Widening versus Deepening of International Unions

The article provides a theoretical framework of international unions in the form of two two-stage games with discounting and one simultaneous game aimed at generating insights into the conflict between widening and deepening in the integration process. Each country (player) has a preference for a set of regulations (policies). Regulatory differences between countries cause utility loss. Harmonization reduces the utility loss but entails a cost since it requires union members to implement harmonized rules that may deviate from the country’s preferred regulation. Insiders harmonize a subset of the regulations. Widening signifies that outsiders join the union by accepting the union’s harmonized set of regulations - which is beneficial for the insiders. Deepening means that insiders proceed to harmonize a larger subset of regulations. We inquire whether widening should precede deepening, or vice versa, or whether it is preferable to interchange widening and deepening in some incrementally prescribed manner. The incentive to pursue further regulatory harmonization within a union increases with the regulatory diversity among insiders certeris paribus, provided the effect of outsiders on the utility of insiders is small. Insiders are more reluctant to opt for widening before deepening the more the mean regulatory preference of insiders deviates from the mean regulatory preference of outsiders in areas likely to become harmonized in the future. In contrast, members are more inclined to choose widening before deepening the more the mean regulatory preference of insiders deviates from the mean preference of outsiders in already harmonized areas

Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples

Game theory, economic equilibrium, economic theory

From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law

Notwithstanding the radically changed landscape of contemporary administrative governance, the categories that guide comparative administrative law and that determine what will be compared remain similar to those used at the founding of the discipline in the late 1800s. These categories are rooted in confidence in an expert bureaucracy to accomplish public purposes and are mainly twofold - administrative organization and judicial review. This outdated model has limited the ability of comparative law to engage with contemporary debates on the administrative state, which instead display considerable skepticism of public administration and are premised on achieving the public good through a plural accountability network of public and private actors. This Article seeks to correct the anachronism by reframing comparative administrative law as an accountability network of rules and procedures designed to embed public administration and civil servants in their liberal democratic societies: accountability to elected officials, organized interests, the courts, and the general public. Based on this paradigm, the Article compares American and European administrative law in a global context. Among the many differences explored are parliamentary versus presidential political control, pluralist versus neo-corporatist forms of self-regulation and public-private collaboration, judicial review focused on fundamental rights versus policy rationality, and reliance on ombudsmen in lieu of courts. The Article concludes with a number of suggestions for how comparative law can speak to current debates on reforming administrative governance

International Nonregimes: A Research Agenda1

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/146934/1/j.1468-2486.2007.00672.x.pd

Differentiation theory and the ontologies of regionalism in Latin America

Abstract In this article, we argue that conventional understandings of regional integration based on neo-functionalism, hitherto often used to describe the diverse projects of Latin American regionalism, are of limited utility in that context. Rather than representing processes of economic or political unification, the various regionalisms could be understood more productively as a reaction to the crisis in legitimacy that social orders in the region have experienced under the conditions of globalized modernity. We then deploy an understanding of regionalism derived from sociological differentiation theory in order to advance this argument

For a of International Commercial Dispute Resolution for Private Parties

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020

Darkness by design: the hidden power in global capital markets/ Walter Mattli.

An exposé of fragmented trading platforms, poor governance, and exploitative practices in today's capital marketsCapital markets have undergone a dramatic transformation in the past two decades. Algorithmic high-speed supercomputing has replaced traditional floor trading and human market makers, while centralized exchanges that once ensured fairness and transparency have fragmented into a dizzying array of competing exchanges and trading platforms. Darkness by Design exposes the unseen perils of market fragmentation and "dark" markets, some of which are deliberately designed to enable the transfer of wealth from the weak to the powerful.Walter Mattli traces the fall of the traditional exchange model of the NYSE, the world's leading stock market in the twentieth century, showing how it has come to be supplanted by fragmented markets whose governance is frequently set up to allow unscrupulous operators to exploit conflicts of interest at the expense of an unsuspecting public. Market makers have few obligations, market surveillance is neglected or impossible, enforcement is ineffective, and new technologies are not necessarily used to improve oversight but to offer lucrative preferential market access to select clients in ways that are often hidden. Mattli argues that power politics is central in today's fragmented markets. He sheds critical light on how the redistribution of power and influence has created new winners and losers in capital markets and lays the groundwork for sensible reforms to combat shady trading schemes and reclaim these markets for the long-term benefit of everyone.Essential reading for anyone with money in the stock market, Darkness by Design challenges the conventional view of markets and reveals the troubling implications of unchecked market power for the health of the global economy and society as a whole.Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; CONTENTS; Figures and Tables; 1 Introduction; A Deeply Puzzling Market Transformation; Power Politics and Market Governance; 2 The Puzzling Transformation of Capital Market Structure: From Gradual Concentration to Sudden Fragmentation; The Evolution of the Market Organization and Its Body Politic; The Transformation of Power Relationships among Members; The Impact of Power Asymmetry; Implications; Appendix; 3 Good Governance in Centralized Markets: The Old NYSE; The Market Makers: Functions and Obligations; Market Surveillance; Rule EnforcementMarket Performance and QualityMoving into the Twenty-First Century; 4 Stratification in Modern Trading: The Haves and Have-Nots; Speed; Globalization, Financial Innovation, and Stratification; 5 Bad Governance in Fragmented Markets; Weakened Market-Making Obligations; Information Asymmetry: Trading Data; Information Asymmetry:Market Microstructure; Darkness; Failing Market Surveillance; Implications; Appendix; 6 Conclusion: The Way Forward; Market Transparency; Leveling the Playing Field; Proper Accountability for Market Disruption and Bad Governance; Consolidation; AcknowledgmentsAppendix: Market Governance: A Theoretical Background NoteA Political Organization Approach in Relation to Other Theories; Behavioral Assumption: Opportunism; Glossary; Notes; Bibliography; Index1 online resource