Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate

The following section provides an overview of how to think about air power and coercion, addressing several key limits of the current literature. We next examine NATO goals in Kosovo and the mixed success eventually achieved. Using that baseline, we explore various explanations for Belgrade\u27s eventual capitulation and clarify how air power\u27s role in each of them should be understood; we leave aside the issue of whether coercion was a proper strategy for addressing the Balkan crisis and focus instead on how to assess air power as a tool of that strategy. We conclude with recommendations for recasting the air power debate to better reflect air power\u27s true contributions and limits

The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might

This book examines how the United States uses limited military force and other means to influence adversaries and potential adversaries. It reviews when limited force can and cannot work and examines a range of current challenges, including those of guerrilla groups or minor powers armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. It also looks at the complications arising from domestic politics and the difficulties of using force in an alliance. Most up-to-date survey of coercion in international relations; focus on US Examines problem from adversary\u27s point of view as well as US Covers range of challenges, including guerrilla warfare, nuclear/chemical/biological warfare, smaller state aggression (e.g. Iraq)https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1176/thumbnail.jp

Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate

The following section provides an overview of how to think about air power and coercion, addressing several key limits of the current literature. We next examine NATO goals in Kosovo and the mixed success eventually achieved. Using that baseline, we explore various explanations for Belgrade\u27s eventual capitulation and clarify how air power\u27s role in each of them should be understood; we leave aside the issue of whether coercion was a proper strategy for addressing the Balkan crisis and focus instead on how to assess air power as a tool of that strategy. We conclude with recommendations for recasting the air power debate to better reflect air power\u27s true contributions and limits

Air Power as a Coercive Instrument

Coercion – the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior – is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer\u27s ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary\u27s military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power – or any other military instrument – will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers\u27 use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater.https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1264/thumbnail.jp

Air Power as a Coercive Instrument

Coercion – the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior – is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer\u27s ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary\u27s military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power – or any other military instrument – will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers\u27 use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater.https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1264/thumbnail.jp