environmental price of human progress. Even more intriguing, however, is the question of which factors of social organization contribute to a responsible use of the resources of our planet to achieve a given social result (‘smart development’). In this essay, we present the first systematic study on how migration – or rather, more concretely, received worker remittances per GDP – helps the nations of our globe to enjoy social and economic progress at a relatively small environmental price. We look at the effects of migration on the balance sheets of societal accounting, based on the ‘ecological price’ of the combined performance of democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human development, research and development, and social cohesion. Feminism in power, economic freedom, population density, the UNDP education index as well as the receipt of worker remittances all significantly contribute towards a ‘smart overall development’, while high military expenditures and a high world economic openness are a bottleneck for ‘smart overall development’

Cliophysics: Socio-political Reliability Theory, Polity Duration and African Political (In)stabilities

Quantification of historical sociological processes have recently gained attention among theoreticians in the effort of providing a solid theoretical understanding of the behaviors and regularities present in sociopolitical dynamics. Here we present a reliability theory of polity processes with emphases on individual political dynamics of African countries. We found that the structural properties of polity failure rates successfully capture the risk of political vulnerability and instabilities in which 87.50%, 75%, 71.43%, and 0% of the countries with monotonically increasing, unimodal, U-shaped and monotonically decreasing polity failure rates, respectively, have high level of state fragility indices. The quasi-U-shape relationship between average polity duration and regime types corroborates historical precedents and explains the stability of the autocracies and democracies.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl

Confrontational Behavior and Escalation to War 1816-1980: A Research Plan

The understanding of international war, like many complex social events, may be - and has been - ap proached from a range of theoretical perspectives and via a variety of research strategies. Outside of the work of Bloch (1898), Sorokin (1936), Richardson (1941), and Wright (1942), however, there was little re search of a scientific nature until the mid-1960s. And while these past fifteen years have certainly not given us a compelling theory of international war, they have seen a steady growth in cumulative knowledge regar ding the correlates of war. These results, despite the expected mix of inconsistencies and anomalies, provide us with some sense of the factors that are most consistently associated with war over the last century and a half, along with some tentative insights into the rising and declining potency of these factors.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68556/2/10.1177_002234338201900104.pd

Short- and long-term growth effects of special interest groups in the U.S. states: A dynamic panel error-correction approach

The perception of special interest groups as a serious threat to economic growth has strengthened over the years; however, the vast empirical literature surrounding this claim has produced mixed and inconclusive results. This study re-examines the issue incorporating a potentially important aspect that has generally been ignored by previous studies, namely, the implicit suggestion by some of the theoretical works that the extent and the intensity of the growth effects of special interest groups may differ significantly over different time frames. Specifically, this study uses dynamic panel error-correction methods (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999)) to properly determine whether these effects, if they exist, occur mostly in the short run or the long run based on data from a panel of 48 U.S. states for the years 1975 – 2004. The joint Hausman-type test selected the preferred model, which controls for human capital achievement, initial income, income inequality, and the tax burden. This model produced results which are in sharp contrast to the simple linearly negative or positive findings reported in much of the literature by indicating that special interest groups have significant non-linearly inverted U-shaped long-run effects on growth, and that it takes time (about 8 years) for the full effects to become evident. The results provide evidence that U.S. states face a threshold point below which special interest groups’ lobbying and rent-seeking activities boost long-run growth performance but above which they have damaging effects on long-run growth effort. This is confirmed by the Lind and Mehlum (2010) u-test which also suggests that the threshold point is reached when the activities and strength of special interest groups (measured by the percentage of each state’s public and private non-agricultural wage and salary employees who are union members, and which varies from 3.8% to 38.7%)) is at the 15.8% level