Transnational organised crime in West Africa: more than a problem of terrorism and law enforcement

The crisis in Mali has sharpened European awareness of the dangers posed by transnational organised crime in West Africa. The UN Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) set up in July 2013 will find itself confronted with the issue as well. But the problem of organised crime reaches far beyond the Sahel, and affects many coastal states in West Africa. Nor can it be reduced to the “crime-terror nexus” and the drug trade. Transnational criminal activities in the region are more diverse than that, the challenges more complex: from piracy in the Gulf of Guinea to illegal extraction of natural resources, cybercrime and human trafficking. Europe is directly affected by these developments as a market and target, and, moreover, has a strong interest in West African stability. So there are various reasons for addressing the problem. However, existing efforts by the European Union and other actors to improve law enforcement will fall short if they remain isolated. (author's abstract

Organized crime on the UN Security Council agenda: action against human trafficking reveals opportunities and challenges

On 7 June 2018, for the first time, a Committee of the United Nations Security Council placed individuals on a sanctions list for human trafficking. As part of the Libya sanc­tions regime, travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed on six individuals iden­tified as the main perpetrators of illegal activities relating to human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants. The European Union and the US have already implemented these UN sanctions. This response is an expression of the UN Security Council’s in­creased attention on transnational organized crime (TOC). For years, the number of resolutions relating to TOC, whether linked to drug or arms trafficking, piracy, kid­nappings or illegal trade in natural resources, has increased substantially. And the Security Council has repeatedly dealt with human trafficking in conflict situations since the end of 2015. The relevant decisions show what role the Security Council can play in addressing organized crime, but also where pitfalls lurk. As a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2019/2020, Germany should advocate a systematic advancement of the agenda. (author's abstract

Organized crime and development: challenges and policy options in West Africa's fragile states

The development implications of transnational organized crime (TOC) have attracted growing attention in Germany and at the international level in recent years. Fragile and conflict-affected countries, which are generally regarded as especially vulnerable to TOC and its impacts, are a particular focus of interest. In the development policy debate, it has long been recognized that TOC and criminal violence are among the reasons why most fragile states have not achieved the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For this reason, too, the development community has no option but to deal with the issue of organized crime and the risks that it poses to fragile states. Organized crime is a cross-cutting issue, not merely a security problem. Indeed, the development community is already dealing with TOC or TOC-relevant sectors more often than is generally assumed - whether in bilateral programmes to promote alternative development in drug cultivation areas or when supporting the establishment of sustainable fishing and forestry sectors in partner countries. The analysis of illicit economies in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea shows that the threats posed by TOC change over time and that their impacts vary across sectors. In conditions of fragile statehood, TOC can act as an external stressor, an economy of violence, a form of state capture, and/or a world of existence/survival. The corresponding threats can be systematically analyzed in order to identify entry points and trade-offs in the development community's engagement with TOC. (author's abstract

Fresh impetus for West African drug policy: opportunities for new partnerships in the wake of UNGASS

Almost two decades after the proclamation of the goal of a "drug-free world", the global illicit drug trade is flourishing. The markets and routes, however, are constantly changing, confronting countries and regions with an array of new challenges. West African countries in particular are no longer merely transit zones for cocaine or heroin. Yet they played virtually no role in the preparations for the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) in late April 2016. Nonetheless, the UNGASS process has injected fresh momentum into the drug policy debate within the region. This offers starting points for new partnerships, particularly with Europe, since various West African countries and organizations have moved closer to the EU's comparatively progressive drug policy position. For genuine change, however, there needs to be not only a shift away from the still predominantly repressive approaches applied by national governments in West Africa, but also a rethink of European security sector programmes. (author's abstract

Containing illicit flows at African borders: pitfalls for Europe

The recent rise in migration to Europe has put borders and their security back on the political agenda of the European Union and its member states. Alongside stricter control of the Union’s external borders, border security also plays a growing role in cooperation with third states. The action plan adopted by European and African heads of state and government at the Valletta summit on migration in November 2015 includes assistance for strengthening national capacities at land, air and sea borders. In particular in the immediate southern neighbourhood, this support is intended to contribute to stemming irregular migration and human smuggling. European programmes to combat illicit flows and organised crime at borders outside the EU have existed for some time, for example to interrupt cocaine smuggling via West Africa. The experience to date reveals potential pitfalls of this approach and underlines the necessity to think beyond technical border management. (author's abstract

Implementing and enforcing UN arms embargoes: lessons learned from various conflict contexts

The Berlin Conference on Libya in January 2020 was held to support United Nations (UN) conflict-resolution efforts. The participating states’ commitment to the existing arms embargo garnered particular attention. But hopes of meaningful progress were quickly dashed, with the embargo violated yet again shortly after the conference. Indeed, the implementation and enforcement of UN arms embargoes is fraught with challenges, especially prominently in the case of Libya. But closer examination of existing embargoes in the context of armed conflict also reveals opportunities for mak­ing better use of the measure, which is the most frequently used form of UN sanc­tions. It goes without saying that no arms embargo can save a peace process on its own, however tightly it is monitored. But the instrument can be applied to greater effect as part of an overall package of conflict resolution measures. (author's abstract

From war to illicit economies: organized crime and state-building in Liberia and Sierra Leone

Liberia and Sierra Leone are commonly categorized as fragile and conflict-affected states. They are seen as being particularly vulnerable to organized crime due to deficiencies in their criminal justice systems and having insufficient control of their borders. But they also have emerged from peace processes combining state-building with the transformation of war economies. These were strongly based on the competing control of resources such as diamonds, gold, and timber by armed groups and state agents. A closer look at the illicit economies in both countries today reveals the legacy of these war economies and new dynamics that emerged with West Africa becoming a transit zone for South American cocaine destined for Europe. Although the organization of crime differs between sectors, the way it is tied to state-building and power structures in Liberia and Sierra Leone is quite similar. Surely, porous borders and a lack of regulation and effective law enforcement are real in both countries. But often organized criminal activities are linked to the very state that is supposed to build and defend the (reformed) framework of legality. Furthermore, certain components of illicit economies have important implications for development. Therefore, responses to organized crime need to be carefully crafted and should generally apply selective law enforcement measures combined with broader governance reforms and development-related initiatives addressing livelihood, health, and environmental issues. (Autorenreferat

Foresight: A breath of fresh air on the East River; the expansion of the UN Security Council triggers unexpected reforms

Surprise and jubilation in the United Nation Security Council (UNSC): 2028 begins with a bang. The permanent members of the body declare that they will voluntarily renounce their right of veto in cases of mass atrocities. This self-limitation, achieved after a long struggle, would have been unthinkable without the far-reaching reform of the Security Council that preceded it. The initiative, based on an earlier Franco-Mexican proposal and the Code of Conduct of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT Group), came from the new members of the enlarged UNSC. Since 2027, it has consisted of 27 instead of 15 members. Germany is among the new members. In her first speech after the enlargement, the German Ambassador to the UN noted with a wink that her country had hoped to be represented in 2027/28 even without the reform. After all, Berlin had already announced in 2023 that it would stand for election as a non-permanent member in 2027/28. However, it was not fore­seeable at the time that Germany would now be one of the six new semi-permanent members of the Security Council. (author's abstract

Organised crime in the "2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development": indicators and measurements for international and national implementation

At the end of September 2015, heads of states and governments of the member states of the United Nations (UN) adopted the »2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development«, which contains 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs). In the run-up to the September summit, there were particularly intense debates on the goal addressing peace, justice and governance (SDG 16). The implementation of the targets anchored in SDG 16 are of central significance for the overall success of the agenda. That applies especially to the containment of organised crime (OC). The aspired reduction of illicit financial and arms flows, strengthening of stolen asset recovery and combating all forms of OC, all covered in one target, play an important role in removing obstacles to development. However, such objectives only take full effect when convincing indicators verify their implementation. (Autorenreferat

Illegal fishing and maritime security: towards a land- and sea-based response to threats in West Africa

West African coastal states lose up to $1.5 billion a year as a result of illegal fishing. The effects of overfishing also hit these countries hard. In its Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, the European Union highlights the threats and risks posed to these coastal states, as well as the connections to Europe as an export market for fishery products and home region of many fishing vessels. Until now, maritime security strategies for West Africa have prioritized the issues of human trafficking, smuggling of migrants, and piracy. In future, however, there should be a stronger focus on the threats posed by illegal fishing, especially when providing advice, training and equipment assistance to improve surveillance and monitoring of West African waters. An integrated approach is required, which should also address the onshore problems associated with the fisheries sector. (Autorenreferat