264 research outputs found
Too-big-to-fail after FDICIA
This reprint of a 1993 article outlines what Congress intended the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 to accomplish. A new preface discusses FDICIA's successes and failures as well as research calling for clearer policies to deal with the problem of "too big to fail" banks.Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ; Deposit insurance
Determinants of the loan loss allowance: some cross-country comparisons
This paper analyses the determinants of banks’ loan loss allowances for samples of US banks and three non-US samples: a group of 21 countries, Canada and Japan. The model includes fundamental (or non-discretionary) determinants of the allowance such as non-performing loans, and discretionary determinants such as income before the loan loss provision. The results suggest that the loan loss allowance is sensitive to pre-provision income in almost all samples. However, the results also suggest that some variables thought to reflect fundamental factors in US analysis, such as net chargeoffs, are not significant factors for non-US banks.loan loss allowance; accounting standards; international banking; nonperforming loan; discretionary accruals
Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's voluntary initiatives: Lessons from banking
The federal government has an interest in the financial stability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because of their importance to financial markets and the government's implicit guarantee of their liabilities. ; In October 2000 these two housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) announced six voluntary initiatives. One initiative would enhance market discipline by having the GSEs issue subordinated debt. A second would boost liquidity by having the GSEs maintain a liquid securities portfolio. The other four initiatives would increase transparency by having the GSEs disclose their credit and interest rate losses under certain scenarios, obtain a credit rating for the government's exposure to loss, and disclose whether the GSEs comply with certain capital adequacy standards. ; This article evaluates the initiatives from the perspective of current banking standards. The analysis suggests that the initiatives are beneficial but could be made more effective. The authors point out that the contribution of the subordinated debt initiative depends largely on whether investors believe the implicit guarantee extends to subordinated debtholders. The need for the liquidity initiative has not been established, the authors conclude, and can be criticized as allowing the GSEs to earn a credit spread. The most important of the disclosure initiatives, the one for interest rate risk, will provide some new information but could be more informative if it summarized a wider set of interest rate scenarios.Government-sponsored enterprises ; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ; Federal National Mortgage Association ; Federal home loan banks
Financing housing through government-sponsored enterprises
Three government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)-Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System-were created to improve the availability of home mortgage financing by supplementing local funding. But today's more evolved financial markets enable retail lenders to tap national markets. Thus, the main contribution of the three housing GSEs has become providing homebuyers an interest rate subsidy that is made possible by the GSEs' special relationship with the federal government. ; This article examines the economic issues arising from the provision of such subsidies via the housing GSEs. The authors first review the benefits and costs of subsidizing housing finance and then provide background information about the housing GSEs and their relationship to the federal government. The GSEs' importance to the financial markets, coupled with their special relationship with the government, raises concerns about the potential for moral hazard and the problems that would arise if a housing GSE became financially distressed or insolvent. ; The discussion then focuses on two public policy debates that have been sparked by this special relationship. The first is whether the housing GSEs are efficient mechanisms for subsidizing housing. The second relates to the housing GSEs' safety and soundness and questions whether implicit guarantees of their liabilities are the best way to subsidize them.Government-sponsored enterprises ; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ; Federal National Mortgage Association ; Federal home loan banks
Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors' prompt corrective action: Is there a case for a banking standard in the European Union?
Over the past years, several countries around the world have adopted a system of prudential prompt corrective action (PCA). The European Union countries are being encouraged to adopt PCA by policy analysts who explicitly call for its adoption. To date, most of the discussion on PCA has focused on its overall merits. This paper focuses on the preconditions needed for the adoption of an effective PCA. These preconditions include conceptual elements such as a prudential supervisory focus on minimizing deposit insurance losses and mandating supervisory action as capital declines. These preconditions also include institutional aspects such as greater supervisory independence and authority, more effective resolution mechanisms, and better methods of measuring capital.
Subordinated debt and prompt corrective regulatory action
Several recent studies have recommended greater reliance on subordinated debt as a tool to discipline bank risk taking. Some of these proposals recommend using subordinated debt yield spreads as additional triggers for supervisory discipline under prompt corrective action (PCA), action that is currently prompted by capital adequacy measures. This paper provides a theoretical model describing how use of a second market-measure of bank risk, in addition to the supervisors’ own internalized information, could improve bank discipline. The authors then empirically evaluate the implications of the model. The evidence suggests that subordinated debt spreads dominate the current capital measures used to trigger PCA and consideration should be given to using spreads to complement supervisory discipline. The evidence also suggests that spreads over corporate bonds may be preferred to using spreads over U.S. Treasuries.Bank supervision ; Debt
Debt, hedging, and human capital
This paper provides a theory of debt and hedging based on human capital. We distinguish human capital from physical capital in two ways: (1) human capital is inalienable and can exercise a one-sided option to leave the firm, and (2) human capital is not perfectly replaceable. We show that a firm may reach the first best solution while issuing debt or equity to outsiders provided that either the insiders receive a senior claim or that the firm hedges. We then show that, given asymmetric information concerning costs, the only viable solution has the firm issuing debt to outsiders and hedging.
Subordinated debt and prompt corrective regulatory action
Several recent studies have recommended greater reliance on subordinated debt as a tool to discipline bank risk taking. Some of these proposals recommend using subordinated debt yield spreads as additional triggers for supervisory discipline under prompt corrective action (PCA); action that is currently prompted by capital adequacy measures. This paper provides a theoretical model describing how use of a second market-measure of bank risk, in addition to the supervisors own internalized information, could improve bank discipline. We then empirically evaluate the implications of the model. The evidence suggests that subordinated debt spreads dominate the current capital measures used to trigger PCA and consideration should be given to using spreads to complement supervisory discipline. The evidence also suggests that spreads over corporate bonds may be preferred to using spreads over U.S. Treasuries. *The authors wish to thank Mark Flannery, Xavier Freixas, Ben Gup, Alan Hess, George Kaufman, Joe Haubrich, William Perraudin and Mark Vaughan for constructive comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The authors also acknowledge the support of Nancy Andrews, Mark Murawski and George Simler in developing the database used in the study, and Andy Meyer, Alton Gilbert, and Mark Vaughan for graciously providing detailed information about their 'early warning model. The opinions expressed, however, are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the people mentioned above, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.Debt ; Bank supervision
Subordinated debt as bank capital: a proposal for regulatory reform
Industry observes have proposed increasing the role of subordinated debt in bank capital requirements as a means to increase market discipline. A recent Federal Reserve System Task Force evaluated the characteristics of such proposals. Here, the authors take the next step and offer a specific sub-debt proposal. They describe how it would operate and what changes it would require in the regulatory framework.Bank capital ; Debt ; Bank supervision
The major supervisory initiatives post-FDICIA: Are they based on the goals of PCA? Should they be?
The prompt corrective action provisions in FDICIA 1991 provide the supervisors with an unambiguous goal: "to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions at the least possible long-term cost to the deposit insurance fund." Yet performance of the regulators in achieving this goal has been lacking in that substantial losses continue to be imposed on the insurance funds when banks fail. Is PCA misguided, or are there incentive defects in the law and how the requirements are being administered? This paper analyzes these issues in the context of recent proposals to reform the deposit insurance system.Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ; Financial institutions ; Deposit insurance ; Bank supervision
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