An empirical analysis ofcompetition, privatization, and regulation in telecommunications markets in Africa and Latin America

The author explores the effects of privatization, competition, and regulation on telecommunications performance in 30 African and Latin American countries from 1984 to 1997. Competition is associated with tangible benefits in terms of mainline penetration, number of pay phones, connection capacity, and reduced prices. Fixed-effects regressions reveal that competition - measured by mobile operators not owned by the incumbent telecommunications provider - is correlated with increases in the per capita number of mainlines, pay phones, and connection capacity, and with decreases in the price of local calls. Privatizing an incumbent is negatively correlated with mainline penetration and connection capacity. Privatization combined with regulation by an independent regulator, however, is positively correlated with connection capacity and substantially mitigates privatization's negative correlation with mainline penetration. Reformers are right to emphasize a combination of privatization, competition, and regulation. But researchers must explore the permutations of regulation: What type of regulation do countries adopt (price caps versus cost-of-service, for example)? How does the regulatory agency work? What is the annual budget? How many employees does it have? Where do regulators come from? What sort of training and experience do they have? What enforcement powers does the regulatory agency have? In addition, researchers must deal with endogeneity of privatization, competition, and regulation to deal with issues of casualty.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,ICT Policy and Strategies,Trade Finance and Investment,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Knowledge Economy,Economic Theory&Research,Education for the Knowledge Economy,ICT Policy and Strategies,Environmental Economics&Policies

Telecom traffic and investment in developing countries : the effects of international settlement rate reductions

Developing countries, which received about $35 billion in net settlement payments from the United States telecom carriers between 1985 and 1998, were upset by the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) decision to slash rates, because lower rates mean lower payments. They claim that the payments help finance telecom investment, and that the FCC's decision will therefore harm their telecom sectors. The author uses a panel data set for 178 countries from 1985 to 1998 to testhow changes in settlement rates affect telecom traffic and investment. He finds that rates are significantly negatively correlated with traffic, with the greatest effects in the poorest countries. In other words, reduced settlement rates spur telecom traffic from developing countries to the United States. And while there is a statistically significant correlation between settlement payments and telecom revenues in developing countries, he finds no correlation between the payments and the number of telephone mainlines or imports of telecommunications equipment. In short, there is no evidence that the payments are invested in telecom networks.Telecommunications Infrastructure,Housing&Human Habitats,Labor Policies,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Airports and Air Services,Economic Theory&Research,Telecommunications Infrastructure,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Housing&Human Habitats

Universal(ly bad) service - providing infrastructure services to rural and poor urban consumers

Until recently, utility services (telecommunications, power, water, and gas) throughout the world were provided by large, usually state-owned, monopolies. However, encouraged by technological change, regulatory innovation, and pressure from international organizations, many developing countries are privatizing state-owned companies and introducing competition. Some observers worry that even if reforms improve efficiency, they might compromise an important public policy goal-ensuring"universal access"for low-income and rural households. The authors review the motivation for universal service, methods used to try to achieve it under monopoly service provision, how reforms might affect these approaches, and the theoretical and empirical evidence of the impact of reform on these consumers. Next, using household data from around the world, they investigate empirically the historical performance of public monopolies in meeting universal service obligations and the impact of reform. The results show the massive failure of state monopolies to provide service to poor and rural households everywhere except Eastern Europe. Moreover, while the data are limited, the evidence suggests that reforms have not harmed poor and rural consumers, and in many cases have improved their access to utility services. Nevertheless, because competition undermines traditional methods of funding universal service objectives (cross-subsidies), the authors also review mechanisms that could finance these objectives without compromising the benefits of reforms.Economic Theory&Research,Health Economics&Finance,Municipal Financial Management,Environmental Economics&Policies,Decentralization,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Health Economics&Finance,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Municipal Financial Management

Has the internet increased trade? Evidence from industrial and developing countries

If the Internet made it easier for firms to enter new markets by reducing communication and search costs, then it may also have made it easier to export goods and services. The authors find that higher Internet penetration in developing countries is correlated with greater exports to industrial countries, but not with trade between developing countries or with exports from industrial countries. Interpreting the correlations is difficult because causation may run from Internet use to exports or from trade openness to Internet use. To test whether Internet use affects export behavior, the authors endogenize Internet use by using countries'regulation of data services and Internet provision as instrumental variables. The results are robust to endogenizing Internet penetration, suggesting that access to the Internet does affect the export performance of firms in developing countries. In other words, Internet access appears to stimulate exports from poor countries to rich countries. Moreover, the analysis suggests that regulatory policies affecting telecommunications and Internet development indirectly affect trade, further emphasizing the importance of deregulating potentially competitive services in the telecommunications industry.Rural Communications,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Knowledge Economy,Information Technology,Knowledge Economy,Education for the Knowledge Economy,Economic Theory&Research,Information Technology,Rural Communications

What Affects the Quality of Economic Analysis for Life-Saving Investments?

Economic analysis of life-saving investments in both the public and private sectors has the potential to dramatically improve longevity and the quality of life, but only if the analyses on which decisions are based are done well. In this paper we analyze a dataset that provides information on the content and quality of journal articles that measure the cost-effectiveness of life-saving investments. Our study is the first to provide a detailed multivariate analysis of factors affecting objective measures of quality. We also explore whether a series of recommendations by an expert panel convened by the U.S. Public Health Service affect the way analyses of specific life-saving investments are done. Our results suggest that four factors are positively correlated with an index we construct to measure analytical quality: 1. having at least one author affiliated with a university; 2. publication in a journal that has experience in publishing these analyses; 3. if the life-saving investment is located in the U.S., and 4. if the analysis considers a measure of social costs or benefits. Somewhat surprisingly, a study's funding source and whether it is affiliated with industry are not significantly correlated with the quality index. Finally, neither time nor the panel guidelines had an impact on the index.

International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999

Why do some countries adopt market-oriented reforms such as deregulation, privatization and liberalization of competition in their infrastructure industries while others do not? Why did the pace of adoption accelerate in the 1990s? Building on neo-institutional theory in sociology, we argue that the domestic adoption of market-oriented reforms is strongly influenced by international pressures of coercion and emulation. We find robust support for these arguments with an event-history analysis of the determinants of reform in the telecommunications and electricity sectors of as many as 205 countries and territories between 1977 and 1999. Our results also suggest that the coercive effect of multilateral lending from the IMF, the World Bank or Regional Development Banks is increasing over time, a finding that is consistent with anecdotal evidence that multilateral organizations have broadened the scope of the “conditionality” terms specifying market-oriented reforms imposed on borrowing countries. We discuss the possibility that, by pressuring countries into policy reform, cross-national coercion and emulation may not produce ideal outcomes.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40099/3/wp713.pd

Of monkeys and men:Impatience in perceptual decision-making

For decades sequential sampling models have successfully accounted for human and monkey decision-making, relying on the standard assumption that decision makers maintain a pre-set decision standard throughout the decision process. Based on the theoretical argument of reward rate maximization, some authors have recently suggested that decision makers become increasingly impatient as time passes and therefore lower their decision standard. Indeed, a number of studies show that computational models with an impatience component provide a good fit to human and monkey decision behavior. However, many of these studies lack quantitative model comparisons and systematic manipulations of rewards. Moreover, the often-cited evidence from single-cell recordings is not unequivocal and complimentary data from human subjects is largely missing. We conclude that, despite some enthusiastic calls for the abandonment of the standard model, the idea of an impatience component has yet to be fully established; we suggest a number of recently developed tools that will help bring the debate to a conclusive settlement