Asset Prices in a Flexible Inflation Targeting Framework

We argue that there are sound theoretical reasons for believing that an inflation targeting central bank might improve macroeconomic performance by reacting to asset price misalignments over and above the deviation of, say, a two-year ahead inflation forecast from target. In this paper, we first summarize the arguments for our basic proposition. We then discuss some of the counter-arguments. Specifically, we counter those who argue that reacting to asset prices does not improve macroeconomic performance by claiming that they are attacking the 'straw man' under which central bankers react in the same way to all asset price changes. We continue to emphasize that policy reactions to asset price misalignments must be qualitatively different from reactions to asset prices changes driven by fundamentals. Hence, we stand by our earlier results and conclusions. In practice, we do believe that central bankers can detect large misalignments (e.g. the Nikkei in 1989 or the NASDAQ in early 2000), and that they might be in a better position to react to long-lived bubbles than many market participants. However, we recognize that our proposal may present communication challenges, and it is critically important that policy set to react to asset price misalignments both be explained well and that it be based on a broad consensus. It is also important to emphasize that our proposal is wholly consistent with the remit of most inflation-targeting central banks, as we are recommending that while they might react to asset price misalignments, they must not target them.

Transmission of Volatility Between Stock Markets

This paper investigates why, in October 1987, almost all stock markets fell together despite widely differing economic circumstances. The idea is that "contagion" between markets occurs as the result of attempts by rational agents to infer information from price changes in other markets. This provides a channel through which a "mistake" in one market can be transmitted to other markets. Hourly stock price data from New York, Tokyo and London during an eight month period around the crash offer support for the contagion model. In addition, the magnitude of the contagion coefficients are found to increase with volatility.

Volatiltiy and Links Between National Stock Markets

The empirical objective of this study is to account for the time-variation the covariances between markets. Using data on sixteen national stock markets, we estimate a multivariate factor model in which the volatility of returns is induced by changing volatility in the orthogonal factors. Excess returns are assumed to depend both on innovations in observable economic variables and on unobservable factors. The risk premium on an asset is a near combination of the risk premia associated with factors. The main empirical finding is that only a small proportion of the time variation in the covariances between national stock markets can be accounted for by observable economic variables. Changes in correlations markets are given primarily by movements in unobservable variables. We also estimate the risk premia for each country, and are able to identify substantial movements in the required return on equity. Our results also suggest that, although inter-correlations between markets have risen since the 1987 stock market crash this is not necessarily evidence of a trend decrease.

Monetary Policy, Regulation and Volatile Markets

Turmoil in financial markets causes reflection. Is monetary policy conducted in the most efficient way? Are regulatory and supervisory arrangements adequate when market volatility increases and financial institutions come under stress? In the present SUERF Study, we have collected the reflections by an outstanding group of top officials, researchers and observers. The editors are proud to be able to present their joint insights to SUERF readers. The papers were presented at the 27th SUERF Colloquium in Munich in June 2008: New trends in asset management: Exploring the implications.Financial markets, volatility, regulatory and supervisory arrangements, LATW, bubbles, monetary policy, asset prices, interest rate policy, LTCM, Basel II, MiFID, subprime, CDOs

The great stagnation: what can policymakers do?

Although the economic recovery in the UK has been disappointing, it is inappropriate to either assert that Japan’s two lost decades illustrate the ineffectiveness of stimulative monetary policy or that the UK is predestined to perform as badly as Japan. Recall that the UK has, so far, avoided the deflation that held back the Japanese economy. One could, instead, argue that Japan illustrates the pitfalls associated with insufficiently aggressive monetary policy. Hence, it is appropriate to consider how we might make monetary policy more effective in the UK

Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset Price Bubbles? Revisiting the Debate

We argue that central banks can improve macroeconomic performance by reacting to asset price misalignments over and above their reaction to fixed horizon inflation forecasts. This is because such countercyclical monetary policy tends to offset the impact on output and inflation of such bubbles. In addition, if it were know ex ante that monetary policy would LATW in this way, it might reduce the probability of bubbles arising at all.

Profit-Sharing and Meade's Discriminating Labour-Capital Partnerships: A Review Article.

Professor Meade has argued that the discriminating labor-capital pa rtnerships (DLCPs) might not only help cure stagflation, but are to be preferred to Weitzman-type profit-sharing schemes. This paper argu es that: (1) Once we endogenize wages, DLCPs might not affect unemplo yment; (2) the multitier pay structure implied by DLCPs may not be op timal from the perspective of either firms or workers; (3) the effect of DLCPs on productivity is ambiguous; and (4) the case for subsidiz ing DLCPs is far from conclusive, especially given the possibility th at greater decentralization of wage decisions can make an economy mor e prone to stagflation. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.