462 research outputs found

    Social Movements and Nationalism: Comfort Women Movement and Narratives of Nation in Post-Democratization Korea, 1988-2007.

    Get PDF
    Ph.D. Thesis. University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa 2017

    Kostant's problem for Whittaker modules

    Full text link
    We study the classical problem of Kostant for Whittaker modules over Lie algebras and Lie superalgebras. We give a sufficient condition for a positive answer to Kostant's problem for the standard Whittaker modules over reductive Lie algebras. Under the same condition, the positivity of the answer for simple Whittaker modules is reduced to that for simple highest weight modules. We develop several reduction results to reduce the Kostant's problem for standard and simple Whittaker modules over a type I Lie superalgebra to that for the corresponding Whittaker modules over the even part of this Lie superalgebra.Comment: 26 page

    Agency Conflicts, Financial Distress, and Syndicate Structure: Evidence from Japanese Borrowers

    Get PDF
    We examine how borrower firm characteristics affect the size structure in the Japanese syndicated loan market for the 1999-2003 period. Consistent with the view by Lee and Mullineaux (2004), we find that syndicates are smaller when borrowers have higher credit risk, while firms with greater information asymmetry are associated with larger syndicates in Japan. These results are primarily driven by nonkeiretsu (non-business group) firms. This suggests that the role of enhanced monitoring and facilitated renegotiation is especially useful for banks participating in Japanese syndicated loan for non-keiretsu firms. On the other hand, information problems seem to be less severe for keiretsu (business group) firms which tend to have easier access to syndicated loan via the intermediation of in-house banks in the relevant syndicate. Finally, we find that keiretsu (non-keiretsu) firms have less (more) fraction of loan by their agent banks as the maturity rises. It appears that main banks of keiretsu firms with informational advantage are likely to retain less of the loan and form a more dispersed syndicate to "signal' that the loan is of high quality with increased maturity. This further confirms the view that information problems are less severe in the keiretsu firms.
    • 

    corecore