Contractual savings and emerging securities markets

Contractual savings institutions - pension funds and life insurance companies - have long been important institutions in several developing countries. But, with notable exceptions, they have been weak and underdeveloped. Some of this is attributable to low levels of income in developing countries and some of it to the negative impact of repressive regulations and the existence of pay-as-you-go social security systems. The author briefly reviews the size of contractual savings institutions in selected developed and developing countries and assesses their role in the development of the financial sector - especially in the development of securities markets. He stresses five points : 1) the structure of a country's financial system depends on the organization of the country's pension system; 2) contractual savings do not increase the rate of saving but shift the composition of total savings toward long-term financial assets; 3) the role of contractual savings institutions in securities markets reflects historical traditions and differences in regulation; 4) investment regulations mustaim at ensuring the safety and profitability of contractual savings; encouraging investment prudence and developing effective supervision should be basic objectives of public policy; and 5) contractual savings institutions can have a great impact on securities markets.Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Insurance Law,Contractual Savings,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation

The role of non-bank financial intermediaries (with particular reference to Egypt)

Non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) comprise a mixed bag of institutions, ranging from leasing, factoring, and venture capital companies to various types of contractual savings and institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds). The common characteristic of these institutions is that they mobilize savings and facilitate the financing of different activities, but they do not accept deposits from the public. NBFIs play an important dual role in the financial system. They complement the role of commercial banks by filling gaps in their range of services. But they alsocompete with commercial banks and force them to be more efficient and responsive to the needs of their customers. Most NBFIs are also actively involved in the securities markets and in the mobilization and allocation of long-term financial resources. The state of development of NBFIs is usually a good indicator of the state of development of the financial system. The author focuses on contractual savings institutions, namely pension funds and life insurance companies, that are by far the most important NBFIs. He also offers a brief review of the role and growth of other NBFIs, such as leasing and factoring companies, as well as venture capital companies and mutual funds. The author covers developments in selected countries in different regions of the world. He also examines the recent growth of NBFIs, especially contractual savings institutions and securities markets, in Egypt. He discusses the necessary regulatory and other policy reforms for promoting NBFIs--in particular, the openness to international markets and foreign presence that is essential for the transfer of skills and technologies.Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Contractual Savings,Non Bank Financial Institutions

The role of occupational pension funds in Mauritius

Mauritius belongs to a select group of developing countries where contractual savings-savings with insurance companies and pension funds-exceed 40 percent of GDP and represent a major potential force in the local financial system. Pension funds account for 75 percent of contractual savings. Contractual savings institutions invest in government securities, housing loans, corporate securities, real estate and bank deposits. They currently hold 35 percent of government securities and also account for 36 percent of total outstanding housing loans.Given their strong demand for long-duration assets, they can stimulate the issue of long-term government bonds (both inflation-linked and zero-coupon) and the development of corporate debentures, mortgage bonds, and mortgage-backed securities.Mauritius has a balanced and well-managed multipillar pension system. In addition to several public components, such as the Basic Retirement Pension, the National Pensions Fund (NPF), the National Savings Fund, and the Civil Service Pension Scheme, there are over 1,000 funded occupational pension schemes that play an increasingly important part in the whole system. The funded schemes are divided into two main groups-those insured and/or administered by insurance companies, and those that are self-administered and are registered with the Registrar of Associations. Coverage of the funded schemes is estimated at about 10 percent of the labor force. Together with the unfunded civil service scheme, occupational pension schemes cover about 100,000 employees or 20 percent of the labor force. All types of pension funds, including the public ones, report low operating costs. This reflects the absence of marketing and selling costs and, in the case of large private pension funds, the assumption of some costs by sponsoring employers. The investment performance of the self-administered funds was less than fully satisfactory in the late 1990s, reflecting poor returns on the local and foreign equity markets. Funds insured or administered by insurance companies as well the NPF performed better during this period because of their heavier allocations in government securities and housing loans. However, over a longer period, the private pension funds probably outperformed the NPF. The regulatory framework, though fragmented, is not unreasonable. It has many important provisions, such as observance of internationally acceptable accounting and actuarial standards and minimum vesting and portability rules, and it does not impose prescribed limits on investments. However, consolidation and modernization of the regulatory framework is required, while supervision, which is currently nonexistent, needs to be developed and to be proactive.Insurance Law,Non Bank Financial Institutions,Pensions&Retirement Systems,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Non Bank Financial Institutions,Pensions&Retirement Systems,Insurance Law,Banks&Banking Reform,Contractual Savings

Swiss Chilanpore : the way forward for pension reform?

Many countries are considering far-reaching pension reform. This is happening in response to growing demographic pressures in some countries (especially in Western and Eastern Europe), to unsustainably generous benefits in others (especially in Latin America), or to failure to ensure the profitable investment of accumulated funds (as seems to be true with national provident funds in African countries). Given the worldwide interest in reform, one could ask: Is there a blueprint for pension reform? Can lessons learned in different countries be combined in a best-practice structure usable in different countries'pension systems? The author reviews the experience of Switzerland, Chile and Singapore, countries with relatively successful economies and pension systems. He suggests a multipillar pension system - which he dubs Swiss Chilanpore - that would blend the hard-headed softness of the Swiss, the expensive yields of the Chilean scheme, and the ruthless efficiency of Singapore. He emphasizes that: there is no perfect pension system - all systems suffer from the problems of moral hazard, adverse selection agency costs, and free riders; and all well-functioning pension systems require good government and good management. All pension systems have to cope with the problems of long-term uncertainty. For these reasons, the author favors a multipillar approach that diversifies across different providers. Swiss Chilanpore would have two compulsory and two voluntary pillars: a first pillar (drawn from the Swiss model) consisting of two parts, a flat-rate pension proportional to the length of a person's career and an earnings-related pension based on annual actualized lifetime earnings; a second pillar consisting of a central agency, which could be public or private, for record-keeping and other centralized functions, and private fund management companies for investing funds, the point being to keep operating costs down and achieve high investment returns; and third and fourth pillars based on occupational pension schemes and personal savings. The proposed structure would aim to combine the strengths and avoid the weaknesses of the three countries'systems, but the author cautions that no reform proposal would apply equally well in all countries, regardless of local circumstances and conditions.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Information Technology,Pensions&Retirement Systems

Policies to promote saving for retirement : a synthetic overview

The author argues that public and private pillars are essential for a well-functioning pension system. Public pillars, funded or unfounded, offer basic benefits that are independent of the performance of financial markets. Since financial markets suffer from prolonged, persistent, and large deviations from long-term trends, they cannot be relied on as the sole provider of pension benefits. Funded pillars provide benefits that are based on long-term capital accumulation and financial market performance. But they need to be privately managed to minimize dependence on public sector institutions and avoid government dominance of the economy and financial markets. The author focuses mainly on the promotion, structure, and regulation of funded pillars. He discusses the case for using compulsion and tax incentives, for exempting some categories of workers such as the very young (under 25), the very old (over the normal retirement age), the very poor (those earning less than 40 percent of the average wage), and the self-employed, and for offering a credit transfer to be added to individual capitalization accounts to encourage participation by lower-income groups. A robust regulatory framework with a panoply of prudential and protective rules covering"fit and proper"tests, asset diversification and market valuation rules, legal segregation of assets and safe external custody, independent financial audits and actuarial reviews, and adequate disclosure and transparency would be essential. An effective, proactive, well-funded, and properly staffed supervision agency would be necessary. Tight investment rules could initially be justified for countries with weak capital markets and limited tradition of private pension provision. But in the long run, adoption of the"prudent expert"approach with publication of"statements of investment policy objectives"(SIPOs) would be preferable and more efficient. Various guarantees covering aspects such as minimum pension levels and relative investment returns need to be provided to protect workers from aberrant asset managers and insolvency of annuity providers, but care must be taken to address effectively the risk of moral hazard. The author also argues for greater individual choice, including the creation of a dual regulatory structure. One part would involve heavy regulation with constrained choice of investment funds, limits on operating fees and on account switching, and strong government safeguards and guarantees. This would cater to those workers with low risk tolerance. The other part would be more liberal but based on strong conduct rules. It would offer greater choice of investment funds, allowing multiple accounts andliberal account switching, impose no limits on operating fees, and providing no or fewer state guarantees. This would cater to workers seeking a higher return and who are willing to tolerate a higher level of risk.International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Pensions&Retirement Systems,Public Health Promotion,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Health Economics&Finance,Pensions&Retirement Systems

Private pension funds in Argentina's newintegrated pension system

Argentina implemented a major reform of its pension system in 1994. The new system has a mixed public-and-private two-pillar structure. Its main elements are an unfunded, defined benefit pillar operated by the state and paying a basic pension to all workers who meet the minimum eligibility period, and a fully funded defined-contribution individual capitalization pillar managed by specially authorized companies (AFJPs). The second pillar also has a public defined-benefit component, which is operated on an unfunded basis. The new system replaced the old public pay-as-you-go pension system, which was facing immense financial pressures. The author assesses the performance of the funded component of the second pillar. He finds that: 1) The private pillar had attracted (by June, 1996) 67 percent of all workers participating in the new integrated system. It also represents 60 percent of those who are active contributors. It has attracted many younger workers and has begun to mobilize a large, fast, growing pool of long-term financial resources. 2) The AFJPs have earned very high real investment returns, offset by very high operating costs. Individual affiliates have so far earned negative real returns because of high commission charges. But in the long run, net returns are likely to be positive as assets accumulate and operating costs are better controlled. 3) Effective coverage is quite low. Affiliates represent fewer than 60 percent of eligible workers and only about 40 percent of the labor force. Fewer than 30 percent of eligible workers and only about 20 percent of the labor force actively contribute. 4) Because the new system is young, the number of beneficiaries is small, mostly recipients of survivorship and disability pensions. 5) Market concentration is high, although lower than in Chile. The top three companies account for 47 percent of affiliates and assets; the top six account for 78 percent. 6) In March, 1997, asset allocation was 51 percent government bonds, 23 percent corporate inquiries and mutual fund shares, 17 percent bank deposits, and 7 percent corporate bonds. Equity holdings share has been rising, mainly at the expense of bank deposits. 7) Real rates of return average over 15 percent a year, although high commission charges substantially reduce the net real returns to individual workers. But costs are coming down sharply as a percentage of average assets. Net real returns for a worker's full career are expected to be highly positive so long as gross investment returns remain strong. The AFJP system faces three main challenges: how to contain operating and marketing costs; how to increase effective coverage; and how to relax the draconian regulations while maintaining a stable, transparent, and safe system.Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Pensions&Retirement Systems,Information Technology,Public Health Promotion,Pensions&Retirement Systems,Information Technology,Banks&Banking Reform,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Environmental Economics&Policies

The insurance industry in Mauritius

The insurance industry is relatively well developed. It makes extensive use of reinsurance facilities and is free from the pervasive premium, product, investment, and reinsurance controls that have bedeviled the insurance markets of so many developing countries around the world. Total premiums amounted in 2001 to 4.1 percent of GDP, while insurance company assets were equivalent to 18 percent of GDP. Life insurance, which has been favored by generous tax incentives and has also benefited from the growth of pension business and housing finance, represents 61 percent of total premiums. Nonlife business is also well organized. Large industrial and commercial risks are reinsured with top international companies, while motor insurance, which is the largest class of business with 45 percent of total nonlife premiums, does not suffer from high loss ratios or unduly long delays in settlement. Investment limits are generally sound and, with some small but important exceptions, effectively nonbinding. There is no minimum requirement for investment in government securities. Investment in overseas assets is limited to 25 percent of total assets, except for foreign life companies and general insurance business which are not allowed to invest in overseas assets. The insurance sector is highly concentrated. The three largest groups have 76 percent of total assets. Despite the high level of concentration, the insurance industry appears to be competitive, operating with high efficiency and re Despite the high level of concentration, the insurance industry appears to be competitive, operating with high efficiency and reasonable profitability. Large and medium-size companies have strong reserves, appropriate reinsurance arrangements, and good profitability. However, several of the smaller companies have weak financial ratios and suffer from long delays in settling claims. Insurance regulation and supervision is entrusted to the Financial Services Commission (FSC). The current regulatory framework has many strong elements, including reliance on solvency monitoring, prudent asset diversification, international accounting standards, and actuarial methods. But there are some important gaps in corporate governance, internal controls, and risk management. In addition, solvency ratios are below international standards and do not include modern risk-based capital requirements. These gaps are already being addressed in two new draft insurance bills which contain many highly modern provisions. Implementing regulations on solvency and actuarial standards need to be developed. Insurance supervision has been invigorated since the creation of the FSC, but further strengthening is required. It needs to emphasize risk management and internal controls, to develop an early warning system, and to establish clear procedures for early and effective intervention. The FSC should require actuaries to report on the reinvestment risk faced by insurance companies and their exposure to a large and persistent fall in interest rates.Non Bank Financial Institutions,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Insurance Law,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Banks&Banking Reform,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Non Bank Financial Institutions,Insurance Law,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies

The use of"asset swaps"by institutional investors in South Africa

Leading financial economists have proposed the use of international asset swaps (Merton 1990, Bodie and Merton 2002) as a way of efficiently achieving international diversification without eroding the level of foreign exchange reserves and weakening local market development. International asset swaps entail limited foreign currency flows (only net gains or losses need to be exchanged). They protect foreign investors from market manipulation and expropriation risk and have much lower transaction costs than outright investments. But asset swaps are constrained by the attractiveness of local markets to foreign investors, and by various regulatory issues covering counterparty risk and collateral considerations, and accounting, valuation, and reporting rules. Institutional investors are well developed in South Africa. Their total assets corresponded in 2001 to 159 percent of GDP, a level that was surpassed by only four high-income countries. But because of the imposition of exchange controls, they lacked international diversification. In July 1995 South Africa was the first developing country that explicitly allowed its pension funds and other institutional investors to make use of"asset swaps."But the South African authorities did not authorize the use of properly specified swap contracts as described by Bodie and Merton, but rather permitted institutional investorsto"obtain foreign investments by way of swap arrangements."As the author argues in this paper, the asset swap mechanism turned out to be cumbersome and inefficient. However, it did allow institutional investors to attain some level of international diversification. Other developing countries should consider authorizing their institutional investors to engage in international asset swaps. But they should authorize the use of properly designed swap contracts, preferably based on baskets of liquid securities, permit only global investment banks to act as counterparties, require the use of global custodians, properly monitor credit risk, maintain adequate collateral, and adopt market-to-market valuation rules. Asset swaps are clearly a second-best option compared to the lifting of exchange controls. However, they may facilitate risk diversification in the presence of such controls. And they may even have a role to play in their absence.Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Settlement of Investment Disputes,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Fiscal&Monetary Policy,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research,Settlement of Investment Disputes,Insurance Law,Non Bank Financial Institutions

Pension reform and capital market development -"feasibility"and"impact"preconditions

The link between pension reform, and capital market development, has become a perennial question, raised every time the potential benefits, and pre-conditions of pension reform are discussed. The author asks two questions. First, what are the basic"feasibility"pre-conditions for the successful launch of a pension reform program? And second, what are the necessary"impact"pre-conditions for the realization of the potential benefits of funded pension plans for capital market development? His main conclusion is that the feasibility pre-conditions, are not as demanding as is sometimes assumed. In contrast, the impact pre-conditions are more onerous. The most import feasibility pre-condition is a strong, and lasting commitment of the authorities to maintaining macroeconomic, and financial stability, fostering a small core of solvent, and efficient banks, and insurance companies, and creating an effective regulatory, and supervisory agency. Opening the domestic banking, and insurance markets to foreign participation, can easily fulfill the second requirement. The main impact pre-conditions include the attainment of critical mass; the adoption of conducive regulations, especially on pension fund investments; the pursuit of optimizing policies by the pension funds; and, a prevalence of pluralistic structures. The author argues that pension funds are neither necessary, nor sufficient for capital market development. Other forces, such as advances in technology, deregulation, privatization, foreign direct investment, and especially regional, and global economic integration, may be equally important. But pension funds are critical players in"symbiotic"finance, the simultaneous and mutually reinforcing presence of many important elements of modern financial systems. They can support the development of factoring, leasing, and venture capital companies, all of which specialize in financing new, and expanding small firms.Infrastructure Finance,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Pensions&Retirement Systems,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Non Bank Financial Institutions,Pensions&Retirement Systems,Economic Theory&Research,Infrastructure Finance,Infrastructure Finance,Non Bank Financial Institutions

Institutional investors and securities markets : which comes first?

Institutional investors comprise pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds. Should a country promote their creation if it lacks well-developed securities markets? The answer to this question, says the author, varies by type of investor. He argues that private pension funds and insurance companies are promoted for their own sake and for their potential economic, fiscal, and financial benefits, whether or not a country already has well-developed securities markets. Mutual funds, by contrast, are unlikely to thrive without strong and well-regulated securities markets. A limited supply of financial instruments should not be a major obstacle to the creation of pension funds and insurance companies. Such institutions build up their financial resources gradually but steadily, giving reforming governments ample time to develop securities markets. More important than the prior development of securities markets is a strong and lasting political commitment to holistic reform: macroeconomic, fiscal, banking, and capital market reform, as well as pension and insurance reform. Institutional investors need to attain critical mass and to be supported by conducive regulations. The author reviews Anglo-American experience since the 1940s. This shows that institutional investors can serve as a countervailing force to commercial and investment banks, helping to stimulate financial innovation, modernize capital markets, enhance transparency and disclosure, strengthen corporate governance, and improve financial regulation.Financial Intermediation,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Infrastructure Finance,Non Bank Financial Institutions,Financial Intermediation,Infrastructure Finance,Infrastructure Finance,Non Bank Financial Institutions,Insurance&Risk Mitigation