Mortgage refinancing in 2001 and early 2002

Over the past ten years, millions of homeowners have taken advantage of lower mortgage interest rates and higher home values and have refinanced their mortgage loans. For many, the decision to refinance was motivated by a desire to reduce their monthly mortgage payments, either by obtaining a lower interest rate or by extending the maturity of their mortgage. When they have refinanced, many homeowners have liquefied some of the equity they accumulated in their homes by borrowing more than they needed to pay off their former mortgage and cover the transaction costs of the refinancing. They have used the funds raised in so-called cash-out refinancings to make home improvements, to repay other debts, or to purchase goods and services or other assets. This article presents estimates, based on recent survey findings, of the incidence of refinancing, the changes in terms and conditions of mortgages after refinancing, the amount of funds homeowners raised in the process, and the ways in which homeowners used the funds. It also provides comparisons with previous surveys of refinancing activity and a statistical analysis of the relative importance of different determinants of refinancing and the amount of home equity liquefied during refinancing. Finally, it gives rough estimates of the effects of recent refinancing on the U.S. economy, including the effects on aggregate consumption spending.Mortgages ; Housing - Finance

Federal Home Loan Bank advances and commercial bank portfolio composition

This paper considers the role of Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances in stabilizing their commercial bank members' residential mortgage lending activities. Our theoretical model shows that using mortgage-related membership criteria or requiring mortgage-related collateral does not ensure that FHLB advances will be put to use for stabilizing members' financing of housing. Using panel vector autoregression (VAR) techniques, we estimate recent dynamic responses of U.S. bank portfolios to FHLB advance shocks, bank lending shocks, and macroeconomic shocks. Our empirical findings suggest that FHLB advances are just as likely to fund other types of bank credit as to fund single-family mortgages.

The role of specialized lenders in extending mortgages to lower-income and minority homebuyers

Home-purchase lending to lower-income and minority households and neighborhoods has expanded significantly and at a faster rate than lending to other borrowers in recent years. Over the same period, however, an increasing proportion of applicants for conventional home-purchase mortgages, including lower-income and minority applicants, have had their applications denied. The first trend often has been taken as evidence that lenders' efforts to expand credit availability have been successful, whereas the second trend has contributed to concerns about access to credit and the fairness of the lending process. An important but little-recognized force behind the shift of credit toward lower-income and minority borrowers has been a rapid expansion of activity by subprime and manufactured-home lenders, lenders who are oriented toward lower-income and minority households. Using data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) from 1993 to 1998, this article finds that part of the growth in mortgage lending and most of the increase in denial rates are associated with the substantial and growing share of mortgage activity of institutions that specialize in subprime and manufactured-home lending.Mortgages ; Discrimination in mortgage loans

FHA, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Great Recession

Part of the Finance and Economics Discussion Series

GSE Activity, FHA Feedback, and Implications for the Efficacy of the Affordable Housing Goals

Abstract There is a seeming paradox about the "affordable housing goals": GSE activities in targeted communities have increased under the goals but there has been little measurable improvement in housing market conditions in these communities. This paper seeks to reconcile this paradox by focusing on linkage between GSE purchases and FHA activities. We build a simple model based on credit rationing theory that suggests that GSE activities can have a feedback effect on FHA. More aggressive GSE pursuit of targeted borrowers under the affordable housing goals induces potential FHA borrowers with best credit quality to use the conventional market. In response, the FHA applies more strict underwriting standards under new market equilibrium, which results in reduced loan volumes. On balance, these effects can offset and make credit supply and homeownership effectively unchanged. Empirical evidence on changes in GSE and FHA lending after affordable housing goals were made more binding is found to be consistent with the theoretical predictions