Why Do Experimental Subjects Choose an Equilibrium which Is Neither Payoff Nor Risk Dominant?

In an experimental 2x2 coordination game with two strict equilibria we observe that, in contrast to equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), only half of the subjects choose the strategy that relates to the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium. We propose modified risk dominance as an explanation for the observed deviations from payoff and risk dominance. Dans un jeu de coordination expérimental avec deux équilibres stricts nous observons que, contrairement à la théorie de sélection des équilibres (Harsanyi et Selten 1988), seulement la moitié des participants choisissent la stratégie reliée à l'équilibre qui est simultanément dominante par rapport au gain et dominante par rapport au risque. Nous proposons d'utiliser la dominance au risque modifiée comme explication des déviations observées par rapport à la dominance au gain et la dominance au risque.Equilibrium selection, modified risk dominance, prominence theory, experimental economics, Sélection des équilibres, dominance par rapport au risque modifiée, théorie de la proéminence des nombres, économie expérimentale

The public loss game: An experimental study of public bads

We analyze cooperative behavior of participants who faced a loss. In particular, we extend the Public Good Game by a fixed loss in the beginning of every period. We show that humans change their behavior compared to corresponding studies with gains only. First, in contrast to literature on gains, we observe significant order effects. When participants first play a treatment with punishment, they cooperate less and face higher punishment costs than when first playing a treatment without punishment. The changes are that drastic that punishment does not pay in the first case, while it does in the later. Second, for participants first playing without punishment the contributions in the very first period of play determine the contributions throughout both treatments of the game, yielding higher contributions in the punishment treatment than when playing with gains. Participants punishing first, show no comparable behavior. --public good,punishment,losses,experiment

Comparison of the Stock Price Clustering of stocks which are traded in the US and Germany—Is XETRA more efficient than the NYSE?

We analyze intraday trades of German stocks (Daimler Chrysler and SAP) that are traded simultaneously at the German stock market XETRA and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). At first glance, the stock price clustering seems to be less pronounced at the NYSE. But after converting Euro-prices into Dollar-prices, we obtain the result that the clustering is stronger at the NYSE indicating that XETRA is more efficient with respect to this measure. This difference in the clustering at the different stock markets should not be observable if the no-arbitrage condition would hold. We also discuss several explanations, like ease of negotiation, convenience and rounding, attraction, odd pricing, and aspiration level for stock price clustering. As a result we see that no model is able to capture all of our empirical observations.behavioral finance; market microstructure; stock price clustering

Attraction to Chance in Germany and Australia. An experimental study of cultural differences

This paper explores cultural differences in risky choices between Australian and German students. The focus is not on risk itself, but on tension which is a positive attribute of risky choices. Furthermore, the effects of real versus hypothetical payoffs are analysed. The experiment of this paper shows that in a given set of tension creating choices, Australians do choose tension more often than Germans, while Germans prefer higher tension. Additionally it is shown that real payoffs do make a difference in the data, but the real payoff even increases the effect.

A Stochastic Model of the Co-evolution of Networks and Strategies

We consider a theoretical model of co-evolution of networks and strategies whose components are exclusively supported by experimental observations. We can show that a particular kind of sophisticated behavior (anticipatory better reply) will result in stable population states which are most frequently visited in co-evolution experiments.evolution, network, strategy, experiment

The Relevance of Irrelevant Alternatives: An experimental investigation of risky choices

Experimental economists have discovered various violations of expected utility theory and offered alternative models that can explain laboratory results. This study discovers a new violation in risky choices that cannot be explained by theories like Prospect Theory, Disappoint- ment or Regret Theory. In an experimental setting using a between- subject design, the influence of a dominated alternative on certainty equivalents is shown. One group of subjects was offered a series of choices between a lottery ticket with a 50-50 chance of winning and a sure payoff. A second group was offered the same choice plus a third alternative, that as it turned out was not chosen by any participant. As a result, the average chosen sure payoff in the second group was higher than in the first group. That means, by adding a dominated alternative to a choice set, the certainty equivalent of a lottery is in- creased.

Loss Aversion for time: An experimental investigation of time preferences

This paper investigates decisions about inter-temporal tradeoffs. The objective of the study is to explore the valuation of time itself without tradeoffs between time and consequences. In an experimental study subjects made decisions about waiting time, where the time was subject to risk. We find that subjects are risk-seeking for decisions about time, which leads to the conclusion that waiting time is experienced as a loss. Subjects in this experiment show similar choice patters as can be seen in studies about money when losses are involved.

The St. Petersburg Paradox despite risk-seeking preferences: An experimental study

The St. Petersburg is one of the oldest violations of expected utility theory. Thus far, explanations of the paradox aim at small probabili- ties being perceived as zero and the boundedness of utility. This paper provides experimental results showing that neither risk attitudes nor perception of small probabilities explain the paradox. We nd that even in situations where subjects are risk-seeking, the St. Petersburg Paradox exists. This indicates that the paradox lies at the very core of human decision-making processes and cannot be explained by the parameters discussed in previous research so far.

Do Equity Preferences Matter in Climate Negotiations? An Experimental Investigation

This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this purposes we conducted a simple experiment with people who have been involved in international climate policy. The experiment, which was run via the Internet, consisted of two simple non-strategic games suited to measure the parameters of inequity aversion in a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function. We find that our participants show aversion against advantageous as well as disadvantageous inequity to a considerable amount. Moreover, the degree of inequity aversion is higher compared to that of students in the similar study of Dannenberg et al. (2007). Regarding the geographical variety in our sample, we cannot confirm significant differences in the degree of inequity aversion between different regions in the world, which is in line with previous findings from the experimental literature. This finding lends support to the hypothesis that equity preferences are "hard-wired" and not much influenced by socio-economic or cultural circumstances. --individual preferences,inequity aversion,climate policy,experimental economics,public goods

Fact or Artifact Does the compromise effect occur when subjects face real consequences of their choices?

This study investigates context effects in general and the compromise effect in particular. It is argued that earlier research in this area lacks realism which is a major drawback to research conclusions and stated management implications. The importance of this issue is stressed by previous research showing that behavioral anomalies found in hypothetical experimental settings tend to be significantly reduced when real payoff mechanisms are introduced. Therefore, to validate the compromise effect, an enhanced experimental design is presented with participants making choices in the laboratory that are binding. We find that the compromise effect holds for real purchase decisions, and therefore is validated and not an artificial effect in surveys on hypothetical buying decisions. While conclusions and implications for marketing managers derived in previous work assume that context effects hold for real market decisions, the results created by this enhanced design close this gap in marketing literature.choice in context, compromise effect, irrelevant alternatives, hypothetical bias, experimental design