Automobile Seatbelt Usage and the Value of Statistical Life

article published in economic journalThis article uses several within-sample tests to assess whether current seatbelt usage decisions are consistent with the stated preferences of survey respondents. The expressed survey values of statistical life are positively associated with the probability of seatbelt usage and are not statistically different from the values of statistical life implied by seatbelt usage decisions, which are in the $1.9 million to$8.4 million range. Seatbelt usage also varies in the expected manner with individual measures of heterogeneous attitudes toward risk, such as smoking status and education. Our evidence on seatbelt usage supports the view that consumers consistently balance expected safety benefits against the time and discomfort costs of seatbelt use

Willingness to Accept Equals Willingness to Pay for Labor Market Estimates of the Value of Statistical Life

Our research clarifies the conceptual linkages among willingness to pay for additional safety, willingness to accept less safety, and the value of statistical life (VSL). We present econometric estimates that in the important case of workers' decisions concerning exposure to fatal injury risk there is no statistically significant divergence between willingness to accept and willingness to pay. Our focal result contrasts with the literature documenting a considerable asymmetry in tradeoff rates for increases and decreases in risk. An important implication for policy is that it is reasonable to use labor market estimates of VSL as a measure of the willingness to pay for additional safety

Do Less-Violent Technologies Result in Less Violence? A Theoretical Investigation Applied to the Use of Tasers by Law Enforcement

The use of a taser by law enforcement can substitute for either a gun (a more-violent technology) or a mildly-violent technology (such as pepper spray or hands-on tactics). Which is used affects both the severity of harm when used and the amount of resistance, which affects how often it must be used. Thus, does the adoption of a less-violent technology lead to more or less violence? This question is addressed in an application to the adoption of tasers by law enforcement officials. A game-theoretic model is developed and environments where resistance to arrest and expected harm both increase and decrease are identified

The value of health

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>A major problem in cost-effectiveness studies is where to draw the line between interventions which are cost-effective and those who are not. Lacking a notion about the value of a QALY, all ultimate values to the cost-effectiveness ratio are essentially arbitrary.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>This paper presents a simple empirical model to estimate the compensating income variation of diseases and health problems. The model is estimated using data for the Netherlands.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>The compensating income variation is between €20,000 and €90,000. This is higher than most of the ultimate values used by policy-makers to decide whether an intervention is cost-effective. Our figures are roughly similar to those found in studies about the value of a statistical life year.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Estimates on the compensating income variation of diseases and health problems may provide useful information on the maximum acceptable cost-effectiveness ratio of medical interventions than those currently used by policy makers.</p

Using Job Changes to Evaluate the Bias of the Value of a Statistical Life

This paper presents a new approach to obtain unbiased estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL) with labor market data. Investigating job changes, we combine the advantages of recent panel studies, which allow to control for unobserved heterogeneity of workers, and conventional cross-sectional estimations, which primarily exploit the variation of wage and risk between different jobs. We find a VSL of 6.1 million euros from pooled cross-sectional estimation, 1.9 million euros from the static first-differences panel model and 3.5 million euros from the job-changer specification. Thus, ignoring individual heterogeneity causes overestimates of the VSL, whereas identifying the wage-risk tradeoff not only by means of between job variation (job-changer model) but also on the basis of noisy variation on the job (panel models) may lead to underestimates of the VSL. Our results can be used to perform cost-benefit analyses of public projects aimed at reducing fatality risks, e.g., in the domains of health, environmental or traffic policy