Die Chancen der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft und die Rolle der Ökonomen

It is first shown that the potential of the market mechanism to solve pressing problems of resource allocation is not being used to its full extent, and three examples from the field of social policy are given. Secondly, it is argued that the public often ignores the advice of economists because they do not have a convincing concept of the term „social” in the Social Market Economy. Existing proposals by economists are examined and found wanting. Finally, it is proposed to equate the term „social” with the goal of equality of opportunity, and again three examples are given in which this goal is insufficiently achieved in Germany. Copyright 2008 der Autor Journal compilation 2008, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Toward a sociology of reuse: deconstructing the milkbottle

This article investigates the practice of reuse, the relation between individuals and objects, using as a case study the refillable glass milk bottle. Based on interviews with 22 individuals in mainly rural settings, the study aims to understand what the milk bottle means today to the many people who still use it, and what the socioeconomic and other structures are that sustain this kind of product reuse. The discussion exposes the way that reuse is about both consumption and disposal and is maintained by a web of household practices, revealing the milk bottle as both a site of resistance to supermarkets and a site for the construction of collective and individual identities. We also expose the way that the materiality of the bottle enables myth and trust to be articulated. We conclude that this reuse practice is a form of non-market mediated exchange, marking reciprocal relations of care and trust

COMPETITION-ACCELERATING PUBLIC INVESTMENTS *

We investigate the effects of infrastructure investments that reduce transport costs. We use a spatial model of Salop (1979). It is well known that the number of firms is excessive at free-entry equilibrium (excess entry theorem). We find that the optimal investment level exceeds the ex post cost-minimising level because investments accelerate competition and reduce the number of entering firms; resulting in the improvement of welfare. We also show that, in cases where the excess-entry theorem is true, the desirable policy is the one accelerating, rather than restricting, competition. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd/University of Adelaide and Flinders University 2005..

IS THE DEFENCE MARKET CONTESTABLE? THE CASE OF MILITARY AEROSPACE

I demonstrate the existence of two sources of contestability in the military aerospace market, within producing and export countries, through the State's triple role as unique buyer, regulator and seller. For the producing countries, I introduce the new concept, 'sovereignty price'; that is, the profit a State agrees to grant to its defence firms to perpetuate their domestic activities. This subjective, evolutionary concept provides a dynamic character to the theory of contestable markets. Moreover, I show that contestability is more effective than antitrust policies and a solution of the cost disease. Empirical cases are shown to confirm the theoretical analysis.Common Operating System, Contestable markets, Cost disease, Aerospace, Regulation, Sovereignty price,