The benefits of introducing a mandatory state hurricane insurance scheme in Florida

As a result of its hurricane exposure, Florida is probably the part of the industrialised world most prone to natural catastrophes. Over the last 20 years the Florida legislator has tried to maintain a situation, where the private insurance sector plays a major role in providing hurricane-insurance. Its attempts to keep such insurance affordable have, however, led to a situation, where the public sector still ends up bearing a large part of the risk. Drawing on the experience of various European countries with mandatory state run catastrophe insurance schemes, we argue that the cost of hurricane insurance for the population could be substantially reduced, if Florida created a similar institution. The massive reduction in sales costs, loss adjustment costs and general administrative costs would allow such a system to work with premiums that are on average 25% lower. The problems of adverse selection which plague the current situation would of course (by definition) be eliminated.hurricane insurance; mandatory insurance; regulation; market failure; Florida

Hurricane Insurance in Florida

This paper studies the evolution of hurricane insurance in Florida over the last decades. Hurricanes (and other natural catastrophes) are typically referred to as "uninsurable" risks. The more exposed property owners find it difficult to obtain insurance cover from the private market and/or can do so only at premiums that substantially exceeds their expected claims costs. The state of Florida has reacted to the incapacity of the private sector to insure hurricane risks at reasonable premium levels with the creation of Citizens (an insurer of last resort) and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. Their existence has resulted in substantial premium reductions for the Florida property owners. Both institutions have the possibility of spreading the costs of a major hurricane over a (very) large number of policy holders through after the event compulsory assessments. The risk borne by each individual property owner is thus reasonably small. The benefits for consumers as a group have thus been substantial. Looking forward the challenge to the policy maker will be to fine-tune the operation (premium structure) of these two institutions so as to increase their political acceptance. To this end it will be necessary to limit the implicit subsidy of the "bad risks" through the "good risks".hurricane; catastrophe insurance; regulation; market failure; Florida

State Intervention on the Market for Natural Damage Insurance in Europe

In this paper we briefly summarise the results of our studies of the property insurance market in 5 countries, Britain, Spain, France, Switzerland and Germany. We then draw conclusions, how the market for insurance against natural disasters (such as floods or subsidence) should be institutionally organised. Both for reasons of efficiency (lower administrative and sales costs) and to reduce the scope of risk selection, public monopolies should play an important role on this market. A further major advantage of the monopoly solution is the fact, that public insurers have a strong incentive to actively participate in prevention.

Hurricane Insurance in Florida

This paper studies the evolution of hurricane insurance in Florida over the last decades. Hurricanes (and other natural catastrophes) are typically referred to as “uninsurable” risks. The more exposed property owners find it difficult to obtain insurance cover from the private market and/or can do so only at premiums that substantially exceed their expected claims costs. The state of Florida has reacted to the incapacity of the private sector to insure hurricane risks at reasonable premium levels with the creation of Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (an insurer of last resort) and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. Their existence has resulted in substantial premium reductions for the Florida property owners. Both institutions have the possibility of spreading the costs of a major hurricane over a (very) large number of policy holders through after the event compulsory assessments. The risk borne by each individual property owner is thus reasonably small, with substantial benefits for consumers as a group. Looking forward the challenge to the policy maker will be to fine-tune the operation (premium structure) of these two institutions so as to increase their political acceptance. To this end it will be necessary to limit the implicit subsidy of the “bad risks” through the “good risks”.Hurricane, Catastrophe Insurance, Regulation, Market Failure, Florida

Disaster Insurance or a Disastrous Insurance - Natural Disaster Insurance in France

We model natural disaster insurance in France. We explicitly take into account the main institutional features of the system, such as the uniform premium rate in both high and low risk regions and the existence of a state reinsurance company. Our model indicates that the institutional set-up is fundamentally flawed. We find that the market is likely to lead to "specialist" equilibria, where insurers specialize in serving either high or low risk regions. As a result the reinsurance company, which offers cover to all insurers at the same price, is likely to suffer from a portfolio with mainly "bad" risks. We show that increasing the premium rate customers have to pay, a policy undertaken by the French authorities, will not necessarily solve these problems and comes at a high cost to the final consumer (and taxpayer).property insurance; reinsurance; risk selection

Risk Selection in Natural Disaster Insurance – the Case of France

It is widely recognized that “market failure” prevents efficient risk sharing in natural disaster insurance. As a consequence, many countries adopted institutional frameworks presenting public sector participation, often praised as public-private partnerships. We define risk selection as a situation where private companies pass insurance of high risk agents on to the public “partner”, arguing that this is a potentially important issue in such situations. In order to illustrate our concerns we look at the case of France. We build a simple model that incorporates the main features of the system, such as the uniform premium rate in both high and low risk regions and the existence of a state reinsurer. We show that in our model, risk selection is likely to be present at equilibrium and discuss the policy options available. When comparing with the actual situation in France we find that the “stylized facts” of the system correspond to our results. Additionally, the policies implemented by the government correspond to policies characterized to reduce the potential of risk selection.risk selection, property insurance, reinsurance, France

Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus

We examine the effect of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on firms' initial selfreporting decision, in one market, by altering their whistle-blowing incentives in another market. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are proactive US strategies which aim at triggering multiple confessions by increasing the incentives of already convicted firms to report in a second market where they collude. Predictably, conditional on the conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms' incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms' incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC Leniency Program. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may induce immediate reporting of both cartels whereas only one of them would have been reported under the EC Leniency Program.Amnesty Plus; Leniency Program; Multimarket Contact; Self-reporting

Disaster Insurance or a Disastrous Insurance – Natural Disaster Insurance in France

We model natural disaster insurance in France. We explicitly take into account the main institutional features of the system, such as the uniform premium rate in both high and low risk regions and the existence of a state reinsurance company. Our model indicates that the institutional set-up is fundamentally flawed. We find that the market is likely to lead to “specialist” equilibria, where insurers specialize in serving either high or low risk regions. As a result the reinsurance company, which offers cover to all insurers at the same price, is likely to suffer from a portfolio with mainly “bad” risks. We show that increasing the premium rate customers have to pay, a policy undertaken by the French authorities, will not necessarily solve these problems and comes at a high cost to the final consumer (and taxpayer).property insurance, reinsurance, risk selection

Assessing the Efficiency of an Insurance Provider - A Measurement Error Approach

The purpose of this paper is to compare the cost efficiency of private and public property insurance providers in Switzerland. The most commonly used measure for this kind of exercise is the Claims / Premium ratio. We argue that this measure may give strongly biased results. We develop a simple model to test whether the elasticity of premiums with respect to claims is less than unity. We address the fact that premium income is relatively stable across time, while claims are not, using estimation techniques that correct for measurement error. We develop tools to cope with heteroskedasticity in such measurement errors and apply the model to a data set on 19 firms in housing insurance markets in Switzerland. We show that the public insurance providers are about 20 per cent more cost efficient than their private counterparts.insurance, public and private, cost efficiency, C/P ratio, measurement error, CALS

Assessing the Efficiency of an Insurance Provider - A Measurement Error Approach

The purpose of this paper is to compare the cost efficiency of private and public property insurance providers in Switzerland. The most commonly used measure for this kind of exercise is the Claims / Premium ratio. We argue that this measure may give strongly biased results. We develop a simple model to test whether the elasticity of premiums with respect to claims is less than unity. We address the fact that premium income is relatively stable across time, while claims are not, using estimation techniques that correct for measurement error. We develop tools to cope with heteroskedasticity in such measurement errors and apply the model to a data set on 19 firms in housing insurance markets in Switzerland. We show that the public insurance providers are about 20 % more cost efficient than their private counterparts.insurance; public and private; cost efficiency; C/P ratio; measurement error; CALS