Q^2-evolution of spin-dependent parton densities

We discuss the NLO evolution of quark transversity densities and of the parton distribution function for linearly polarized gluons in a linearly polarized hadron. A supersymmetric relation between the NLO evolution kernels for transversity and for linear polarization is found. We also study the implications of NLO evolution for Soffer's inequality and the prospects of measuring transversity densities in polarized Drell-Yan at RHIC.Comment: 12 Pages, LaTeX, 4 figures as eps files, Invited talk presented at the `Cracow Epiphany Conference on Spin Effects in Particle Physics and Tempus Workshop', Jan. 9--11, 1998, Cracow, Polan

Prompt Photon Production in Polarized Hadron Collisions

We consider spin asymmetries for prompt photon production in collisions of longitudinally polarized hadrons. This reaction will be a key tool at the BNL-RHIC pp collider for determining the gluon spin density in a polarized proton. We study the effects of QCD corrections, such as all-order soft-gluon `threshold' resummations.Comment: Contribution to the proceedings of the ``8th International Workshop on Deep-Inelastic Scattering'' (DIS2000), April 2000, Liverpool, UK; 3 Pages, LaTeX, two figures as eps file

Optimal Price Regulation for Natural and Legal Monopolies

Optimal price regulation for natural and legal monopolies is an impossible task. The still difficult .task of good price regulation can be systematized by considering separately price level and price structure of the regulated firm. Various methods of price level and price structure regulation are evaluated and then considered for the regulation of electricity transmission, both in the context of an independent transmission company and of vertical integration between transmission and most of the generation capacity. The regulatory approach suggested uses price caps defined on two-part tariffs. This way, flexibility for short-term capacity utilization can be combined with incentives for investments in new transmission capacity.

Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation

Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a “used and useful” criterion.