On boundedness of discrete multilinear singular integral operators

Let $m(\xi,\eta)$ be a measurable locally bounded function defined in $\mathbb R^2$. Let $1\leq p_1,q_1,p_2,q_2<\infty$ such that $p_i=1$ implies $q_i=\infty$. Let also $0<p_3,q_3<\infty$ and $1/p=1/p_1+1/p_2-1/p_3$. We prove the following transference result: the operator {\mathcal C}_m(f,g)(x)=\int_{\bbbr} \int_{\bbbr} \hat f(\xi) \hat g(\eta) m(\xi,\eta) e^{2\pi i x(\xi +\eta)}d\xi d\eta initially defined for integrable functions with compact Fourier support, extends to a bounded bilinear operator from L^{p_1,q_1}(\bbbr)\times L^{p_2,q_2}(\bbbr) into L^{p_3,q_3}(\bbbr) if and only if the family of operators {\mathcal D}_{\widetilde{m}_{t,p}} (a,b)(n) =t^{\frac{1}{p}}\int_{-\12}^{\12}\int_{-\12}^{\12}P(\xi) Q(\eta) m(t\xi,t\eta) e^{2\pi in(\xi +\eta)}d\xi d\eta initially defined for finite sequences a=(a_{k_{1}})_{k_{1}\in \bbbz}, b=(b_{k_{2}})_{k_{2}\in \bbbz}, where P(\xi)=\sum_{k_{1}\in \bbbz}a_{k_{1}}e^{-2\pi i k_{1}\xi} and Q(\eta)=\sum_{k_{2}\in \bbbz}b_{k_{2}}e^{-2\pi i k_{2}\eta}, extend to bounded bilinear operators from l^{p_1,q_1}(\bbbz)\times l^{p_2,q_2}(\bbbz) into l^{p_3,q_3}(\bbbz) with norm bounded by uniform constant for all $t>0

Macroeconomic outcomes and the relative position of Argentina’s economy: 1875-2000

This paper attempts to investigate the main factors behind Argentina’s economic decline comparing its evolution to that of Australia and Canada. With this objective, we have constructed a reduced index of economic freedom which captures and summarises the main political macroeconomic outcomes covering the period 1875-2000, After using co integration and causality techniques, the results obtained show how the macroeconomic policies implemented during this very long period are to explain the relative evolution, in terms of GDP per head, of Argentina’s economy.Convergence, backwardness, economic freedom, cointegration, causality

EXPLAINING MARKET POWER DIFFERENCES IN BANKING: A CROSS-COUNTRY STUDY

This paper presents evidence on the impact of bank-specific, regulatory, institutional, macro and financial development variables on competition in banking, using information at both national and bank level. With this aim, Lerner indices of market power are estimated using a sample of 10,479 annual observations over the period 1995-99 across 58 countries. Results show that although bank-specific characteristics explain a substantial proportion of market power, market structure variables and, above all, the level of financial development also help to explain the differences observed in the levels of banking competition. Regulatory impediments to competition are not significant when controlling for financial development. Este artículo presenta evidencia del impacto que las variables específicas de cada banco, las regulatorias, institucionales, macroeconómicas y de desarrollo financiero ejercen sobre la competencia bancaria, utilizando información tanto a escala nacional como a nivel de empresa. Con este objetivo, se estiman índices de Lerner de poder de mercado utilizando 10.479 observaciones durante el periodo de 1995-99 para una muestra de 58 países. Los resultados muestran que, aunque las características específicas de cada banco explican una parte sustancial del poder de mercado (especialmente el tamaño y la eficiencia), las variables de estructura del mercado, y, sobretodo, el nivel de desarrollo financiero también ayudan a explicar las diferencias observadas en los niveles de competencia bancaria. Las barreras regulatorias a la competencia no son significativas cuando se controla por desarrollo financiero.banking, market power Banca, poder de mercado

The determinants of net interest income in the Mexican banking system: an integrated model

This paper analyzes net interest income in the Mexican banking system over the period 1993-2005. Taking as reference the seminal work by Ho and Saunders (1981) and subsequent extensions by other authors, our study models the net interest margin simultaneously including operating costs and diversification and specialization as determinants of the margin. The results referring to the Mexican case show that its high margins can be explained mainly by average operating costs and by market power. Although non-interest income has increased in recent years, its economic impact is low. El trabajo analiza el margen de intermediación de la banca Mexicana en el periodo 1996-2005. Tomando como referencia el trabajo seminal de Ho and Saunders (1981) y extensiones posteriores de otros autores, nuestro estudio modeliza el margen de intermediación incluyendo simultáneamente los costes operativos y la diversificación y especialización como determinantes del margen. Los resultados referidos al caso mexicano muestran que los altos márgenes vienen explicados principalmente por los costes medios operativos y por el poder de mercado. Si bien los ingresos no financieros han aumentando en los últimos años, su impacto económico es reducido.Banca, Margen financiero, Costes operativos, Poder de Mercado, Ingresos no financieros. banking, net interest income, operating cost, non-interest income

DEREGULATION, LIBERALIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE MEXICAN BANKING SYSTEM: EFFECTS ON COMPETITION

This paper analyses the evolution of competition in the Mexican banking system in the period 1993-2005, a period of deregulation, liberalization and consolidation of the sector. For this purpose we use two indicators of competition from the theory of industrial organization (the Lerner index and the Panzar and Rosse´s H-statistic). The empirical evidence does not permit us to reject the existence of monopolistic competition. The Lerner index shows a decrease in competitive rivalry in the deposit market and an increase in the loan market, a cross subsidization strategy being observed. The results obtained call into question the effectiveness of the measures implemented hitherto, aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the Mexican banking system. Este artículo analiza la evolución de la competencia en el sistema bancario Mexicano en el periodo 1993-2005, periodo de desregulación, liberalización y consolidación del sector. Para ello se utilizan dos medidas de competencia derivadas de la teoría de la Organización Industrial: el índice de Lerner y el estadístico H de Panzar y Rosse. La evidencia empírica no permite rechazar la existencia de competencia monopolística. El índice de Lerner muestra una disminución en la rivalidad competitiva en el mercado de los depósitos y un incremento en el mercado de los préstamos, observándose una estrategia de subsidiación cruzada entre ambos mercados. Los resultados obtenidos cuestionan la efectividad de las medidas hasta ahora implementadas dirigidas a incrementar la competencia en la banca Mexicana.banca, competencia, desregulación banking, competition, deregulation