73 research outputs found
Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic
According to a widely held view of the matter, whenever we assess beliefs as ârationalâ or âjustifiedâ, we are making normative judgements about those beliefs. In this discussion, I shall simply assume, for the sake of argument, that this view is correct. My goal here is to explore a particular approach to understanding the basic principles that explain which of these normative judgements are true. Specifically, this approach is based on the assumption that all such normative principles are grounded in facts about values, and the normative principles that apply to beliefs in particular are grounded in facts about alethic valueââa kind of value that is exemplified by believing what is true and not believing what is false. In this chapter, I shall explain what I regard as the best way of interpreting this approach. In doing so, I shall also show how this interpretation can solve some problems that have recently been raised for approaches of this kind by Selim Berker, Jennifer Carr, Michael Caie, and Hilary Greaves
Plato's Theory of Knowledge
An account of Platoâs theory of knowledge is offered. Plato is in a sense a contextualist: at least, he recognizes that his own use of the word for âknowledgeâ varies â in some contexts, it stands for the fullest possible level of understanding of a truth, while in other contexts, it is broader and includes less complete levels of understanding as well. But for Plato, all knowledge, properly speaking, is a priori knowledge of necessary truths â based on recollection of aspects of the Forms â and so in contemporary terms, it meets the conditions of âsafetyâ and âadherenceâ (or âindefeasibilityâ) to the highest degree. This account is defended on the basis of the text of Meno, Phaedo, and the Republic, against some objections â especially objections that are due to Gail Fine
The Pitfalls of âReasonsâ
Many philosophers working on the branches of philosophy that deal with the normative questions have adopted a " Reasons First" program. This paper criticizes the foundational assumptions of this program. In fact, there are many different concepts that can be expressed by the term 'reason' in English, none of which are any more fundamental than any others. Indeed, most of these concepts are not particularly fundamental in any interesting sens
Doxastic Rationality
This chapter is concerned with the distinction that most contemporary epistemologists express by distinguishing between âpropositionalâ and âdoxasticâ justification. The goal is to develop an account of this distinction that applies, not just to full or outright beliefs, but also to partial credencesâand indeed, in principle, to attitudes of all kinds. The standard way of explaining this distinction, in terms of the âbasing relationâ, is criticized, and an alternative accountâthe âvirtue manifestationâ accountâis proposed in its place. This account has a certain kinship with the epistemological approach that is known as âreliabilismâ, but it also has certain key differencesâabove all, it is compatible with an internalist view of rationality
The Reasons Aggregation Theorem
Often, when one faces a choice between alternative actions, there are reasons both for and against each alternative. On one way of understanding these words, what one âought to do all things considered (ATC)â is determined by the totality of these reasons. So, these reasons can somehow be âcombinedâ or âaggregatedâ to yield an ATC verdict on these alternatives. First, various assumptions about this sort of aggregation of reasons are articulated. Then it is shown that these assumptions allow for the proof of a âReasons Aggregation Theoremâ â parallel to John Harsanyiâs 1955 âSocial Aggregation Theoremâ. All reasons for action are grounded in reason-providing values; and, for every such reason-providing value, there is in principle a way of measuring how strongly this value counts against each alternative. The theorem tells us that the appropriate measure of how much reason ATC there is against each alternative is simply a weighted sum of the strengths with which these values count against that alternative; the agent ought not ATC to perform an action iff there is ATC more reason against it than against some available alternative
- âŠ