Angel investor's selection criteria: a comparative institutional perspective

Despite the important role of angel investors as critical financial providers for new ventures, little is known regarding how institutions make their investment decisions. While angels make decisions based on selection criteria during the first stage, they are also embedded within and affected by different institutional settings and as a result weight these criteria differently than other investors. We compare angel investors' selection criteria in China and Denmark using the comparative institutional perspective. We use a policy capturing approach and hierarchy linear modeling, revealing that since Chinese angels are embedded within relationship-based institutional settings they tend to reply more on strong ties such as family and friends in management team, as well as weighting risks less compared to Danish angels operating within more rule-based institutional contexts

Co-optation & Clientelism: Nested Distributive Politics in China’s Single-Party Dictatorship

What explains the persistent growth of public employment in reform-era China despite repeated and forceful downsizing campaigns? Why do some provinces retain more public employees and experience higher rates of bureaucratic expansion than others? Among electoral regimes, the creation and distribution of public jobs is typically attributed to the politics of vote buying and multi-party competition. Electoral factors, however, cannot explain the patterns observed in China’s single-party dictatorship. This study highlights two nested factors that influence public employment in China: party co-optation and personal clientelism. As a collective body, the ruling party seeks to co-opt restive ethnic minorities by expanding cadre recruitment in hinterland provinces. Within the party, individual elites seek to expand their own networks of power by appointing clients to office. The central government’s professed objective of streamlining bureaucracy is in conflict with the party’s co-optation goal and individual elites’ clientelist interest. As a result, the size of public employment has inflated during the reform period despite top-down mandates to downsize bureaucracy.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/116599/1/Ang, Cooptation & Clientelism, posted 2016-01.pdfDescription of Ang, Cooptation & Clientelism, posted 2016-01.pdf : First Onlin