Development that works, March 31, 2011

This repository item contains a single issue of the Pardee Conference Series, On March 31, 2011, more than 100 people participated in a conference titled “Development That Works,” sponsored by Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future in collaboration with the BU Global Development program. In the pages that follow, four essays written by Boston University graduate students capture the salient points and overarching themes from the four sessions, each of which featured presentations by outstanding scholars and practitioners working in the field of development. The conference agenda and speakers’ biographies are included following the essays.The theme and the title of the conference—”Development That Works”—stemmed from the conference organizers’ desire to explore, from a groundlevel perspective, what programs, policies, and practices have been shown—or appear to have the potential—to achieve sustained, long-term advances in development in various parts of the world. The intent was not to simply showcase “success stories,” but rather to explore the larger concepts and opportunities that have resulted in development that is meaningful and sustainable over time. The presentations and discussions focused on critical assessments of why and how some programs take hold, and what can be learned from them. From the influence of global economic structures to innovative private sector programs and the need to evaluate development programs at the “granular” level, the expert panelists provided well-informed and often provocative perspectives on what is and isn’t working in development programs today, and what could work better in the future

The problem of constitutional legitimation: what the debate on electoral quotas tells us about the legitimacy of decision-making rules in constitutional choice

Proponents of electoral quotas have a ‘dependent interpretation’ of democracy, i.e. they have formed an opinion on which decision-making rules are fair on the basis of their prior approval of the outcomes these rules are likely to generate. The article argues that this position causes an irresolvable problem for constitutional processes that seek to legitimately enact institutional change. While constitutional revision governed by formal equality allows the introduction of electoral quotas, this avenue is normatively untenable for proponents of affirmative action if they are consistent with their claim that formal equality reproduces biases and power asymmetries at all levels of decision-making. Their critique raises a fundamental challenge to the constitutional revision rule itself as equally unfair. Without consensus on the decision-making process by which new post-constitutional rules can be legitimately enacted, procedural fairness becomes an issue impossible to resolve at the stage of constitutional choice. This problem of legitimation affects all instances of constitutional choice in which there are opposing views not only about the desired outcome of the process but also about the decision-making rules that govern constitutional choice

Women biology and public policy

272 p.; 21 cm